Maid v R

Case [2022] NZSC 39


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

 SC 154/2021
 [2022] NZSC 39
BETWEEN

PREETAM PRAKASH MAID
Applicant

AND

THE QUEEN
Respondent

Court:

William Young, Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
J A Eng for Respondent

Judgment:

4 April 2022

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is granted.

BThe application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Introduction

  1. Mr Maid worked as an aviation security (“AVSEC”) officer at the Dunedin International Airport.  He was convicted after a jury trial of taking an imitation explosive device into a security enhanced area (SEA) in breach of s 11(1A) of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972.  He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.[1] 

    [1]R v Maid [2021] NZDC 1547 (Judge Crosbie).

  2. He seeks leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of his appeal against conviction.[2] 

Court of Appeal decision

[2]Maid v R [2021] NZCA 456 (Clifford, Thomas and Muir JJ) [CA judgment].

  1. The case against Mr Maid was circumstantial.  No one saw him assembling the device or carrying it into an SEA.[3] 

    [3]The full facts are set out in the CA judgment, above n 2, at [3]–[14].

  2. It was conceded by Mr Maid’s counsel on appeal to the Court of Appeal that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that he had constructed an imitation improvised explosive device, transported it in an AVSEC patrol vehicle, and placed it next to a building on the runway “for the purposes of creating a security incident”.[4]

    [4]At [18].

  3. However, it was argued on appeal that there was no evidence that the device had been taken by him into an SEA as there were different routes to the AVSEC patrol vehicle that did not require him to pass through an SEA. 

  4. The Court of Appeal accepted the argument as conceivable. However it held that there was strong circumstantial evidence that the device had been taken into an SEA.  It was more than open to the jury to accept this evidence.[5]  Complaints regarding the summing up were also dismissed.[6]

Extension of time

[5]At [29].

[6]At [33]–[38].

  1. The application is 40 working days out of time.  The applicant explains the delay with reference to his imprisonment and the lack of legal aid.  As the delay is not extreme and has been explained, we grant his application for an extension of time.[7]

The application for leave

[7]Supreme Court Rules 2004, r 11(4).

  1. Mr Maid raises numerous grounds of appeal, many of which had not been raised in the Court of Appeal and all of which ultimately are related to the particular circumstances of this case.  No point of public or general importance arises.[8]  Nor does anything raised by Mr Maid suggest that the analysis of the Court of Appeal may be wrong.  Nothing suggests there is a risk of a miscarriage of justice.[9]

Result

[8]Senior Courts Act 2016, s 74(2)(a).

[9]Section 74(2)(b).

  1. The application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is granted.

  2. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent


Details
AGLC
Maid v R [2022] NZSC 39
Case
[2022] NZSC 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand was asked to decide on an application for leave to appeal from Mr. Maid, who had been convicted of taking an imitation explosive device into a security enhanced area. Mr. Maid was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and was appealing against the Court of Appeal's decision to dismiss his appeal against conviction. The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal should be granted and whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court had to consider the nature of the case, which was circumstantial, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court also had to determine whether there was a risk of a miscarriage of justice and whether any point of public or general importance arose.

The court found that the application for an extension of time was reasonable given the circumstances of the case. The delay was not extreme and could be explained by Mr. Maid's imprisonment and lack of legal aid. However, the court found that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The grounds of appeal raised by Mr. Maid were not of public or general importance and did not suggest that the analysis of the Court of Appeal was wrong. The court was satisfied that there was no risk of a miscarriage of justice.

The court granted the application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal but dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The court found that the delay in applying for leave to appeal was reasonable and could be explained by the circumstances of the case. However, the court found that the grounds of appeal raised by Mr. Maid did not suggest that the analysis of the Court of Appeal was wrong and that there was no risk of a miscarriage of justice.

No further orders were made by the court. The final orders were that the application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal was granted and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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