MacLaren v Tenancy Tribunal
[2022] NZHC 3562
•20 December 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND GISBORNE REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TŪRANGANUI-A-KIWA ROHE
CIV-2021-416-2
[2022] NZHC 3562
UNDER the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 IN THE MATTER
of Gisborne Tenancy Tribunal Order 4240789
BETWEEN
F L MACLAREN
Applicant
AND
TENANCY TRIBUNAL
First Respondent
A B OTTER
Second Respondent
Hearing: 17 November 2022 Appearances:
Applicant in Person
J Watson, Counsel Assisting the Court
Judgment:
20 December 2022
JUDGMENT OF McQUEEN J
[1] Ms MacLaren seeks judicial review of a Tenancy Tribunal decision dated 21 March 2020 (the Tenancy Tribunal decision).1
Background
[2] Ms MacLaren let a property in Gisborne to Mr Otter and his wife. The lease commenced on 3 March 2017. Ms MacLaren retained the use of one third of a shed
1 MacLaren v Otter [2020] NZTT Gisborne 4240789 [Tenancy Tribunal decision]. The first respondent, the Tenancy Tribunal, abides the decision of the Court. The second respondent, Mr Otter, who was the tenant, did not participate in this proceeding. Accordingly, counsel to assist the Court was appointed pursuant to r 10.22 of the High Court Rules 2016.
MACLAREN v TENANCY TRIBUNAL [2022] NZHC 3562 [20 December 2022]
(also described as a garage) on the property for personal storage, and the rent owed per week was reduced accordingly. Due to events arising from the tenancy, Ms MacLaren brought proceedings in the Tenancy Tribunal alleging that the tenants had breached the tenancy agreement in a number of respects. The Tenancy Tribunal upheld Ms MacLaren’s claim for $280 in rent arrears but dismissed several other claims.
[3] Ms MacLaren unsuccessfully appealed the decision under review to the District Court.2 The District Court judgment, although thoroughly analysing Ms MacLaren’s arguments, proceeded on the incorrect basis the decision under appeal was a decision of the Disputes Tribunal rather than a decision of the Tenancy Tribunal. The District Court accordingly considered its jurisdiction on appeal was governed by s 50 of the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988 and not ss 117–118 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act).3
[4] Despite encouragement to focus on the District Court judgment, including pursuing an appeal to the High Court,4 Ms MacLaren appears to consider that there is public interest in exposing alleged errors in the Tenancy Tribunal’s reasoning and has maintained her focus on the decision of the Tribunal. Accordingly, she now brings a claim for judicial review in this Court.
Tenancy Tribunal decision
[5] Both Ms MacLaren and Mr Otter appeared at the Tenancy Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal, in its decision, set out additional details of the history and dispute of the parties as they related to Ms MacLaren’s claims, which I refer to as necessary.
2 MacLaren v Otter [2020] NZDC 26184.
3 At [3]. I also note that although the District Court judgment was heard on 1 November 2020 and delivered on 15 December 2020, it was not distributed to the parties until August 2021.
4 Counsel assisting the Court clearly set out the options for Ms MacLaren in his memorandum of counsel dated 20 August 2021. He observed that it was very likely that if asked, the High Court would quash the District Court decision and direct the District Court to rehear the appeal. He noted that the District Court has broad remedial powers under s 118 of the Act while the Courts are slow to grant judicial review where specific statutory remedies such as rights of appeal are available. He also observed that the issues Ms MacLaren has with the Tenancy Tribunal decision are less likely to be ventilated in judicial review proceedings than an appeal. These matters were also discussed with Ms MacLaren at judicial conferences once she commenced this proceeding in the High Court.
[6] Ms MacLaren was, for most of the tenancy, based in Christchurch. After moving back to Gisborne, she wished to move into the property and, on 1 March 2020, gave Mr Otter 42 days’ notice that his tenancy would end.5 This notice was declared by the Tribunal to be valid, with the consequence that the tenancy would conclude on 15 April 2020.6
[7] Ms MacLaren considered that the tenants had breached the tenancy agreement in a number of respects. The proceedings before the Tribunal were heard on 17 March 2020 with its decision given on 21 March 2020.
