Lynda Rose Barry v Francis Carlisle

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 157/2016
[2017] NZSC 64
BETWEEN

LYNDA ROSE BARRY
Applicant

AND

FRANCIS CARLISLE
Respondent

Court:

William Young, OʼRegan and Ellen France JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
M G Locke for Respondent

Judgment:

4 May 2017

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

B         The applicant is to pay costs of $2,500 to the respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. The case arises out of an attempt by the applicant to enforce a deed which she and the respondent entered into in 2002 under which she was to have a half interest in a property owned by the respondent in Marlborough.  In the High Court, Brown J held that there was no consideration for the deed and that it was therefore not enforceable by specific performance.[1]  He also held that the deed should be set aside as unconscionable.[2]  In both respects, his judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal.[3] 

    [1]Barry v Carlisle [2015] NZHC 1554, (2015) 16 NZCPR 449 (Brown J) [Barry (HC)]

    [2]At [130]–[134].

    [3]Barry v Carlisle [2016] NZCA 551 (Randerson, Duffy and Whata JJ) at [48]–[60] and [61]–[72].

  2. For the purposes of the present application, it is sufficient to address only the proposed ground of appeal relating to the setting aside of the deed.

  3. The applicant and respondent had a relationship which, on the findings of fact in the courts below, lasted for approximately 18 months and concluded in August 1992.  They had a continuing association up until 2011.  In 1997 the respondent purchased the Marlborough property.  Although named as a purchaser on the agreement for sale and purchase, the applicant did not commit any funds towards the purchase and title was taken in the respondent’s name.  Later a house was built on the property.  Although the applicant lived there from time to time and met some living expenses, the courts below held that she made no contribution to the costs of acquiring the land or the improvements placed upon it.  The 2002 deed is an unusual document.  The respondent said in evidence that he could not remember signing it and the applicant’s evidence as to the context would appear not to have been accepted by the trial judge.

  4. On the findings of fact in the High Court:[4]

    (a)the respondent was not well at the time the deed was signed and was significantly compromised in terms of cognitive ability;[5]

    (b)the applicant was well aware of this; and

    (c)she took advantage of his disadvantage by inducing him to enter into a bargain which was improvident from his point of view.

    [4]Barry (HC), above n 1, at [132].

    [5]See also the relevant material as to the respondent’s health at [3] and at [39]–[42].

  5. These findings were upheld by the Court of Appeal.

  6. In her submissions in support of her application for leave to appeal, the applicant advances many challenges to the concurrent findings made by the High Court and Court of Appeal.  She also challenges…

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Details
Case
[2017] NZSC 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed an application for leave to appeal a decision made by the Court of Appeal, which had previously upheld the High Court's ruling that a deed was not enforceable due to lack of consideration and was unconscionable. The applicant, Lynda Rose Barry, sought a half interest in a property owned by the respondent, Francis Carlisle, under a deed executed in 2002. The High Court held that the deed lacked consideration and should be set aside as unconscionable. These findings were upheld by the Court of Appeal. The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the findings of fact and application of legal principles by the lower courts warranted an appeal.

The Supreme Court found that the lower courts had correctly applied settled principles in concluding that the deed should be set aside. The Court of Appeal had upheld findings that the respondent was significantly compromised in terms of cognitive ability at the time the deed was signed, and the applicant was aware of this and took advantage of his disadvantage. These findings did not raise any question of public or general importance, nor did they appear to indicate a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the application for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $2,500 to the respondent. The reasoning and outcome underscore the importance of the established principles regarding unconscionability and the role of the Supreme Court in reviewing such findings.

The Supreme Court's decision highlights the limited circumstances under which it will allow an appeal against findings of fact and application of legal principles by lower courts. The Court’s dismissal of the application, along with the award of costs, reinforces the finality of the Court of Appeal's decision in this matter.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application by Lynda Rose Barry to enforce a deed that she and Francis Carlisle entered into in 2002. According to the deed, Barry was to receive a half interest in a property owned by Carlisle in Marlborough. The relationship between Barry and Carlisle lasted for about 18 months, ending in August 1992, but they remained associated until 2011. In 1997, Carlisle purchased the Marlborough property, with title taken solely in his name despite Barry being named as a purchaser. A house was later built on the property, which Barry occupied occasionally and contributed some living expenses for, but made no contributions to the acquisition costs or improvements. The 2002 deed, which Barry seeks to enforce, is considered unusual, with Carlisle stating he could not recall signing it. The High Court found that at the time the deed was signed, Carlisle was not well and significantly compromised cognitively, facts of which Barry was aware, and she took advantage of his condition to induce him into an improvident bargain.

In the High Court, Brown J held that the deed was not enforceable due to lack of consideration and deemed it unconscionable, ordering it be set aside. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Barry subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand, challenging the findings of fact and the rejection of new evidence by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered Barry to pay costs to Carlisle.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the application for leave to appeal should be granted.
2. Whether the findings of fact made by the High Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal are correct.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in rejecting the new evidence presented by Barry.

Held
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The findings of fact made by the High Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal are correct.
3. The Court of Appeal did not err in rejecting the new evidence presented by Barry.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application for leave to appeal in the case of Lynda Rose Barry v Francis Carlisle. The Court concluded that the agreement should be set aside based on well-settled principles applied by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the respondent was not well at the time the deed was signed and was significantly compromised in terms of cognitive ability, and that the applicant was well aware of this and took advantage of his disadvantage by inducing him to enter into an improvident bargain. These findings of fact were upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court saw no question of public or general importance in the application of these principles nor any appearance of a miscarriage of justice in the findings of fact. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs of $2,500 were awarded to the respondent. The Court of Appeal's rejection of the new evidence presented by Barry was also upheld as the dispute was essentially factual in nature.