Maghsoudi v Police
[2025] NZHC 1590
•17 June 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2024-404-000755
[2025] NZHC 1590
BETWEEN MOHAMMAD SHAHIN MAGHSOUDI
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 26 May 2025 Appearances:
Appellant in person
MW Büdler for Respondent
Judgment:
17 June 2025
JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J
This judgment was delivered by me on Tuesday, 17 June 2025 at 10 am.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Auckland. Copy to: Appellant.
MAGHSOUDI v POLICE [2025] NZHC 1590 [17 June 2025]
The appeal
[1] Mohammad Maghsoudi was found guilty of possessing a knife in a public place without reasonable excuse.1 He was ordered to appear for sentence if called upon within six months.2 Mr Maghsoudi appeals both conviction and sentence.
[2]As in the District Court, Mr Maghsoudi self-represents.3
Background
[3]The facts are simple, and uncontentious.
[4] On 20 February 2023, Mr Maghsoudi’s driving caught Constable Gavin Russ’s attention. So, he stopped Mr Maghsoudi. Constable Russ then noticed a knife protruding from Mr Maghsoudi’s trouser pocket. He asked Mr Maghsoudi to remove the knife and place it on the bonnet. Mr Maghsoudi did so. A photographic exhibit shows a black hunting knife with a seemingly sharp blade 12 centimetres long. Mr Maghsoudi said his religion required him to carry a weapon for self-defence. Mr Maghsoudi offered the same explanation, without elaboration, to another constable who was assisting Constable Russ.
[5] Both officers said Mr Maghsoudi shouted at them, failed to follow directions, and behaved aggressively towards them.
The (only) issue at trial
[6] Section 13A of the Summary Offences Act 1981 creates an offence of possessing any knife, in any public place, without reasonable excuse.4 Section 2(2) of the same Act provides “a person is in a public place if he is in any… vehicle, which is in a public place”.5 Consequently, the only issue at trial was whether a reasonable excuse existed in relation to Mr Maghsoudi’s possession of the knife.
1 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 13A.
2 Police v Maghsoudi [2024] NZDC 32214. Sentencing Act 2006, s 110.
3 Mr Maghsoudi had a McKenzie friend in that Court.
4 The offence is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding $2,000.
5 See Police v Tito (1994) 11 CRNZ 609 (HC) at 612; and Khan (aka Rafiq) v Police [2013] NZHC 169 at [14].
Mr Maghsoudi’s trial case
[7] Mr Maghsoudi’s cross-examination of the Police officers was to the effect that he was entitled to arm himself because Police are armed.
[8] Mr Maghsoudi testified. He said he had done nothing wrong, and Police were “stealing” his knife. Mr Maghsoudi said the knife was a “pizza” knife, intended for use to eat pizza, and he was on his way to lunch. Mr Maghsoudi also said the Qur’an required him to carry a knife, citing 4:102, “keep your weapons with you, always keep your weapons with you”.
[9] The trial Judge, Judge C H Bennett, noted Mr Maghsoudi’s evidence “was at times difficult to follow”. While he “presented as an intelligent man, he had difficulty staying on task”.6
[10] The Judge found Mr Maghsoudi guilty. She rejected his evidence the knife was for use (or had been used) in connection with pizza; so too the existence of a reasonable excuse founded on religious grounds:
[17] Dealing first with the “manifestation of a religion and belief”', the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 state:
15 Manifestation of religion and belief
Every person has the right to manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private.
[18] It was not expressly articulated by Mr Maghsoudi that he was claiming a religious exception, such as in the case of a Sikh carrying a kirpan. There is case law which supports that possession of a kirpan is reasonably excused as being a manifestation of religion or belief.
[19] Mr Syddall, in his written submissions on behalf of Mr Maghsoudi, quoted a verse from the Qur’an, and submitted that it was justification for carrying the knife. I refer to paragraph 15 of Mr Syddall’s submissions:
When you ‘O Prophet’ are campaigning with them and you lead them in prayer, let one group of them pray with you—while armed. When they prostrate themselves, let the other group stand guard behind them. Then the group that has not yet prayed will then join you in prayer—and let them be vigilant and armed. The disbelievers would wish to see you neglect your weapons and belongings, so they could launch a sweeping assault on you. But there is no blame if you lay aside your weapons when
6 Police v Maghsoudi [2024] NZDC 15071 at [16].
overcome by heavy rain or illness—but take precaution. Indeed, Allah has prepared a humiliating punishment for the disbelievers.
[20] With respect, that passage was not cited in evidence. I have already referred to Mr Maghsoudi’s evidence on point. Even if Mr Maghsoudi was relying on that particular portion of the Qur’an, I find that it does not provide him with a reasonable excuse to carry a knife in the circumstances that arose in this particular case. I also reject the excuse that he was carrying the knife for the purposes of cutting up pizza. There was no evidence that Mr Maghsoudi had indeed purchased pizza, or was eating pizza. I bear in mind that there is no onus on Mr Maghsoudi to prove anything. In this case he raises an affirmative defence, being reasonable excuse. The evidence in my view simply does not support the assertion made by Mr Maghsoudi.
