Lynch v FCL CL Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WAIHŌPAI ROHE

CIV-2024-425-42

[2024] NZHC 2117

UNDER the Land Transfer Act 2017

IN THE MATTER

of an application for an order under s 143 of the Land Transfer Act 2017 that a caveat not lapse

BETWEEN

MONIQUE HUNE LYNCH and LUKE ALEXANDER SANSOM

Plaintiffs

AND

FCL CL LIMITED, as trustee of the FCL CL TRUST

Defendant

CIV-2024-425-41

UNDER

the Land Transfer Act 2017

IN THE MATTER

of an application for an order under s 143 of the Land Transfer Act 2017 that a caveat not lapse

BETWEEN

MARTA YATES

Plaintiff

AND

FCL CL LIMITED, as trustee of the FCL CL TRUST

Defendant

Hearing: 16 July 2024

Appearances:

D G Chesterman for Applicants S A Grant for Respondent

Judgment:

31 July 2024


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER


LYNCH v FCL CL LIMITED [2024] NZHC 2117 [31 July 2024]

[1]    Monique Lynch and Luke Sansom purchased a residential apartment off the plans from FCL CL Limited (FCL). Ms Yates, by a separate contract, also purchased a unit in the same development being constructed by FCL in Queenstown. I will refer to the plaintiffs in this proceeding as the purchasers as, by and large, their circumstances are the same.

[2]    The purchasers seek by summary judgment, specific performance of their agreements. As the purchasers are in the same position, neither counsel suggested the outcome of their applications should differ.

[3]    I have the advantage in preparing  this  judgment  of  having  Associate  Judge Paulsen’s judgment of 9 April 2024 between the same parties.1 That judgment concerned an application by the purchasers to sustain their caveats over the development land. I fully adopt Judge Paulsen’s summary of the background which  I set out below.

[4]I will refer to the defendants in this judgment as either FCL or the vendor.

Summary of dispute

[5]    FCL exhausted its funding facility for the development due, it says, to delays and costs increases resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. When the purchasers would not agree to increase the purchase price for their units, FCL purported to cancel their agreements relying on a force majeure clause. The purchasers lodged caveats over the head title which FCL regarded as a further breach of the agreements giving rise to an independent entitlement to cancel. Associate Judge Paulsen maintained the purchasers’ caveats in his judgment of 9 April 2024 and the evidence from that proceeding is by consent produced in this proceeding along with further evidence.

[6]    The following statement of the background is taken largely unchanged from Associate Judge Paulsen’s judgment — neither counsel suggested his Honour’s summary was not accurate (albeit FCL has appealed the outcome).


1      Lynch v FCL CL Ltd [2024] NZHC 700.

Background

[7]    The dealings between the parties took place against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first case of COVID-19 was reported in New Zealand on 28 February 2020 and the  Government  introduced  COVID-19  restrictions  from  14 March…

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Details
Case
[2024] NZHC 2117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Monique Lynch and Luke Sansom, as well as Marta Yates, sought summary judgment against FCL CL Limited, a developer, to enforce their agreements to purchase residential units in a Queenstown development. The agreements included force majeure and no-caveat clauses, which FCL argued could justify cancelling the agreements. FCL claimed the COVID-19 pandemic caused cost increases and delays, leading to the exhaustion of its funding. When the purchasers refused to increase their purchase prices, FCL purported to cancel the agreements and demanded the removal of the caveats the purchasers lodged to protect their interests. The purchasers argued that FCL did not have a valid basis to cancel under the force majeure clause because it had obtained or was negotiating for new funding, and therefore, completion of the development was not impractical. They also argued that FCL could not validly cancel based on the no-caveat clause because FCL itself was not willing or able to perform the agreements.

The court found that the purchasers had satisfied the low threshold required for summary judgment, as FCL could not show an arguable defence. While there were disputed factual issues, such as the exact timing of the funding arrangements, the court concluded that it was at least reasonably arguable that FCL had funding in place or was in the process of obtaining it, which meant that it was not impractical for FCL to continue construction. The court also found that the purchasers were forced to lodge caveats due to FCL's unwillingness to perform the agreements, and therefore, FCL could not validly cancel based on the no-caveat clause. The court granted summary judgment in favour of the purchasers, ordering specific performance of their agreements, with leave reserved to apply further should the need arise. Costs were to be addressed in a later filing.

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Background to the litigation

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