M v Police HC Auckland CRI-2005-404-368

[2006] NZHC 200

This case has been anonymized

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI-2005-404-368

M

Appellant

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:         20 February 2006

Appearances: Appellant in Person (with McKenzie Friend, G Stephen) A R Longdill for Respondent

Judgment:      9 March 2006

JUDGMENT OF FRATER J

CopiesTo:  R A M   C/- 11 Stuart Street Helensville (Appellant) Meredith Connell P O Box 2213 Auckland for Respondent

M V POLICE HC AK CRI-2005-404-368  9 March 2006

Introduction

[1]      This is an appeal against conviction and sentence.

[2]      On 29 September 2005, after a hearing at the District Court at Waitakere before two Justices of the Peace, the appellant was found guilty of three minor traffic offences:

i)breach of s 31(1)(C) of the Land Transport Act 1998 – failing to produce a driver’s licence for inspection without delay after being required to do so by an enforcement officer;

ii)breach of s 17(e) of the Transport (Vehicle and Driver and Registration and Licensing) Act 1986 – using a motor vehicle with an unauthorised registration plate affixed;  and

iii)breach of ss 52 and 193 of the Transport Act 1962 – driving a vehicle on a road at a speed exceeding the relevant speed limit of 50 kilometres per hour.

[3]      When these matters were first called, Mrs M   made it clear that she did not recognise the jurisdiction of the Court.   Accordingly, the presiding Justices entered not guilty pleas and a fixture was allocated for 29 September 2005.

The hearing before Justices of the Peace

[4]      At that hearing the prosecution called two witnesses:  Snr Cons Savage and

Cons King.

[5]      Snr Cons Savage is an instructor for the use of radar and speed detecting devices used within the Police Department.  His evidence was that, on 17 January

2005, at approximately 7.30 am, he was in a Police patrol vehicle with Cons King, who he was instructing on the use of the moving radar device.  They were travelling eastwards towards Parrs Cross Road, in Henderson – a 50 kilometre per hour area. As they did so, a Nissan car with the registration plates DACODA came into the

radar beam at 75 kilometres per hour.   They gave chase and stopped the vehicle, which was being driven by the appellant.   Upon making enquiries, the officer ascertained  that  no  such  registration  name  had  been  issued  by  Land  Transport New Zealand Ltd.   On closer inspection, he found that the plates were homemade and not standard issue from LTNZ.  Accordingly, they were removed.

[6]      Cons King confirmed the evidence of his colleague concerning the speed at which the vehicle was travelling.  He said that after stopping the car he spoke with the appellant and required her to produce her driver’s licence, which she did. However, it, too, was found to be homemade.

[7]      In explanation, Mrs M   told him that both the driver’s licence and the plates were legal issue from the Maori Confederation of Chiefs, the Maori Government, of which she was Transport Minister.

[8]      Notwithstanding frequent entreaties, followed by warnings, by the presiding Justices to focus her questions, the appellant persisted in cross-examining the two witnesses about her so-called status as a citizen of the Confederation of Chiefs.  She did not dispute the fact that she was driving at the speed claimed;  nor did she assert that either the registration plates or the driver’s licence were properly authorised or issued under the laws of New Zealand.  Her case was simply that she was not and is not subject to these laws.  She told the presiding Justices that:

I’m not a citizen of your Government.

[9]      Then, rather than giving evidence herself, or calling witnesses on her behalf, she and her supporters left the Court.

[10]     At that, the Justices, purporting to proceed by way of formal proof, found the offences  established,  convicted  and  fined  the  appellant  $170  in  respect  of  the speeding offence, $55 on the failure to produce a driver’s licence, and $200 for using unauthorised registration plates.  In addition, they ordered her to pay Court costs of

$130 on each of the three offences.

Grounds of appeal

[11]     The appellant’s notice of appeal, filed on 12 October 2005, reads as follows: [spelling, grammatical and punctuation errors not corrected]

1.        That I am a Freewoman whom is a subject of the Queen Elizabeth

II and by Royal proclamation a woman of Israel.