[8] Ms MacLaren’s first claim, that the rent was $280 in arrears, was accepted by Mr Otter and his wife. The Tribunal made an order that the arrears must be paid immediately (Order 1) but was not satisfied that the criteria for immediate termination of the tenancy for rent arrears under s 56(1) of the Act was made out.7
[9] The Tribunal dismissed the claim that Mr Otter was responsible for any alleged damage to a vehicle Ms MacLaren had left in a shed on the tenancy property, said to have occurred as a result of Mr Otter moving the vehicle from the shed and leaving it outside uncovered (Order 2).8 Instead, the Tribunal found that Mr Otter was justified in moving the car as it was occupying more than one-third of the shed-space, and that the ongoing rent reduction was fair given the car was still occupying space on the tenancy property which the tenant could not use.9
[10] Likewise, a claim that the tenants had stolen property by using certain furniture left in the shed was not made out (Order 3). The Tribunal found that it was reasonable for the tenants to believe that the landlord consented to them using furniture the landlord had left at the property, and that the tenants, by using the furniture, did not intend to permanently deprive the landlord of her rights as to the furniture.10
5 Under s 51 of the Act. The section has since been amended by the Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2020.
6 Tenancy Tribunal decision, above n 1, at [3].
7 At [6]–[7].
8 At [8]–[18].
9 At [16]–[17].
10 At [19]–[24].
[11] The Tribunal also dismissed Ms MacLaren’s claim that the tenants had intentionally breached the clause of the tenancy agreement which specified that only two persons may ordinarily reside in the premises during the tenancy (Order 4).11
[12] Mr Otter accepted that each of his two children had stayed with him and his wife at points during the tenancy, as the house has three bedrooms. However, Mr Otter’s evidence was that this clause was not in the initial tenancy agreement he had been provided, and that he did not realise this condition had been changed on the version of the tenancy agreement which he signed. Mr Otter’s evidence was that he believed Ms MacLaren knew his daughter would be moving into the property along with himself and his wife; all three had previously been renting an adjacent property.
[13] The Tribunal decision records that Ms MacLaren raised issues concerning the permitted numbers of tenants in February 2020, apparently for the first time, and the notice issued by Ms MacLaren incorrectly stated that the tenants had breached the condition for an extended period of over a year.12
[14] Against that background, the Tribunal held it was possible the tenancy agreement was breached but that the tenants were not aware of the breach and that, in the circumstances, there were insufficient grounds to order the tenants pay compensation for a breach of the tenancy agreement.13
[15] Finally, under the heading ‘Other Matters’, the Tribunal referred to an allegation from Mr Otter that Ms MacLaren had behaved aggressively toward him and had stayed on the tenancy property for an extended period during an unannounced inspection.14 Without determining the accuracy or otherwise of the allegation, the Tribunal observed that the relationship between the parties had broken down and, given there was no urgent need for Ms MacLaren to access the property again before the termination date, ordered that Ms MacLaren was not to enter onto the tenancy property before 15 April 2020 (Order 6).15
11 At [25]–[32].
12 At [30].
13 At [31]–[32].
14 At [33].
15 At [35]–[36].
Approach to judicial review of Tenancy Tribunal decision
[16] The Tenancy Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine, in accordance with the Act, any dispute that exists between a landlord and a tenant that relates to any tenancy to which the Act applies or applied at any material time.16 The Act, in ss 77–78, lists in non-exhaustive fashion the matters over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction and orders the Tribunal can make.
[17] Where, in any proceedings before the Tribunal, any party contends that the Act does not apply in respect of any tenancy of any residential premises, it is for that party to establish the facts upon which it is contended that the Act does not apply.17
[18] Subject to the provisions of the Act and any secondary legislation made under that Act, the Tribunal must exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that is most likely to ensure the fair and expeditious resolution of disputes between landlords and tenants of residential premises to which the Act applies, and must determine each dispute according to the general principles of the law relating to the matter and the substantial merits and justice of the case, but shall not be bound to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations or to legal forms or technicalities.18
[19] Against that background Mr Watson, counsel assisting, submits that the Tribunal provides a relatively informal forum for disputes to be heard and determined inexpensively and expeditiously, and a means of dispute resolution which prioritises the value of finality for low-value disputes. In that way the Tribunal promotes access to civil justice, a fundamental right,19 in an area affecting people’s day-to-day lives and in which the potential for power imbalances is implicit.
