Lipsham v Helmbright

[2022] NZHC 1350

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE

CIV-2020-488-000088

[2022] NZHC 1350

BETWEEN

MARK EDWARD LIPSHAM

Plaintiff

AND

KIM KATHERINE HELMBRIGHT

Defendant

Hearing:	23 May 2022
Appearances:	S L Cogan for the Plaintiff Defendant in Person
Judgment:	9 June 2022

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE GARDINER

This judgment was delivered by me on 9 June 2022 at 3.30 p.m. pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date.......................................

Solicitors:

Lodder Law Limited, Auckland

S L Cogan, Quay Chambers, Auckland Copy for:

K K Helmbright, Whangarei

LIPSHAM v HELMBRIGHT [2022] NZHC 1350 [9 June 2022]

Introduction

[1]    In 2017, Mark Lipsham’s life changed when he won approximately $17 million on Lotto. He met Kim Helmbright in 2019, and engaged her to advise him on financial, property, spiritual and personal matters. By December 2019, he had paid her approximately $2.8 million. By May 2020, their relationship had broken down.

[2]    This proceeding  concerns  whether  the  $2.8  million  Mr  Lipsham  paid  Ms Helmbright was, as Mr Lipsham contends, for Ms Helmbright to buy one or more properties for him. Or, as Ms Helmbright contends, payment under a “Freelancing Agreement” under which she was to provide him with the described services.

[3]    In this application, Mr Lipsham seeks particular discovery of categories of documents relating to the $2.8 million he paid, properties Ms Helmbright investigated for him and properties she bought for herself, and the services she provided to       Mr Lipsham. Ms Helmbright opposes the application on the grounds that the documents are either not in her possession or control; or are confidential and/or legally privileged.

[4]    During the hearing Ms Helmbright agreed to discover some of the categories she had previously contested.

Background

Facts

[5]    In or around October 2019, Mr Lipsham engaged Ms Helmbright to provide him with financial, property, personal and spiritual services. Over a period of approximately two months, Mr Lipsham paid Ms Helmbright approximately $70,000 for these services.1

[6]    Amongst other services, Ms Helmbright was to act on behalf of Mr Lipsham to buy one or more properties in his name.2

1 Statement of claim dated 27 April 2021 at [15]; statement of defence dated 11 October 2021 at [15].

2      Statement of claim at [31]-[33]; statement of defence at [31]-[33].

[7]In addition to the $70,000, Mr Lipsham paid Ms Helmbright approximately

$2.8 million on 2 December 2019.

[8]    Ms  Helmbright  engaged with real estate agents and  lawyers on behalf of  Mr Lipsham regarding properties at:

(a)Aucks Road, Russell; and

(b)Opito Bay Road, Opua.

[9]In the end, these properties were not purchased.

[10]   On or about 17 January 2020, Ms Helmbright purchased, in her own name, a property at Pungaere Road, Waipapa for $1,675,000.

[11]   On 26 March 2020, Ms Helmbright purchased, in her own name, a property at Horeke Road, Okaihau for $660,000.

[12]As noted, by May 2020 their relationship had ended.

Issues

[13]Mr Lipsham’s case is that Ms Helmbright represented to him that the

$2.8 million payment was required to settle the purchase of one or more properties in his name, and that he made the payment for that express purpose.

[14]   Ms Helmbright says that the payment was for services under the “Freelancing Agreement”. She has discovered this document. It is signed by Mr Lipsham and dated 4 October 2019.

[15]   Mr Lipsham concedes that he signed the Freelancing Agreement. But he disputes that he signed it on 4 October 2019 as Ms Helmbright contends. He says he signed it in December 2019, after he had paid the $2.8 million to Ms Helmbright, and that the Agreement was backdated by Ms Helmbright. Thus, he says that the payment

was not made pursuant to the Freelancing Agreement because it did not at that time exist.

[16]   If the Freelancing Agreement was entered into by the time of the payment (which is denied by Mr Lipsham), he says that it was: an unconscionable bargain; as a result of undue influence by Ms Helmbright over Mr Lipsham; was repudiated by Ms Helmbright and subsequently cancelled by Mr Lipsham; and/or was entered into under a mistake by Mr Lipsham.

