Malcolm Edward Rabson v Judicial Conduct Commissioner

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 41/2015
[2015] NZSC 96

BETWEEN

MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON
Applicant

AND

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER
First Respondent

AILSA DUFFY
Second Respondent

Court:	William Young, Arnold and O'Regan JJ
Counsel:	Applicant in person L Theron and C P A Cross for First Respondent
Judgment:	1 July 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
BThe applicant is to pay the first respondent costs of $2,500.

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REASONS

The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of Brown J in the High Court[1] dismissing as an abuse of process judicial review proceedings challenging the conduct of the first respondent in relation to a complaint made by a third party against the second respondent. The third party – a declared vexatious litigant – had previously unsuccessfully sought leave to commence very similar judicial review proceedings.[2] This application was declined on the basis that the proposed proceedings would be an abuse of process.
[1]Rabson v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2015] NZHC 714.
[2]Re Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2014] NZHC 2712.
As well as applying for leave to appeal to this Court, the applicant also appealed to the Court of Appeal. He has, however, been required to pay security for costs. In support of the contention that we should grant leave to appeal direct to this Court, he asserted in his leave application that the “oppressive security for costs regime” will prevent him appealing to the Court of Appeal.[3] We assume therefore that he does not propose to provide security.
[3]The argument that leave should be granted for direct appeal from the High Court because of the requirement to pay security for costs in the Court of Appeal was rejected in Siemer v Brown [2015] NZSC 41 at [4]–[6].
The application does not meet the criteria specified in s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. The proposed appeal does not involve a matter of general or public importance and there is no appearance of a miscarriage of justice. We are not satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for this Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal. As well, there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify an appeal to this Court.

Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Wellington for First Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Malcolm Edward Rabson sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment which dismissed his judicial review proceedings against the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and another respondent. The High Court found that the proposed proceedings would be an abuse of process. Rabson applied for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal, arguing that the oppressive security for costs regime would prevent him from appealing to the Court of Appeal. However, this argument was rejected in a previous Supreme Court case. The Supreme Court found that the proposed appeal did not involve a matter of general or public importance and there was no appearance of a miscarriage of justice. The Court was also not satisfied that it was in the interests of justice for this Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal, nor were there any exceptional circumstances that would justify an appeal to this Court.

The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the application for leave to appeal met the criteria specified in s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. The Court considered whether the proposed appeal involved a matter of general or public importance, whether there was an appearance of a miscarriage of justice, whether it was in the interests of justice for this Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal, and whether there were any exceptional circumstances that would justify an appeal to this Court. The Court found that the application did not meet any of these criteria. The Court was particularly focused on the fact that there was no appearance of a miscarriage of justice or any exceptional circumstances that would justify an appeal to this Court.

The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the application for leave to appeal, holding that the proposed appeal did not meet the criteria specified in s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. The Court found that the proposed appeal did not involve a matter of general or public importance and there was no appearance of a miscarriage of justice. The Court was also not satisfied that it was in the interests of justice for this Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal, nor were there any exceptional circumstances that would justify an appeal to this Court. As a result, the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent costs of $2,500. The Court's decision reinforces the importance of meeting the criteria specified in the Supreme Court Act 2003 for an appeal to be heard by the Supreme Court.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's application for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment which dismissed his judicial review proceedings against the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and another respondent. The Court found that the proposed appeal did not meet the criteria specified in s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003 and that it was not in the interests of justice for this Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal. The Court also found that there were no exceptional circumstances that would justify an appeal to this Court. As a result, the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent costs of $2,500. This decision highlights the importance of meeting the criteria specified in the Supreme Court Act 2003 for an appeal to be heard by the Supreme Court.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established