[20] Mr Watson submits that for these reasons, judicial review of the Tenancy Tribunal is not to be lightly entertained, and the Court should hesitate to exercise its discretion to conduct judicial review and hold the Tribunal to the same standards that
16 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, ss 77 and 82.
17 Section 10.
18 Section 85.
19 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27. See Trotman v Disputes Tribunal [2020] NZHC 2040 at [28].
might be expected of a court, or in a manner which may undermine the access to justice imperatives which underpin the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.20
[21] As Cooke J helpfully commented in the context of the judicial review of a Disputes Tribunal decision in Patterson v District Court, Hutt Valley:21
[14] This approach is consistent with general principle. At its heart judicial review involves the Court exercising a supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that powers are exercised in accordance with law. Usually those powers will be contained in statute or delegated legislation, where the limits of the power are identified as a matter of statutory interpretation. But the legal limits of discretionary powers may also arise from other sources, such as common law requirements. An example is the rules of natural justice, albeit in the present case such requirements are also to be found in the statute. Most judicial review involves the Court assessing whether a decision is made in accordance with the express and implied requirements of the empowering instrument, both in terms of the substantive decision and the procedures followed to reach it. Here the primary function of the Court would be to ensure that the decisions were made in accordance with the provisions of the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988.
[22] In essence, therefore, the role of the Court in this matter is to ensure that the Tribunal’s decision was made in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
[23] Ms MacLaren reiterated that she has deliberately sought judicial review in this proceeding because she believes that the questions to be determined are matters that will be of great interest and assistance to both landlords and Tenancy Tribunal adjudicators throughout New Zealand. In this sense, Ms MacLaren says, this proceeding is nothing to do with Mr Otter and she understands why he is not participating in it.
[24] Despite holding this view, Ms MacLaren sought to provide me with considerable factual detail, both in relation to what she says is the true position in relation to events occurring during Mr Otter’s tenancy and in relation to events that have occurred since the date of the Tenancy Tribunal decision. I explained to Ms MacLaren that none of this information is relevant to the matters she has asked me
20 See Wright v Wright [2017] NZHC 3053 at [11], discussing the Disputes Tribunal but broadly applicable by analogy to applications seeking to judicially review the Tenancy Tribunal.
21 Patterson v District Court, Hutt Valley [2020] NZHC 259 at [14]. I consider these comments applicable to judicial review of Tenancy Tribunal decisions under the Residential Tenancies Act.
to consider in her application for judicial review. For this reason, I do not record the matters she raised.
[25] Ms MacLaren also contended that the Tenancy Tribunal adjudicator did not take the right approach to the hearing generally. Ms MacLaren’s point seems to be that she considers that the adjudicator should have required Mr Otter to prove any fact that he put forward in support of his position. This reflects her view that the adjudicator was wrong in many of her factual conclusions. Once again, I explained to Ms MacLaren that in this proceeding I am not able to address factual matters in the way she seeks and that she must focus on whether the Tribunal has exercised its powers according to law.
[26] In order to proceed with the application for judicial review, I consider it appropriate to first address the issue of the District Court decision on Ms MacLaren’s appeal from the Tenancy Tribunal decision.
[27] The District Court decision is plainly defective, given the Judge’s reliance on s 50 of the Disputes Tribunal Act rather than the relevant appeal provision of the Act.
[28] Mr Watson submits that s 16(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 permits me to set the decision aside. He says, if necessary, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court would also allow me to quash the decision. Ms MacLaren did not address me on what to do with the District Court decision.
[29] Given the defective nature of the District Court decision, I set it aside in accordance with s 16(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.
Issues for determination
[30] Ms MacLaren’s statement of claim runs to 42 pages and advances eight grounds of review but, following discussions with counsel assisting the Court, Ms MacLaren clarified the scope of her claim and set out the central points for this Court to consider.
