| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 32/2012 [2012] NZSC 77 |
| BETWEEN LOKTRONIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED |
| AND STEPHEN JOHN DIVER |
| AND SDR LIMITED |
| AND ROY BOWYER |
| AND TRIMEC TECHNOLOGY PTY LIMITED |
| AND NEIL RICHARD HINGSTON |
| AND ASSA ABLOY NEW ZEALAND LIMITED |
| Court: Elias CJ, McGrath and William Young JJ |
| Counsel: S A Grant and E Krishnan for Applicant |
| Judgment: 5 September 2012 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (RECALL)
AThe application for recall is dismissed with costs of $1,000 to be shared equally by each set of respondents making submissions on the application.
BAny issues concerning orders made by the Court of Appeal or other outstanding matters must be addressed to that Court.
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REASONS
The applicant applies for recall of a judgment refusing it leave to appeal.[1] The ground is that the Court, in refusing leave, did not address whether the appeal had a sufficient prospect of success to warrant leave being granted to address a question of general commercial significance.
The applicant says that the Court has not made clear which of the versions of the facts is relied on in concluding the appeal is unlikely to succeed. In this respect, the applicant’s submissions misinterpret the Court’s leave judgment. Paragraph [5] addressed the different possible formulations of the legal standard of knowledge required to establish liability. This Court said that a formulation of a test for that standard, that was different in subtle respects from that adopted by the Court of Appeal,[2] would not be dispositive. The comment that the applicant would not succeed in a further appeal on the point merely repeats what was said in the previous sentence. It is not expressing a conclusion that the appeal against the factual determination could not succeed if leave were granted.
[2] Diver v Loktronic Industries Ltd [2012] NZCA 131, [2012] 2 NZLR 388.
The underlying premise of the application to recall appears to be that where a proposition of general commercial significance is associated with a proposed appeal, leave to appeal should be given even if the determination of that question will not affect the outcome of the case. Under s 13(2)(c), however, it is only necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear a proposed appeal concerning a matter of general commercial significance if the matter relied on is likely to be material to the outcome of the case.
As well, the proposed appeal on the factual issues did not satisfy the interests of justice test under s 13(1)(b) as the circumstances did not indicate that a miscarriage of justice might have occurred, applying that principle as explained in Junior Farms Ltd v Hampton Securities Ltd.[3]
[3]Junior Farms Ltd v Hampton Securities Ltd(in liq) [2006] NZSC 60, [2006] 3 NZLR 522.
The application for recall is accordingly dismissed with costs of $1,000 to be shared equally by each set of respondents making submissions on the application. Any remaining issues concerning the interim orders made by the Court of Appeal, or other outstanding matters, must be addressed in that Court or the High Court.
Solicitors:
Baldwins Law Limited, Auckland for Applicant
Lowndes Jordan, Auckland for First Respondent
Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, Auckland for Third, Fourth and Sixth Respondents
- AGLC
- Loktronic Industries Ltd v Diver [2012] NZSC 77
- Case
- [2012] NZSC 77
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues at hand revolved around the criteria for granting leave to appeal as outlined in section 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. Specifically, the court had to decide whether the appeal had a sufficient prospect of success to warrant leave being granted and whether the matter of general commercial significance warranted such leave. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal did not properly consider whether the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success, particularly in relation to a question of general commercial significance. Additionally, Loktronic contended that the Court of Appeal did not clearly identify which version of the facts it relied upon in concluding that the appeal was unlikely to succeed.
The Supreme Court found that the applicant's arguments misconstrued the Court of Appeal's decision. The Court of Appeal had indeed considered the different possible formulations of the legal standard of knowledge required to establish liability, as outlined in paragraph [5] of its judgment. The Supreme Court emphasized that the comment regarding the applicant's likelihood of success in a further appeal was not expressing a conclusion that the appeal against the factual determination could not succeed if leave were granted. The Court also noted that under section 13(2)(c), it is only necessary for the Court to hear a proposed appeal concerning a matter of general commercial significance if the matter relied on is likely to be material to the outcome of the case. Furthermore, the appeal did not satisfy the interests of justice test under section 13(1)(b) as it did not indicate that a miscarriage of justice might have occurred.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for recall and ordered that costs of $1,000 be shared equally by each set of respondents making submissions on the application. Any remaining issues concerning the interim orders made by the Court of Appeal or other outstanding matters were to be addressed in that Court or the High Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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