Malcolm Edward Rabson v Justices William Young

Case [2017] NZSC 163


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 93/2017
[2017] NZSC 163
BETWEEN

MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON
Applicant

AND

JUSTICES WILLIAM YOUNG, ARNOLD, GLAZEBROOK, OʼREGAN AND ELLEN FRANCE
Respondents

Court:

Elias CJ, William Young and OʼRegan JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
A F Todd for Respondents

Judgment:

1 November 2017

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for recall of this Court’s judgment in Rabson v Young [2017] NZSC 146 is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. The applicant has applied for a recall of this Court’s judgment in Rabson v Young (the leave judgment).[1]  In the leave judgment, this Court dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to appeal as an abuse of process.  The Court said:[2]

    We are satisfied that the applicant’s conduct constitutes an abuse of process, exemplified by circularity, repetitiveness and general vexatiousness.  It is accordingly struck out.  A copy of this judgment is to be provided to the Solicitor‑General.

  2. The application for recall continues the abuse of process.  It is accordingly dismissed.  A copy of this judgment is to be provided to the Solicitor-General.

  3. We direct the Registrar to reject any further application for recall of the leave judgment.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondents


Details
AGLC
Malcolm Edward Rabson v Justices William Young [2017] NZSC 163
Case
[2017] NZSC 163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand recently dismissed an application for recall of its earlier judgment in the case of Malcolm Edward Rabson versus the Justices William Young. Rabson, acting in person, sought to recall the Court's decision which had dismissed his application for leave to appeal as an abuse of process. The Court, comprising Elias CJ, William Young, and O'Regan JJ, addressed the matter and upheld its initial ruling.

The central issue before the Court was whether the application for recall should be granted or dismissed. The Court had previously determined that Rabson's conduct constituted an abuse of process due to its circularity, repetitiveness, and general vexatiousness. Rabson's application for recall was seen as a continuation of this abusive conduct. The Court held that the application for recall should be dismissed as it perpetuated the abuse of process identified in the original leave judgment.

In dismissing the application for recall, the Court emphasized that the applicant's conduct remained vexatious and repetitive. The Court's decision was clear and final, instructing the Registrar to reject any further applications for recall of the leave judgment. Additionally, the Court directed that a copy of the judgment be provided to the Solicitor-General, reinforcing the seriousness with which it viewed Rabson's actions.

The Court's judgment was unequivocal in its dismissal of the recall application and its direction to the Registrar to reject any further attempts by Rabson to recall the earlier judgment. The case underscores the Court's stance against the abuse of legal processes and its commitment to preventing repetitive and vexatious litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.