[31]These points are that the Tenancy Tribunal:
(a)failed to take into account the mandatory considerations set out s 109(3) of the Act as required in relation to a claim for exemplary damages (Ms MacLaren having made such a claim asserting that the tenants allowed more than the prescribed number of tenants to live at the property) (Issue one);
(b)did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims relating to one area of the property (being part of the shed) which was excluded from the tenancy agreement and erred in dismissing claims relating to that area of the property (Issue two); and
(c)did not have the power to make an order that Ms MacLaren was not to enter the tenancy property before 15 April 2020 (Order 6) (Issue three).
Issue one — did the Tribunal err in failing to address the considerations set out in s 109(3) of the Act?
[32] Ms MacLaren submits that, in reaching its conclusion as to whether exemplary damages were appropriate for exceeding the maximum number of tenants living at the property, the Tribunal should have clearly articulated its consideration of each element of s 109(3). She submitted that the decision is a bad precedent, and the proper approach is demonstrated in another Tenancy Tribunal decision, where the adjudicator considered each element, on the facts of the case.22 Ms MacLaren submits that I should send this matter back to the Tenancy Tribunal, requiring it to properly consider s 109(3). She was at pains to emphasise that it is not an award of exemplary damages that she seeks, rather that the Tenancy Tribunal be directed as to how it is to properly reach a decision under s 109(3).
[33] The Act provides that a landlord may apply to the Tribunal for an order requiring the tenant to pay the landlord an amount in the nature of exemplary damages (not exceeding $1,000) where a tenant has without reasonable excuse exceeded the maximum number of persons that may ordinarily reside in the premises during the
22 Landlord v Clancy [2021] NZTT [Event location suppressed] 4304673.
tenancy at any time during the tenancy.23 This (amongst other things) is deemed an “unlawful act”.
[34]Section 109(3) of the Act provides:24
If, on an application under subsection (1)…the Tribunal is satisfied that the person against whom the order is sought committed the unlawful act intentionally, and that, having regard to—
(a)the intent of that person in committing the unlawful act; and
(b)the effect of the unlawful act; and
(c)the interests of the landlord or the tenant against whom the unlawful act was committed; and
(d)the public interest,—
it would be just to require the person against whom the order is sought to pay a sum in the nature of exemplary damages, the Tribunal may make an order accordingly.
[35] As has been recounted above, it was accepted that the tenancy agreement specified that there should be no more than two tenants living at the tenancy property, and that Mr Otter confirmed his two children had stayed with him during the tenancy, thus breaching this condition. However, the Tribunal implicitly rejected Ms MacLaren’s assertion advanced in this proceeding that Mr Otter had ‘intended to deceive’ his landlord. The Tribunal accepted Mr Otter’s evidence that the tenancy agreement he and his wife had read (not being the one that they signed) did not contain a ‘maximum permitted tenants’ condition, and appeared to accept that, in all the circumstances, although Mr Otter had possibly breached that condition he did not do so knowingly; he “was not aware of the breach”.25
[36] The Tribunal’s reasoning on this point can be rationalised as a finding that Mr Otter had a ‘reasonable excuse’ for the breach of the maximum permitted tenants condition, in terms of s 40(3A)(e) of the Act. It may also be understood as a finding that, having regard to the s 109(3) factors, the unlawful act should not attract an award of exemplary damages because:
23 Residential Tenancies Act, ss 40(3), 40(3A)(e) and 109(1) and (4). See also sch 1A.
24 Emphasis added.
25 At [31].
(a)the “house was not overcrowded”.26 Ms MacLaren herself accepted the house was clean and tidy,27 meaning the ‘effects of the unlawful act’ were not material and that ‘the interests of the landlord’ were not undermined in a meaningful sense by the breach (s 109(3)(b) and (c)); and
(b)the plausible confusion from the tenants’ perspective about the existence of this condition, combined with the breach only having been brought to Mr Otter’s attention after the fact, meant that the ‘unlawful act’ was not committed with an intention to gain an advantage as against the landlord and there was no public interest in marking the breach with an award of exemplary damages (s 109(3)(a) and (d)).
