Lobb v Lockhart Trustees Services no 56 Limited

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA728/2020
 [2021] NZCA 180

BETWEEN

STUART JAMES LOBB
Applicant

AND

LOCKHART TRUSTEES SERVICES NO 56 LIMITED
First Respondent

VERENA COLLEEN RYAN
Second Respondent

DIGBY JOHN NOYCE
Third Respondent

Court:

Brown and Clifford JJ

Counsel:

P A Fuscic for Applicant
A A H Low for First Respondent
W M Patterson for Second Respondent
H L Thompson for Third Respondent

Judgment:

13 May 2021 at 12.30 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for an extension of time to appeal is declined. 

BThe applicant must pay the second respondent costs on a band A basis for a standard application for leave to appeal and usual disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Brown J)

Introduction

  1. The applicant, Mr Lobb, applies under r 29A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 for an extension of time to appeal against a judgment of the High Court which ordered the removal of each of Mr Lobb, the first respondent (Lockhart) and the second respondent (Ms Ryan) as trustees of the Lothbury Trust, and appointed the third respondent (Mr Noyce) as receiver of the Trust.[1] 

  2. The application is opposed by Ms Ryan.  Mr Noyce abides the decision of the Court.  While initially opposing, Lockhart now abides the Court’s decision on the extension of time application because it understands that Mr Lobb is not expressly seeking Lockhart’s reappointment as a trustee.  However Lockhart reserves its position both in respect of any appeal and in relation to costs.

Background

  1. The Trust, whose assets include the former Remuera family home of Mr Lobb and Ms Ryan, who are now estranged, was settled by Mr Lobb and Ms Ryan by Deed of Trust dated 17 June 2005.  They were the first trustees of the Trust together with the Public Trust, the latter of which was replaced as independent trustee by Lockhart in 2015.  Mr Lobb and Ms Ryan have the power to appoint and remove trustees, a power required to be exercised by them jointly and unanimously.

  2. Lockhart applied for orders discharging it as a trustee and appointing an interim trustee or a receiver of the Trust assets.  In her judgment of 27 July 2020 granting the application, Edwards J described Lockhart’s position as impossible, it being unable to obtain instructions or agreement from the other trustees which prevented it from discharging its duties as an independent trustee.[2]  The Judge noted that a replacement trustee could not be found, but observed that, even if that were not so, an appointment would serve little purpose as the new trustee would find itself caught in the crossfire between Mr Lobb and Ms Ryan.[3]

    [2]At [26].

    [3]At [27].

  3. The Judge concluded:

    [28]     The Trust Deed allows for the Trust to continue with only two trustees.  That means Lockhart could be removed without any further orders being made.  However, the extent of the dysfunctional…

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Details
Case
[2021] NZCA 180
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Lobb v Lockhart Trustees Services no 56 Limited, the applicant, Mr Lobb, sought an extension of time to appeal against a High Court judgment that ordered the removal of the trustees of the Lothbury Trust, including Mr Lobb, and appointed a receiver. The application was opposed by the second respondent, Ms Ryan. The court was required to determine whether to grant an extension of time for Mr Lobb to appeal the judgment, and if so, on what terms. The court considered the principles applicable to extensions of time under rule 29A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005, and whether the reasons advanced for the delay in appealing were sufficient to justify an extension of time.

The court found that the reasons for the delay did not adequately explain or justify the delay in pursuing the matter. The delay was substantial and there was significant prejudice to the second respondent, Ms Ryan, who had a concern that the continued delay in resolving the matter would result in her being unable to meet any contribution she may be required to make from her share of the Trust asset. The court also found that the two judgments were not intrinsically linked, and that there was no strong public interest in the hearing of an appeal from the judgment of Edwards J. The court declined the application for an extension of time and ordered Mr Lobb to pay the second respondent costs on a band A basis for a standard application for leave to appeal and usual disbursements.

This case highlights the importance of timely appeals and the need for applicants to provide sufficient reasons for any delay in pursuing an appeal. The court emphasised the need to consider the interests of justice when deciding whether to grant an extension of time, and the need to balance the reasons for the delay against the prejudice caused to the respondent. The court also noted the importance of considering the significance of the issues raised by the proposed appeal, both to the parties and more generally.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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