2.        That I am the accused in the above matters

3.That the accused was born in Niu Tireni and is a protected subject under the United Kingdom of Great Britain under the Royal sea of the Crown Queen Elizabeth II.

4.And  that  the  freewoman  R  M    was  born  a freewoman to the Freeman Mohi Wirimu M   of Tamaki Makaurau Niu Tireni

5.That  I am  under  the  protection  of  Royal  Lore/Law  through  the Declaration of Independence 1835 which is the Lore/Law of the Land and not the Law of the Sea being Admiralty Law the CROWN ENTITY which derives  it’s authority by the Treaty of  Waitangi

1840

6.        That I am not the entity which a judgment was made against on the

29th day of September 2005

7.That the said entity (Accused) was the corporate entity R M, which is not me

8.That   the   Respondent   had   issued   INFRINGEMENT   NOTICE (ISSUED   UNDER   THE   LAND   TRANSPORT   ACT   1998) N454774, by way of contract without the permission of R M   to hold such a contract.

9.That R M   has never held a contract with the Respondent that would allow the Respondent to create such an invoice

10.That the accused was served with a notice of proceeding, of which contained  a  memorandum  requesting  R  M    to attend a defended hearing and for R M   to bring a witness and or evidence that she wish the court to consider.

11.      That the accused approached legal counsel for advice

12.That the legal counsel did not understand the accused common law rights and defence, and so they would not represent the defendant in the defendants, best interest.

13.That as the accused was not able to seek legal council therefore she was unable to mount a suitable defence in accordance with court

procedures and therefore was unable to conduct an appropriate defence.

14.That the presiding Justice’s of Peace failed to allow R M the opportunity to cross examine the POLICE, and further advised the POLICE not to answer any questions that were put forward

15.That the corporate entity known as the POLICE whom have laid the said the charges on behalf of the corporate entity UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE LAND TRANSPORT ACT 1998 against R M are chasing R M   whom is a freewoman and that this is a case of mistaken identity, and that Rita Harriata M   has been requested to appear before the courts relation to the matters arising in the case against RITA HARRIATA MANUKAU the DEFENDANT.   When questioning these  matters  with  the  court’s  counter  staff  in  relation  to  the document titled RITA HARRIATA MANUKAU it was stated that it was  Rita  Harriata  M    the  Freewoman  who  is  required  to attend the court.

16.That the presiding Justice’s of Peace who heard the matters have made judgment that was incorrect in fact and incorrect in law.

17.      That the respondent never held honor in the court

18.That the Justice’s of Peace had no capacity, ability and or Authority to rule over such a matter

19.      That the DISTRICT COURT OF WAITAKERE is not the correct

Court to hear such a matter

20.That the Respondent has not proven their case, and upon cross examination during the court hearing IN THE DISTRRICT COURT HELD AT WAITAKERE as the presiding Justice’s of Peace failed to  allow  R  M    the  opportunity  to  defend  the matters as the presiding Justice’s of peace did not hold the authority to hear such a case as the defence was based on Common Law/Lore of the Land not the Law of the Sea being Admiralty Law the CORPORATE ENTITY by which the DISTRICT COURT JUDGE and JUSTICE’S OF PEACE operate under and hold there Authority. These matters should have been herd in the Royal Court, Court Room 3, which is within the complex of the HIGH COURT OF AUCKLAND.

21.That R M   holds a contract with the sovereign entity known as the Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes of Niu Tireni and that their Sovereign rights are protected by Queen Elizabeth II through the Declaration of Independence and further through the statues bound by the Imperial Laws Application Act

1988 112 section 5 Application of common law of England, and

First Schedule of this same Act including written into law 1297 The Magna Carta.  This clause is for the benefit of all parties, to protect them  both  in  fairness   and  equity  of  The  Supreme   Law   of New Zealand.

22.That R M   has previous to this occasion has had charges withdraw of similar such matters.