[17]   There is no dispute that Ms Helmbright bought the above properties at Waipapa and Okaihau in her own name. Further, she appears to concede that she bought the properties with the $2.8 million Mr Lipsham paid her.3 However, her case is that this payment was not for her to purchase properties on Mr Lipsham’s behalf, but for her services under the Freelancing Agreement, and she was free to use it as she wished.

[18]   Mr Lipsham pleads 10 causes of action against Ms Helmbright. The first (breach of express trust), second (breach of resulting trust), fourth and fifth (institutional constructive trust) are proprietary and seek to trace the payment into property purchased by Ms Helmbright.

[19]Key issues for the Court to determine at trial will be:

(a)Whether the payment was made to Ms Helmbright:

(i)for  the  purposes  of  buying  one  or  more  properties  in    Mr Lipsham’s name; or

(ii)pursuant to the so-called “Freelancing Agreement”.

(b)How Ms Helmbright in fact applied the payment and whether the payment can be traced into such asset(s).

3 Defendant’s affidavit of documents sworn 11 March 2022 at [13].

Procedural history

[20]   On 8 April 2021, Associate Judge Bell made an order for standard discovery under r 8.7 of the High Court Rules 2016.

[21]   On 1 December 2021, Ms Helmbright filed and served an affidavit of documents.

[22]   On 28 January 2022, Mr Lipsham filed this application. The application is supported by an affidavit from Mr Lipsham sworn on 4 February 2022.

[23]On 21 February 2022, I ordered:4

[a]   Within 14 days, Ms Helmbright is to file and serve a further affidavit of documents that:

[i]   states in respect of the documents and/or classes of documents listed in the Schedule to the interlocutory application, whether they are or have been in her control; and

[ii]  if any of the documents have been but are no longer in her control, states to her best knowledge and belief when the documents ceased to be in her control and who now has control of them.

[24]   Leave was reserved for Mr Lipsham to apply for the application to be set down for hearing if Ms Helmbright’s affidavit was considered inadequate.

[25]   On 11 March 2022, Ms Helmbright filed and served a further affidavit of documents and made certain limited documents available for inspection.

[26]   In respect of the balance of documents sought by Mr Lipsham, Ms Helmbright asserted that the documents were not in her possession or control; or were confidential or privileged. As a result, Mr Lipsham’s interlocutory application for particular discovery was set down to be heard.

4      Minute of Associate Judge Gardiner dated 21 February 2022.

Legal principles

[27]   Under r 8.19 of the High Court Rules, a Court may make an order for particular discovery after the proceeding has commenced where:

…it appears to a Judge, from evidence or from the nature or circumstances of the case or from any document filed in the proceeding, that there are grounds for believing that a party has not discovered 1 or more documents or a group of documents that should have been discovered…

[28]   The starting point is that a document or class of documents will only be discoverable if relevant to the matters at issue before the Court. Only then can it be said that, in terms of the rule, they “should have been discovered”.5

[29]   The Court usually follows a four-stage approach in considering applications under r 8.19.6 First, are the documents relevant to issues before the Court, and if so, how important will they be? Secondly, are there grounds for belief that the documents exist? This will often be a matter of inference. Thirdly, would the time and cost of discovery be proportionate to its potential value? Fourthly, weighing and balancing these matters, and in the Court’s discretion, is an order appropriate?

[30]   This Court has previously observed that relevance is to be assessed according to the pleadings.7 In determining relevance, it is the case of the party seeking discovery that must be assumed to be true, not the party from whom discovery is sought. Further, the party seeking particular discovery has the onus of establishing that the party from whom discovery is sought is in control of document that should have been discovered under standard discovery.8

[31]   The threshold embodied in 'grounds for belief' is not high; all that is necessary is to show that there is some credible evidence which, assessed objectively, indicates that the documents that are sought exist.9

5      Robert v Foxton Equities Ltd [2014] NZHC 726, [2015] NZAR 1351 at [8](a).

6      Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd [2015] NZHC 2760, [2018] NZAR 600 at [14]; and Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR8.19.03].

