Malcolm Edward Rabson v Judicial Conduct Commissioner

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 19/2017
[2017] NZSC 45

BETWEEN	MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON Applicant
AND	JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER Respondent

Court:	Arnold, OʼRegan and Ellen France JJ
Counsel:	Applicant in person L Theron and C P A Cross for Respondent
Judgment:	5 April 2017

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

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REASONS

The applicant, Mr Rabson, issued judicial review proceedings against the Judicial Conduct Commissioner in respect of the Commissioner’s rejection of various complaints made by Mr Rabson against members of this Court arising out of decisions made by the Court.[1] Cull J struck the proceedings out, on the basis that they disclosed no reasonable cause of action and were an abuse of process.[2]
[1]Mr Rabson included the “Supreme Court of New Zealand” as second respondent in the proceedings, but Williams J struck the Court out as a party: see Rabson v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2016] NZHC 884.
[2]Rabson v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2016] NZHC 2539, [2016] NZAR 1679.
Cull J held that the proceedings disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the Commissioner had rejected Mr Rabson’s complaints on the basis they challenged the legality or correctness of judicial decisions and were accordingly outside the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.[3] Given the nature of Mr Rabson’s complaints, Cull J considered that the Commissioner’s assessment in relation to jurisdiction was correct.[4] As to abuse of process, Cull J held that the application for judicial review contained speculative and extreme allegations without any reasonable basis and were, in any event, a collateral attack on earlier decisions of this Court.[5]
[3]At [32]–[41].
[4]At [38].
[5]At [42]–[47].
Mr Rabson filed an appeal against Cull J’s decision in the Court of Appeal, but that appeal was ultimately deemed to have been abandoned. Mr Rabson now seeks leave to appeal directly to this Court.
The general point that Mr Rabson wishes to argue is that Cull J was wrong to strike out the proceedings because the Commissioner had not considered the merits of his complaints, so that it was not possible for Cull J to reach a view about them. In relation to the exceptional circumstances required to justify a “leap frog” appeal,[6] Mr Rabson relies on his inability to pay security of costs in the Court of Appeal, as well as the importance of the matters he seeks to raise.
[6]Section 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003, which applies to this application despite the Act’s repeal: Senior Courts Act 2016, sch 5 cl 10.
We do not consider that Mr Rabson has raised anything which would justify a conclusion that there are exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify a “leapfrog” appeal to this Court. Moreover, we are not satisfied that Mr Rabson has raised anything which suggests that there is a point of general or public importance in the proposed appeal or which casts doubt on the correctness of Cull J’s decision.
Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal is dismissed. The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.

Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Wellington for Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Malcolm Edward Rabson, the applicant, sought leave to appeal against the Judicial Conduct Commissioner, the respondent, regarding the dismissal of his judicial review proceedings. Rabson had filed these proceedings to challenge the Commissioner's rejection of complaints against members of the Court based on decisions made by the Court. The Court of Appeal had already dismissed Rabson's appeal, and he now sought to appeal directly to the Supreme Court. The central legal issue was whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying a leapfrog appeal directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the usual requirement to appeal to the Court of Appeal first. The applicant argued that the Judicial Conduct Commissioner had not considered the merits of his complaints, and he was unable to pay the security of costs required for an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court considered these arguments and determined whether there was a point of general or public importance in the proposed appeal.

The Supreme Court found that Rabson had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant a leapfrog appeal. The Court was not convinced that the appeal raised any point of general or public importance or that there was any doubt about the correctness of the lower court's decision. The Court of Appeal had already dismissed Rabson's appeal, and Rabson did not provide any compelling reasons why this Court should entertain his appeal directly. The inability to pay costs was not deemed sufficient grounds to warrant a leapfrog appeal in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

As a result of the dismissal, Rabson was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of $2,500. The Court held that the exceptional circumstances necessary for a leapfrog appeal were not present, and there was no point of general or public importance in the proposed appeal. Consequently, the application was denied, and the costs were awarded to the respondent.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established