Malcolm Edward Rabson v Registrar of the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice

Case [2014] NZSC 175


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 104/2014
[2014] NZSC 175
BETWEEN

MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON
Applicant

AND

REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT
First Respondent

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Second Respondent

Court:

William Young, Arnold and O'Regan JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
K Laurenson for Respondents

Judgment:

2 December 2014

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. The applicant and another person were joint plaintiffs in judicial review proceedings.  Dobson J held that these proceedings ought not to have been accepted for filing because of the terms of a vexatious litigant order against the applicant’s co‑plaintiff.[1]  The applicant has subsequently issued replacement proceedings in his sole name and these were accepted for filing.  But, more relevantly, he also filed a notice of appeal against the order made by Dobson J.  The Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal refused to accept this notice on the basis that the applicant is an undischarged bankrupt.  An application by the applicant to review that decision was allowed by French J, who directed that his notice of appeal be accepted for filing as of the date on which it was filed.[2] 

    [1]Siemer v Registrar of the Supreme Court HC Wellington CIV-2014-485-10918, 25 August 2014.

    [2]Rabson v Registrar of the Supreme Court [2014] NZCA 481.

  2. In the course of determining the application, French J:

    (a)saw s 101(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 2006 as applicable to the applicant’s appeal on the basis that his appeal rights if any in relation to the judicial review proceedings were vested in the Official Assignee;[3] but

    (b)thought it arguable that by reason of an alleged waiver by the Official Assignee, the applicant might be entitled to appeal, an issue which she thought should be determined by a panel of three judges.[4]

She concluded by saying that, “The issue as to whether Mr Rabson is in fact entitled to bring the appeal will be dealt with at the substantive hearing”.[5]

[3]At [4].

[4]At [5]–[7].

[5]At [8].

  1. The applicant wishes to challenge in this Court the conclusion of the Judge referred to above in [2](a).  The difficulty, however, is that the actual decision of the Judge (which was to direct that his notice of appeal be accepted for filing) was in his favour.  So he is seeking to challenge not the decision itself, but rather the reasons.  As explained in Independent Fisheries Ltd v Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain challenges of that kind.[6]

  2. There is no hardship for the applicant in this conclusion.  This is because, in addressing the issue identified by French J, the Court of Appeal panel which hears his appeal will have no choice but to grapple with the accuracy or otherwise of her views as to the effect of s 101(1)(b).

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondents


Details
AGLC
Malcolm Edward Rabson v Registrar of the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice [2014] NZSC 175
Case
[2014] NZSC 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Malcolm Edward Rabson v Registrar of the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice involves the applicant, Malcolm Rabson, who sought leave to appeal a decision made by Dobson J regarding the acceptance of certain judicial review proceedings. The dispute escalated to the Supreme Court of New Zealand where Rabson challenged the Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal's decision to refuse his notice of appeal on the basis of his status as an undischarged bankrupt. French J had previously directed that Rabson's notice of appeal be accepted for filing. Rabson now seeks to challenge French J's reasoning that his appeal rights, if any, were vested in the Official Assignee under s 101(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 2006, but he does not challenge the outcome of French J's decision.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Rabson could challenge the reasoning of French J in concluding that s 101(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 2006 applied to his appeal. The Court had to determine whether it had the jurisdiction to review French J's reasons for his decision, which was favourable to Rabson, and not the decision itself. The Court was also required to consider whether there was any arguable waiver by the Official Assignee that would allow Rabson to bring the appeal.

The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review French J's reasons for his decision, as such challenges fall outside the scope of permissible appeals. The Court noted that the issue of whether Rabson was entitled to bring the appeal would necessarily be addressed by the Court of Appeal when it heard the substantive appeal. The Court emphasized that it could not entertain challenges to the reasoning behind a decision that ultimately favoured the applicant. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

In light of the Court's decision, the final orders were that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. This means that the Court of Appeal will now determine the substantive appeal, including the issue of whether Rabson is entitled to bring the appeal based on the Official Assignee's alleged waiver, without the need for further review of French J's reasons by the Supreme Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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