[21] The only defence pursued was reasonable excuse. Accordingly, I find that Mr Maghsoudi did not have a reasonable excuse to have possession of the knife on that particular day. I find the charge proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Wide-ranging grounds of appeal
[11] Mr Maghsoudi offered wide-ranging grounds of appeal. I offer examples only. Mr Maghsoudi argued the courts have no jurisdiction over him, but “the common law” did. Mr Maghsoudi said the laws did not apply to him as he did not “consent” to their application. Mr Maghsoudi said the offence was not made because of a “promissory note” he tendered to the Court, ostensibly to the value of $330,000. Mr Maghsoudi said he committed no offence as the Police had stolen the knife from him, and he would sue them (for theft). Mr Maghsoudi said the offence provision was ineffective because he is a living man, not a trust. Mr Maghsoudi also said the Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the appeal because he enjoyed sovereign status.
[12] As I explained to Mr Maghsoudi at the hearing, arguments of this nature are untenable.7 Courts must give effect to the laws enacted by Parliament, including, obviously, s 13A of the Summary Offences Act.
Was there a reasonable excuse for possessing the knife?
[13] The Judge’s rejection of the pizza-based excuse would be impeachable if the Judge erred in her assessment of the evidence to such an extent a miscarriage of justice
7 See, for example, Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 105 at [10]–[11].
had occurred.8 There is, however, no reason to conclude the Judge erred in relation to this aspect. Mr Maghsoudi’s evidence on the topic was broad. It was also bereft of detail. In any event, the knife is clearly a hunting knife, not an item of cutlery. No one could think otherwise given the exhibit.
[14] As the Judge recognised, s 15 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirms the right to manifest religion, hence the (international) case law in which possession of a kirpan by a devout Sikh has not constituted an offence.9 But as the Judge also recognised, this does not avail Mr Maghsoudi a reasonable excuse.
[15] First, a reasonable excuse in this context would need to rest upon a (sincerely held) belief that a knife had to be carried in the circumstances in question as a matter of religion, and carriage of the knife would need to constitute a manifestation of that belief. Put another way, the carrier would need to believe, as a matter of religion, that they needed to carry a knife in the circumstances in question, and carriage of the knife would need to reflect that belief in those circumstances. So, carrying a knife for another reason – say, to use it as weapon – or carrying a knife absent a belief that was required as matter of religion in the circumstances, would not assist a defendant in this context. This follows from the nature of the right: manifestation of a religious belief.
[16] Mr Maghsoudi’s evidence does not meet these precepts. A close reading of Mr Maghsoudi’s testimony reveals an asserted belief in God, but no religious affiliation or tradition: “I believe in one God that has three religions with three books …”. Moreover, Mr Maghsoudi did not say he was carrying the knife to manifest a religious belief. Rather, Mr Maghsoudi said carriage of a knife could be justified by reference to scriptural texts: the Bible, the Qur’an, and Torah:10
A........... The second excuse is really this belief. Even though you say it is
not a pizza knife that I say it is, anybody who has seen a hunting knife how this is a pizza knife, it clearly shows. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, section 13, section 15. Freedom of talk, conscience and religion, one sentence. Everyone has their right to freedom of talk, conscience,
8 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 232(2)(b).
9 State of Ohio v Singh 690 NE 2d 917, 920 (Ohio Ct App 1996); and New York v Singh, 516 NYS 2d 412 (NY Crim Ct 1987).
10 Police v Maghsoudi, North Shore District Court, 17 November 2023 at p 24 li 25 – p 25 li 13.
religion and belief and including the right to adopt and to hold an opinion without interference. Section 15, the manifestation of religion and belief. Every person has the right to manifest, it is an action on it, not just thinking. That person’s religion or belief in the worship, observance, has been listening to what God says, practice or teaching either individually or in the community with others and either in public or in private, this is not of New Zealand and again they called it a precedent and I explained it in the beginning of this section. The guy, according to his belief, doesn’t need to work Saturday because it is written in the Toran, Saturday holiday, other days of the week work.
Q. Well what religious belief…
A. This is in Torah.
Q. Yes, I’ve got that but what religious belief do you rely upon just –
A. I rely on the other book of God, God has sent three official books; the Qur’an, this Bible that you have and the Torah. The Torah is my five books, Deuteronomy, numbers, et cetera. …
[17] Second, there would need to be credible evidence, typically from a suitably qualified expert witness, that the asserted belief is commensurate with a recognised religious tradition. Mere recitation from scripture, whether the Bible, the Qur’an, or Torah, would not ordinarily suffice. Mr Maghsoudi adduced no expert evidence.
[18] Third, a religious justification based upon an open-ended notion of self-defence would not be commensurate with s 48 of the Crimes Act 1961,11 the case law in relation to possession of offensive weapons and s 48,12 or the offence provision itself. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to striking the offence from the books.
Under our constitutional arrangements, that is not an available response.13
[19] This leaves one matter. Mr Maghsoudi has not brought an application to be discharged without conviction, but the remedy is available on appeal. The question then becomes, would a discharge (without conviction) be appropriate? The gravity of the offending is, as the respondent accepts, low. However, Mr Maghsoudi’s extensive written material does not contain any evidence about the consequences of conviction.
11 48 Self-defence and defence of another
(1)Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or herself or another, such force as, in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, it is reasonable to use.
(2)This section is subject to section 37 of the End of Life Choice Act 2019.
12 Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law — Crimes Act (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CA48.03]
13 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4.
Result
[20]The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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Downs J
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