[37] I consider that there is no absolute requirement that the s 109(3) factors be set out as Ms MacLaren seeks. While she is able to point to another Tenancy Tribunal decision where that did occur, this does not mean it is required in every case. I accept Mr Watson’s submission that given the statutory scheme within which the Tenancy Tribunal operates, it should not be held to the same standard of legality as the Courts in terms of the reasons it must supply. I am satisfied that that the adjudicator considered the application of ss 40(3), 40(3A) and 109(3) in reaching her decision that no award of compensation was appropriate in the circumstances and that decision is sufficiently reasoned.
[38]Accordingly, no error of law is made out in relation to Issue one.
Issue two — did the Tribunal make orders in respect of areas over which it had no jurisdiction?
[39] Ms MacLaren submits that the Tribunal erred in making Orders 2 and 3— respectively, dismissing the claims for compensation for damage to her vehicle and the alleged stealing of furniture—because the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the one third of the shed which she retained the use of under the tenancy agreement.
26 Tenancy Tribunal decision, above n 1, at [31].
27 See transcript of Tenancy Tribunal hearing at 62.
[40] In adjudicating these matters, and making Orders 2 and 3, it appears the Tribunal was responding to matters that had been raised by Ms MacLaren herself, as opposed to addressing issues it had discerned from the factual matrix of its own motion. It follows that Ms MacLaren’s claim before this Court that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims represents something of a change of position on her part.
[41] Mr Watson submits that, in this context, the Tribunal did not err in making those orders. Mr Watson submits that I do not need to, nor should, reach a decision as to whether the area of the shed Ms MacLaren claims was reserved for her exclusive occupancy falls outside the jurisdiction of the Tenancy Tribunal, given that Ms MacLaren sought the orders before the Tribunal and given the Tribunal’s factual findings. He further submits that the Tribunal took a pragmatic approach in dealing with Ms MacLaren’s claims and this was appropriate in light of the statutory framework under which the Tribunal operates.
[42] Ms MacLaren submits that the Tribunal was wrong to accept her claims. She says that even though she made these claims before the Tribunal it should have known there was no legal basis for them, and in any event, this Court should find there was no legal basis for them. She says that s 85 of the Act does not permit such a legal error. Ms MacLaren further argued that the adjudicator was confused, and her entire consideration of this issue was irrational and therefore reviewable.
[43] Ms MacLaren has sought advice from Tenancy Services. She submitted that the advice recommended that she argue that as she had exclusive occupancy of her part of the shed, s 40(2)(c) of the Act means that she was a neighbour of the tenants. The argument seemed to be that they then were obliged to provide her with reasonable peace, comfort and privacy and a breach of that would be an unlawful act that could result in a claim for compensation under s 109 of the Act. This did not seem to be Ms MacLaren’s preferred argument, however. Rather, she seeks a determination from me as to whether such a claim for compensation for damage to the car is within the Tenancy Tribunal’s jurisdiction or should be taken to the Disputes Tribunal.
[44] Given the way Ms MacLaren advanced her claim in front of the Tenancy Tribunal, I conclude that the Tribunal did not err in considering these compensation claims as advanced by Ms MacLaren on the basis that it had jurisdiction to do so, and in then dismissing the claims. Had Ms MacLaren been intending to argue that the Act did not apply to any incidents connected with the shed she would have borne the onus of establishing the facts upon which that contention was based.28 There is no clear discussion of this in the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, or in its decision. The Tribunal concluded that there was no factual foundation for the claims. It is not a matter for this Court to reconsider those facts. I do not accept Ms MacLaren’s submission that the adjudicator’s consideration of these claims was irrational.
[45] Nonetheless, the question of how Ms MacLaren might properly advance a claim in relation to damage to the car as a result of Mr Otter moving it from the garage to leave it outside on the property is not uncontroversial. I understand from Ms MacLaren that she is pursuing a claim against Mr Otter for the damage to the car in the Disputes Tribunal.
[46] For the avoidance of doubt, nothing I have said in this decision prevents Ms MacLaren from bringing a claim in the Disputes Tribunal in relation to damage to the car if such a claim is within that Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Issue three — did the Tribunal have jurisdiction to make an order that Ms MacLaren was not to enter the tenancy property before 15 April 2020 (Order 6)?
