M v The Police HC Auckland CRI 2004-404-428

[2006] NZHC 50

This case has been anonymized

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI 2004-404-428

M

Appellant

v

THE POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:         8 February 2006

Appearances: Appellant in person

A Longdill for the Crown

Judgment:      9 February 2006

JUDGMENT OF ALLAN J

(on application for leave to appeal)

Solicitors

Meredith Connell, PO Box 2213, Auckland [email protected]

Party

R M   , 11 Stewart St, Helensville.

M V POLICE HC AK CRI 2004-404-428  9 February 2006

[1]      On 11 November 2005, I dismissed an appeal by the appellant from an order made on 1 October 2004 by Judge Kiernan in the Waitakere District Court imposing a sentence of 80 hours community work by reason of the failure of the appellant to pay traffic fines totalling $1,965.

[2]      The appellant now applies for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against my judgment.   The application for leave to appeal is out of time but the Crown abides the decision of the Court in respect of an enlargement of the time for filing the application.  The Crown is not prejudiced and the time for filing the application for leave to appeal is accordingly enlarged.

Jurisdiction

[3]      The appellant seeks leave to mount a second appeal.   Her application is governed by s 144(3) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 which provides for the grant of leave only in cases involving a question of law, which by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal.   That section is discussed and explained in R v Slater [1997] 1

NZLR 211.

[4]      In order for leave to be granted an applicant must identify a discrete question of law, and demonstrate that the question ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason.  It is implicit in the statutory test that the appellant’s proposed argument has an arguable chance of success.

The High Court judgment

[5]      At the hearing of her appeal in this Court, the appellant submitted that by reason of the Declaration of Independence made by the Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes in 1835, the common law took precedence over statute law, with the result that some statutes could bind a citizen in certain circumstances, only if that

citizen had “contracted” to abide by the law concerned.  Much of the law enacted by statute or by regulation was binding on citizens only to the extent that an individual citizen  was  prepared  to  accept  that  law  as  a  matter  of  contract.    So  went  the argument.  The appellant accepted that her argument might apply not only to Maori but to any citizen of this country, and indeed to any person subject to the laws of this country.  It was further argued that the Land Transport Act 1998 was not binding on citizens who did not elect to be bound by it, and that the appellant had not contracted with the Crown to abide by the provisions of the Land Transport Act, and was accordingly not bound by it.

[6]      The argument was therefore, in effect, a challenge to the power of Parliament to enact legislation binding upon all persons within the jurisdiction.  I held that the settled law in this country is that the Courts will give effect to legislation passed or authorised by Parliament according to its terms:  Cooper v Attorney General [1996]

3 NZLR 480, 483 and that the appellant’s argument was not supported by authority.

[7]      Further, I pointed out that the appellant did not in her argument address the limited issue before the Court which was whether the sentence of community work imposed by Judge Kiernan was appropriate.  It was not open to the appellant to argue that she ought not to have been convicted of the traffic offences themselves;   she ought to have appealed against those convictions at the time.

The application for leave to appeal

[8]      The appellant appeared today in the company of Mr Graham Stephen, and sought leave to have Mr Stephen speak on her behalf.  I granted leave to Mr Stephen to speak for the appellant, as I had done in respect of Mr M Hall, at the hearing of the appeal itself.  As was the case at the earlier appeal hearing, it was only with great difficulty  that  I  was  able  to  discern  the  thrust  of  the  appellant’s  submissions. Mr Stephen was disinclined to answer direct questions from the Court, preferring rather to proclaim propositions which for the most part reflected material to be found in  a  brief  written  submission  filed  in  Court.    The  substantive  portion  of  the submission reads as follows:

Statement of claim

That Rita-Harriata M    and her counsel conditionally accepts all the claims made by THE CROWN ENTITY by proof of claim that the laws quoted in the submission by THE CROWN PROSECUTOR are the laws of the land by showing written proof:

1.   By written proof of claim:  That THE CROWN ENTITY being

THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF LONDON known as

‘THE   CROWN”   and   its   controlled   agency   THE   NEW ZEALAND COLONIAL GOVERNMENT with its MINISTRY

OF  JUSTICE,  have  a  written  Constitution  along  with  Royal

Estate  and  Title  of  Allodium  over  the  land  known  as  New

Zealand, to allow it to operate and apply the Laws of the Land.