23.That R M  , has been recently stopped by POLICE, under the  grounds  based  on  the  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  LAND TRANSPORT ACT 1998, and she has been allowed pass freely. There haven been no such charges claimed against her

24.That individuals within the POLICE a CORPORATE AUTHORITY operating under the CROWN CORPORATE ENTITY based on MARITIME CORPORATE LAW and not the Law of the Land has no such jurisdiction over a Freewoman such as R M  , who holds loyalty to the Confederation of Chiefs of the United tribes and Queen Elizabeth II and is protected by the Queen and her Royal Seal through the declaration of Independence and Common Law/Lore

25.That the Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes of Niu Tireni is a lawful Government and holds lawful office within the Lands of Niu Tireni better known as New Zealand and or Aotearoa.

26.       That  The  Confederation  of  Chiefs  of  the  United  Tribes  is  a

Protectorate of the United Kingdom.

27.That the Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes have lawful citizens who hold valid passports, and travel freely on these documents, as they are a protectorate of the, United Kingdom of Great Britain.

[12]     In the week before the hearing in this Court the appellant filed a further document entitled:

The 1835 Declaration of Independence and Its Royal Laws upheld by H.M. Queen Elizabeth II The Royal Sovereign Crown protecting The Sovereign Rita – Harriata; M   and Her Sovereign Council in opposition to THE CROWN ENTITY being THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF LONDON known as “THE CROWN” and Its New Zealand agency THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE with its SUBMISSIONS.

[13]     Then, on the morning of the hearing, she filed a document labelled

LETTER  ROGATORY.  RE:  OFFER  FOR  SETTLEMENT  AND CLOSURE VIA MUTUAL FACT-FINDING,

together with an affidavit in support.

Issues

[14]    From the notice of appeal and submissions, Ms Longdill identified five allegations by the appellant, for consideration on this appeal, namely that:

i)She was not able to secure legal representation for the hearing, and hence was unable to conduct an appropriate defence.

ii)There were procedural defects with the hearing itself – the Justices of the Peace failed to allow her to cross-examine the Police.

iii)The Waitakere District Court and the Justices of the Peace had no jurisdiction to deal with the hearing.   The matters should have been heard in Court 3 in the High Court at Auckland.

iv)The  Police  powers  to  issue  an  infringement  notice  are somehow dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between them and the appellant.   She has never been party to any such contract.

v)She holds loyalty to the Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes of Niu Tireni and Queen Elizabeth II and is protected by the Queen through the Declaration of Independence.

[15]     In addition, of course, some comment needs to be made about the “letter rogatory” – what it purports to be, and whether it, or the supporting affidavit, raise any new issues which can be determined on this appeal.

The effect of the 1835 Declaration of Independence

[16]     Allegations (iii)-(v) above have been  raised  by the  appellant  in  previous proceedings in this Court.

[17]     At the end of last year, Allan J heard an appeal from the same appellant against an order of Judge Kiernan imposing a sentence of 80 hours community work for non-payment of fines of $1,965 in respect of minor traffic offending on various occasions between 9 August 2002 and 6 April 2004.  On that occasion the appellant appeared, as she did before me, with a group of supporters.   One of them was granted leave to act as her spokesperson and made, it would seem, more or less identical arguments on the sovereignty issue to those put to me.  In fact, the primary document before Allan J, which he quoted in full in his judgment, was the document which I have referred to in [12] above.

[18]     In his judgment, Allan J set out in detail what he understood to be the essence of the appellant’s case, and commented that:

To say the least her argument is radical.

[19]     In the end, however, he concluded that there was:

... no substance in any of the arguments addressed to the Court.

[20]     Accordingly, the appeal being without merit, it was dismissed.

[21]     Recently, Mrs M   appeared before Allan J again, this time seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against his judgment.   She also sought an enlargement of the time for filing the application, which was granted.   Leave to appeal was not.

[22]     In his judgment declining leave, Allan J, of necessity, briefly summarised both the appellant’s submissions and his response to the sovereignty argument as follows:

[5]       ...  the  appellant  submitted  that  by  reason  of  the  Declaration  of

Independence made by the Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes in

1835, the common law took precedence over statute law, with the result that some statutes could bind a citizen in certain circumstances, only if  that citizen had “contracted” to abide by the law concerned.   Much of the law enacted by statute or by regulation was binding on citizens only to the extent that an individual citizen was prepared to accept that law as a matter of contract.  So went the argument.  The appellant accepted that her argument might apply not only to Maori but to any citizen of this country, and indeed to any person subject to the laws of this country.  It was further argued that

the Land Transport Act 1998 was not binding on citizens who did not elect to be bound by it, and that the appellant had not contracted with the Crown to abide by the provisions of the Land Transport Act, and was accordingly not bound by it.