7      Robert v Foxton Equities Ltd, above n 5, at [8](b).

8      At [8](c).

9      Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd, above n 6, at [12].

[32]   I will now consider each of the categories of documents sought by Mr Lipsham against these principles.

Category 1 – the Freelancing Agreement

[33]   Mr Lipsham seeks discovery of documents relating to the Freelancing Agreement, including:

(a)documents relating to the negotiation of the Agreement;

(b)any drafts of the Agreement in their native electronic form, including metadata as to when the document was created; and

(c)any invoices, credit cards, bank statements, receipts or other documents relating to the purchase and download of the precedent for the Agreement.

[34]   There is no dispute that any documents that exist within this category are relevant. Plainly they are relevant to the issue of when the Freelancing Agreement was entered into.

[35]   Ms Helmbright says she disposed of the computer on which she created the Freelancing Agreement in or about February 2020.10 Further, she says that she does not have any documents relating to negotiation of the Agreement, drafts, receipts or invoices or other documents relating to the purchase and download of the template for the Agreement.

[36]   At the hearing, Ms Helmbright stated that she did not download the Agreement as such but created it from extracts of different template documents she found online. She stated that she did this with Mr Lipsham within days of them meeting.

10 Defendant’s affidavit of documents sworn 11 March 2022 at [5].

[37]   Further, she says she did not backup the contents of the laptop in question before she disposed of it. She is unaware whether the contents were automatically backed up to a cloud-based system and undertook to check that.

[38]   Mr Cogan for Mr Lipsham submits that it defies credibility that Ms Helmbright did not have some form of cloud-based backup of the contents of the laptop that has been disposed of, or that she did not transfer the content of the old laptop to a new device. He submits that it is inherently improbable that the contents of the laptop were simply discarded.

[39]   Mr Cogan also submits that the Freelancing Agreement is plainly based on a template document downloaded online. Therefore, there must be a payment record.

[40]   With leave, Mr Cogan filed a further affidavit after the hearing. The affidavit, of Louise Keddell, Senior Consultant at Blomfield Consultancy Limited, a provider of litigation support services, addresses the source of the Freelancing Agreement document.11 Ms Keddell deposes that on 24 May 2022, she sourced and printed a “Sample Freelancing Agreement” template from a website called Documatica Legal Forms ( She downloaded the template from

She states that Documatica allows the customer to build a personalised document by answering a series of questions on a form.

[41]   Ms Keddell states that she completed the form using the details from the Freelancing Agreement relied on by Ms Helmbright in this proceeding. She then downloaded the completed document, paying the required cost of USD 29.95 by way of credit card through the online payment service PayPal. She received a receipt by email along with the transaction ID, which she has annexed to her affidavit.

[42]   Ms Keddell then compared the completed document she downloaded after completing the form and making payment with the Freelancing Agreement produced by Ms Helmbright. She has annexed that comparison to her affidavit. The two documents are remarkably similar. From this, I infer that Ms Helmbright must have

11     Affidavit of Louise Christina Keddell affirmed 24 May 2022.

created, downloaded and paid for the Freelancing Agreement from the Documatica website.

[43]   On that basis, there are compelling grounds for believing that Ms Helmbright will have received a receipt with a transaction ID from Documatica when she downloaded and paid for the document. She should also have a record of payment through a credit card or bank account. An order follows at the end of this judgment requiring Ms Helmbright to provide discovery of these documents, and any record of the download.

Categories 2 and 3 – tax related documents

[44]Mr Lipsham seeks discovery of:

(a)income tax and/or GST returns for the 2018 to 2021 tax years (Category 2);

(b)all communications between Ms Helmbright and any third parties (including her accountants and the Inland Revenue Department) regarding payments received by her from Mr Lipsham and/or any income tax or GST paid and/or claimed in respect of such payments (Category 3).