[47] Ms MacLaren’s position is that the effect of the Tribunal’s Order 6 was that she was unable to make urgent repairs for six months, and that this amounted to an unreasonable incursion on her rights of entry as a landlord, set out in s 48 of the Act. Ms MacLaren explained to me that she wished to replace the stove as the stove element thermostat had broken and the tenants were cooking on the stove over a tripod which was dangerous. Ms Maclaren accordingly seeks a declaration that the order “preventing the landlord from going onto the property until the end of the tenancy” was ultra vires.
28 Residential Tenancies Act, s 10.
[48] Ms MacLaren seems to overlook the circumstances at the time of the Tenancy Tribunal decision. The case was heard on 17 March 2020 and the decision issued on 21 March 2020. The Tribunal concluded that Ms MacLaren had given valid notice under the Act and accordingly the tenancy would end on 15 April 2020. The Tribunal also ordered that Ms MacLaren was not to enter onto the tenancy property before 15 April 2020.
[49] Thus, Order 6 only prevented Ms MacLaren from accessing her property for around 25 days. Ms MacLaren informed me that, in fact, the tenants stayed in the property for another ten months. She also disagrees with the factual background as recorded in the Tribunal decision. Once again, this is not relevant to my assessment of Ms MacLaren’s claim.
[50] On the face of the Tribunal’s decision, it is clear the Tribunal was concerned that the relationship between the parties had broken down and was of the view that, given Ms MacLaren had no urgent need to access the tenancy property, Order 6 was a pragmatic solution to ensure the balance of the tenancy proceeded smoothly. A review of the transcript confirms that the Tribunal was at pains to determine whether Ms MacLaren had any legitimate reason for entering the tenancy property before the tenancy expired. The issue regarding the replacement of the stove was before the Tribunal (although not Ms Maclaren’s specific explanation before me, as set out above). It was not accepted by the Tribunal as something which required Ms MacLaren’s supervision (or, if it did, that installation of the stove was not accepted as something that needed to happen before the tenancy ended) especially in light of Mr Otter’s evidence that he had been asking for a new stove for three years and Ms MacLaren had not taken such a step and so he did not wish a new stove to be installed in the last few weeks of the tenancy.29
[51] Against that background Ms MacLaren’s assertion that she was kept out of the property in a manner not permitted under the Act cannot be sustained. It is premised on a factual narrative at odds with the Tribunal’s decision and inconsistent with the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. If in fact the tenants did remain at the
29 See transcript of Tenancy Tribunal hearing at 96–98.
property for a period beyond 15 April 2020 and there were issues about Ms MacLaren’s access to the property this is a matter she could have pursued through the Tenancy Tribunal.
Name suppression
[52] Ms MacLaren requested that her name be suppressed in this proceeding. She submitted that it is common for the Tenancy Tribunal to make an order suppressing the landlord’s name in its decisions. Ms MacLaren did not refer me to any legal basis for making such an order.
[53] Mr Watson noted that s 95A of the Act addresses where name suppression may be available in the Tenancy Tribunal. I note that this provision only came into force after the Tenancy Tribunal decision at issue in this proceeding. I also note that it does not expressly apply to proceedings in this Court. The principles of open justice would usually require that in this Court, parties are named and the case heard in open court.
[54]No order for suppression of Ms MacLaren’s name is made.
Costs
[55] Ms MacLaren submits that she should not be liable for any costs order that might be made in this proceeding. She notes that she holds a Community Card.
[56] Mr Watson drew my attention to s 178 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, which provides that costs may be sought by a counsel assisting the Court and that it is common for such an order to be made in the interests of protecting the public purse. Mr Watson also submitted that account might properly be taken of the fact that without this proceeding, the erroneous District Court decision may not have been unearthed.
[57] In the circumstances of this case, I consider it is appropriate for costs to lie where they fall. I therefore make no costs order.
Result
[58] The District Court decision in MacLaren v Otter [2020] NZDC 26184 is set aside pursuant to s 16(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016.
[59]Ms MacLaren’s application for judicial review is dismissed.
[60]Ms MacLaren’s application for name suppression is dismissed.
[61]Costs are to lie where they fall.
McQueen J
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for counsel assisting
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