[6]       The argument was therefore, in effect, a challenge to the power of Parliament to enact legislation binding upon all persons within the jurisdiction.  I held that the settled law in this country is that the Courts will give effect to legislation passed or authorised by Parliament according to its terms:   Cooper v Attorney General [1996] 3 NZLR 480, 483 and that the appellant’s argument was not supported by authority.

[23]     Having had the benefit of reading both judgments beforehand, I warned the appellant and Mr Stephen that she should not attempt to re-litigate the very issues on which this Court has already ruled.   Her remedy in that regard, if any, is to seek special leave from the Court of Appeal to take the matter further – bearing in mind, of course, that Court’s oft expressed rejection of Maori Sovereignty arguments, as for example in the statement of Hammond J in R v Mitchell CA68/04 23 August

2004 that:

[14]     This Court has made it plain on a number of occasions now that arguments  that  are  based  upon  an  assertion  that  the  Parliament  of New Zealand was not authorised to make law affecting some or all of the persons living in New Zealand cannot succeed before it.   Our courts are bound to accept the validity of Acts of Parliament, including the Land Transport  Act  1998.    Although  this  issue  does  involve  a  point  of  law, Mr Mitchell’s proposition has been squarely rejected on many occasions in the High Court and Court of Appeal.  No useful purpose would be served in retraversing the authorities.  Mr Mitchell was perfectly familiar with them, and indeed was physically in possession of some of those authorities before us, including Knowles.  He just does not accept them.  He is not entitled to put himself outside the law of New Zealand.

“Letter rogatory” and supporting affidavit

[24]     I have made several fruitless attempts to find a cogent argument among the random collection of words and phrases in these two documents.  The most that I can say is that the following themes seem to run through them:

i)The use of capital letters in the name of the defendant on the infringement notice indicates that the intended recipient was a corporate entity, rather than the appellant, a “freewoman”.

ii)The prosecution failed to establish that the corporate entity and the freewoman are one and the same.

iii)In the absence of proof that the two entities are the same, service of the notice on the freewoman was defective.

iv)The  appellant  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  documents addressed to the corporate entity, although she can somehow or other hold them in trust for that entity.

v)Despite requests to do so, the Police have failed to produce any documents, material facts or evidence, to establish their legal authority to take proceedings against the freewoman, the appellant.

[25]     Notwithstanding   the   errors   made   by   the   Police,   the   appellant,   “the freewoman”, wants to resolve all issues with the Police.   However, to do so, she requires the Police/Crown to provide proper disclosure of the legal basis for the proceedings.  They have failed to do so.

[26]     Accordingly,  although,  at  first  sight,  this  documentation  may  seem  far removed from the initial material considered by Allen J, the underlying theme remains the same:   i.e. the lack of power of the Police and/or the Crown to take proceedings against those governed by the 1835 Declaration of Independence.

[27]     I find the argument is no more plausible in this guise, than it was in the material rejected by Allen J.

Factual issues concerning the original hearing

[28]     Finally  there  are  the  appellant’s  complaints  about  the  original  hearing, namely:

i)        her lack of legal representation;  and

ii)       her inability to cross-examine the Police witnesses. [29]         These are detailed in her notice of appeal, set out in [11] above. [30]          These arguments are also without foundation.

[31]     The appellant’s complaint about lack of legal representation was not that she was denied legal representation.  It was rather that she could not find a lawyer who was willing to advance her misconceived defence.  That is hardly surprising.  But, significantly, there is no indication in the transcript of the hearing that she either sought  an  adjournment  to  enable  her  to obtain  legal  representation,  or  that  she mentioned the issue at all.

[32]     Nor can she complain about the hearing she was afforded before the Justices. She was given ample opportunity to cross-examine each of the Police witnesses. What she was not allowed to do was to question them at length about Maori Sovereignty issues;  she was not to use cross-examination as a forum for advocating her views on that issue;   she was to focus on questioning the officers about their evidence.  That is apparent from the transcript.  For example:

“CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS MANUKAU Mr Savage?.....  Senior Constable thank you.