[45]   Mr Cogan submits that the Category 2 and 3 documents are relevant and within the terms of the discovery order as they relate to whether Ms Helmbright treated the

$2.8 million as income for services provided to Mr Lipsham (as she alleges), or as funds for the purchase of properties for Mr Lipsham.

[46]   Ms  Helmbright  has  included  in  her  discovery  a  purported  invoice   to Mr  Lipsham (which Mr  Lipsham denies ever  having received) for $2.8 million.  Mr Cogan submits that if, as Ms Helmbright asserts, that payment was made for services rather than for purchase of properties on behalf of Mr Lipsham, one would expect Ms Helmbright to  have returned income tax to the IRD on this amount.     Ms Helmbright has disclosed what appears to be a GST summary but no other documents relating to how she treated the payment for tax purposes.

[47]   Ms Helmbright does not deny that the Category 2 and 3 documents exist and are within her possession or control.12 However, she raises two objections: first, that she had no association with Mr Lipsham during 2018.13 Second, that the documents sought are privileged and/or confidential.

[48]   In relation to the first objection, income tax and/or GST returns for the 2018/ 2019 tax period are sought because  it  was  within  that  tax  period  that  she  and Mr Lipsham began their relationship; and Mr Lipsham paid the $2.8 million and other amounts to her.

[49]   In relation to the second objection, confidentiality is not a ground for resisting discovery.14 Relevant confidential documents must be listed, but constraints may be imposed on inspection of those documents where the confidentiality warrants it.15

[50]   I do not consider that the documents in Categories 2 and 3 are of a confidential character that warrants constraints being imposed on their inspection. The Category 3 documents are focused on payments received by Ms Helmbright from Mr Lipsham and how these payments were treated for tax purposes. Tax returns are not by their nature confidential. Examples of documents the courts have considered confidential include private, commercially sensitive documents held by businesses such as market pricing information16 and reports concerning marketing strategies and performance data,17 especially where the party seeking discovery is a competitor. Holding that a company’s financial reports were not protected by confidentiality, this Court has confirmed that the disclosure of company and personal financial information is “a standard part” of most litigation.18 A claim for confidentiality should not be based simply on distrust and unsubstantiated allegations that the other party will misuse the documents.19 More than a general allegation of hostility between the parties is

12     Defendant’s affidavit of documents sworn 11 March 2022 at [7]–[8].

13     At [7]–[8] and [14]–[17].

14     Exit Timeshare Now (NZ) Ltd v Classic Holidays Ltd [2021] NZHC 442 at [37]; and see Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission (1994) 7 PRNZ 344 (CA) at 348.

15     At [37]; and see the High Court Rules 2016, r 8.28(3) and Vector Gas Contracts Ltd v Contact Energy Ltd [2014] NZHC 3171 at [32].

16     See for example Vector Gas Contracts Ltd, above n 15.

17     See for example Intercity Group (NZ) Ltd v Nakedbus NZ Ltd [2013] NZHC 2261.

18     Detection Services Ltd v Pickering [2018] NZHC 1617 at [13].

19 At [10].

required    to   justify   imposing    constraints    on    inspection    on   the   ground   of confidentiality.20

[51]   The documents sought under Categories 2 and 3 are also not privileged. Legal professional privilege as defined by the  Evidence  Act  2006  does  not  attach  to Ms Helmbright’s tax-related information.21 Privilege for legal advice only applies to communications between a person and a legal professional where the communication was intended to be confidential and made in the course of, and for the purpose of, the person requesting or receiving professional legal services.22 That is not the case here. Nor were the communications exchanged and information prepared for the dominant purpose of preparing for litigation, which would give rise to what is called litigation privilege.23 Ms Helmbright’s tax and/or GST returns were prepared as a matter of course. Similarly, the communications between Ms Helmbright and third parties did not occur in anticipation of this proceeding.

[52]At the hearing, Ms Helmbright agreed to provide these documents.