2.  By written proof of claim:   That THE NEW ZEALAND COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  with its  MINISTRY  OF JUSTICE and the Treaty of Waitangi has a written Constitution signed by the Sovereign HM Queen Victoria or any Royal Sovereign since the Reign of HM Queen Victoria.

3.   By written proof of claim:   That all the laws quoted by THE CROWN PROSECUTOR can over ride the 1835 Declaration of Independence,  its  Constitution  protecting  Rita-Harriata M   , supported by the Royal Laws upheld by the Defender of the Faith HM Queen Elizabeth II, by Her Majesties (sic) Holy Royal Blood Line relating directly to King David of Israel and Our Lord Jesus Christ. (see attached our Queen’s Blood-line).

4.   By written proof of claim:  That there is ‘money’ to extinguish any claimed debt.  This written proof of claim to be undersigned by THE CROWN PROSECUTOR upon their personal Full Commercial Liability

[9]      None of the points made in argument addressed the real issue on this appeal, namely, whether Judge Kiernan was correct to impose a sentence of community work consequent upon the appellant’s failure to pay her traffic fines.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how any question of law could arise from that decision.   For that reason alone, the appellant’s application for leave must fail.  However, in deference to the argument I heard, I deal briefly with the submission which Mr Stephen based upon the propositions set out above.

[10]     He was reluctant to formulate a relevant question of law, as I invited him to do.  Having listened to him for some time I formulated a question in the following terms:

Whether  the  provisions  of  the  Land  Transport  Act  1998  apply  to  the appellant, having regard to the protection provided to her by the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand?

[11]     Mr  Stephen  was  not  prepared  to  accept  that  a  question  as  formulated adequately encapsulated his argument.  I am nevertheless satisfied that it does.

[12]     In essence it is claimed that because Mrs M    claims the protection of the Confederation, the Crown must establish that the Land Transport Act over-rides the 1835 Declaration of Independence and unless the Crown can do so the appellant is not bound by the Act.  That argument is, of course, no more and no less than a challenge to the authority of Parliament to enact legislation, binding on all persons within its jurisdiction.  The appellant says, purely and simply, that she is outside the law of New Zealand, or at least some of it, including the provisions in the Land Transport Act or regulations made under it pursuant to which she was originally convicted.  Challenges of that sort have on numerous occasions been rejected by the Court of  Appeal:    see Knowles  v Police CA146/98  12  October  1998,  and  R  v Mitchell CA68/04 23 August 2004.

[13]     The appellant’s argument is untenable.  There is no prospect whatever that it might succeed in the Court of Appeal.   To the extent that a question of law truly arises it is not one which by reason of its general public importance ought to be submitted to that Court.

[14]     Finally, I should note what appears to be a separate argument raised by the appellant in the context of the issue of her indebtedness to the Crown in respect of the traffic fines.  The appellant claimed that in consequence of a departure from the policies of former times when legal tender, and in particular bank notes issued by the Reserve Bank had the backing of gold reserves, an issue arose as to the legality of the currency now used as “money” for the purpose of engaging in ordinary transactions, and in particular for the purpose of discharging debts.

[15]     As I understood the argument, the appellant’s position is that it is for the

Crown to establish that legal tender exists with which the appellant might discharge

her debt, and the Crown had failed to do so.  That is, I understand, the point which appears at paragraph 4 of the submissions I have reproduced above.

[16]     That argument is completely without any proper foundation.   I mention it simply for the sake of completeness.

Decision

[17]   The application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is wholly misconceived.   The appellant has no prospect of success in that Court.   The application for leave is accordingly dismissed.

C J Allan J