Oh  Well  Senior  Constable  Mr  Savage  I’m an  equal  partner  to  the  Her

Majesty Queen Elizabeth of the land.

THE COURT – Now hang on?.....  No, no, you said I had my stay [sic].

No, no, I didn’t say you had your say, no, no, listen.  I didn’t say you had a say there I said you have your say about what Constable has just said ?..... Yes that’s where I’m getting up to.

Well let’s go straight to it alright?.....  Okay.

A representative of another Government in Aotearoa that has a constitution in sovereignty of the land Mr Savage you sated [sic] here today that you work,  who  do  you  work  for?.....     I  am  a  Senior  Constable  of  the New Zealand Police based at Henderson.

That’s  okay,  okay,  what  firm  do  you  work  for?.....    I  work  for  the

New Zealand Police as a Senior Constable based at Henderson.

And what Crown is that?.....

THE COURT – He explains what he does, carry on, carry on Mrs M  . I am a representative of

THE COURT – Stand back where you are now, stand back.   Now this is what happens in this Court and you are well aware of this Court?..... Yes.

We are not going to go through those procedures again otherwise I will start at the beginning and we will go through.  Now you keep it right direct to the right questions, you are not asking what his seniority is or anything anymore.

What is the Crown.

THE  COURT  –  You  know  what  the  Crown  is.   He  has  answered  the question he does not have to answer anymore, continue please.

Is that Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth

THE COURT – Continue, we are not going down that road at all. Ms Kelly JP Kelly.

THE COURT – Please don’t try to.

Look I’m trying to present my case as a sovereign, individual and equal partner to Her Majesty the Queen.

THE COURT – And Mrs M   I’m here as the community person and I’m doing my job too, we are not going through the (Inaudible) and actual so just that we get it right this is my Court not your Court so let’s not challenge or lead those areas.  We are actually here to deal with the situation please don’t go down them [sic] anymore because going away from it is not going to help.

As an equal partner of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth. THE COURT – Off you go, carry on.

As Tangata Whenua of the land your ship is in dry dock.

THE COURT – Absolutely, I don’t mind whether its, what dock it is in.  My

Court will carry on so please carry on.

So what you are saying I am going to be convicted under admiralty. THE COURT – No.  Come on Ms M  .

[33]     The  Justices  were  right  to  endeavour  to  focus  the  appellant’s  line  of questioning.   Like any judicial officers, it was their responsibility to control proceedings in their Court.  They have both the right, and the duty, to all involved in the Court process:  defendants, prosecutors and witnesses alike, to ensure that time is not wasted pursuing issues which are clearly without merit.  The Court hearing is not

an opportunity for anyone who has a grievance to harangue those present about their views on unrelated issues.

[34]     What is clear from the transcript in this case is that the appellant did not challenge any of the factual evidence given by the officers:  that she was the driver of the car they stopped;   the speed at which the car was being driven;   that the allowable speed limit in the particular area was 50 kilometres per hour and that neither the driver’s licence that she carried, nor the licence plates on the car that she was driving, were authorised by the laws of New Zealand.  Her argument was that she was not subject to those laws.   Although, clearly, for the reasons already traversed, that is not a valid argument, it was not a matter on which the officers were required to, or could comment, beyond identifying the laws or regulations under which they carried out their procedures and the offence notices were issued.

[35]     If anything, these were matters of legal submission.  Mrs M   chose not to remain in Court to make submissions.  In any event, it is apparent that the Justices were well aware of the argument she wished to raise, and properly rejected it.  They cannot be criticised for that.

Costs

[36]     In the circumstances, Ms Longdill sought an order for costs.   Neither the appellant nor her McKenzie friend made any submissions on that issue.

[37]     Given that the matters raised on appeal had already been raised before, in one guise or another, and rejected, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to award costs to the Crown on this completely unmeritorious appeal.

[38]     Accordingly, I make an order for costs against the appellant in the sum of

$750.

M A Frater J