Categories 4 to 7 – the properties

[53]   Mr Lipsham seeks discovery of the following documents relating to the properties:

(a)sale and purchase agreements for the properties described at [8], [10] and [11] and any other properties purchased using any of part of

$2.8 million (Category 4);

(b)all communications between Ms Helmbright and any third parties regarding the properties, and/or the sale and purchase of them (Category 5);

20     Exit Timeshare Now (NZ) Ltd v Classic Holidays Ltd, above n 14, at [37].

21     See Evidence Act 2006, ss 54 to 57.

22     Section 54.

23     Section 56; and see Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596 (CA).

(c)Ms Helmbright’s solicitor’s trust account statements for any sale and purchase transactions for any of the properties (Category 6);

(d)customer due diligence information, including source of funds information provided by Ms Helmbright to her solicitors, accountants or other professional advisers in connection with any transactions using any part of the $2.8million (Category 7).

[54]   Mr Cogan submits that these documents fall within the discovery order because they will confirm whether Ms Helmbright used any part of the $2.8 million payment from Mr Lipsham to purchase the two properties in Okaihau and Waipapa. The source of the funds to buy these properties is in issue because of Mr Lipsham’s proprietary claims over those properties.

[55]   Mr Cogan submits that Ms Helmbright must have engaged a firm of solicitors to act for her on these purchases. Those solicitors will have performed customer due diligence on Ms Helmbright in accordance with their obligations under the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009. That customer due diligence is likely to have extended to whether Ms Helmbright was acting on behalf of anyone, and the source of the funds for the purchases.

[56]   Ms Helmbright does not dispute the relevance of these documents, or that they exist. She says that she has already discovered the sale and purchase agreements for the two properties she purchased. She says that there are no agreements for the two other properties as Mr Lipsham decided he did not want to buy them. In relation to the balance, she claims confidentiality and/or privilege.24

[57]   As mentioned above, communications between Ms Helmbright and her solicitors will be subject to privilege where they involve Ms Helmbright requesting or receiving legal advice. Customer due diligence information, settlement statements and trust account statements do not involve the giving or receiving of legal advice. They are not privileged.

24     Defendant’s affidavit of documents sworn 11 March 2022 at [9]–[17].

[58]   To the extent these documents could be considered confidential, that is not a bar to discovery. I do not consider restrictions on their inspection to be warranted. Ms Helmbright must discover the documents in Categories 6 and 7. To the extent she does not already have the documents, she must request them from her solicitors.

[59]   In relation  to  the  documents  in  Category  5,  communications  between  Ms Helmbright and any third party who is not a solicitor (for example a real estate agent, lender, valuer, building inspector and/or insurer) cannot be subject to legal advice privilege. The litigation was not reasonably in prospect at the time of the relevant communications, so there can be no suggestion that litigation privilege applies. Nor are these communications confidential. Ms Helmbright must discover these documents.

Category 8 – bank statements

[60]   Mr Lipsham seeks discovery of bank statements for any of Ms Helmbright’s bank accounts into which Mr Lipsham paid funds, and/or into which Ms Helmbright transferred those funds.

[61]   Mr Cogan submits that these documents are relevant to Mr Lipsham’s proprietary claim, and in particular, what Ms Helmbright spent the $2.8 million on or how she otherwise dealt with the $2.8 million after receiving it.

[62]   Ms Helmbright opposes discovery of these bank statements. She submits that there is no dispute that Mr Lipsham paid the $2.8 million to her, and that he did so by paying it into her bank account. Further, she has discovered a transaction summary which  shows  payments   from   Mr   Lipsham,   including   the   $2.8   million   on  2 December 2019, into a Kiwibank account in her name.25 I note that the account number is redacted.

[63]   Also, Ms Helmbright is concerned about Mr Lipsham seeing her private and confidential information in the bank statements.

25     Exhibit A to affidavit of Kim Katherine Helmbright, sworn 22 April 2022.

[64]   Ms Helmbright’s bank statements over the relevant period are highly relevant. Mr Lipsham seeks proprietary remedies against the Okaihau and Waipapa properties on the basis that they were purchased using funds derived from his $2.8 million payment to Ms Helmbright, in breach of trust. Therefore, he seeks to ‘trace’ the

$2.8 million after he paid it into Ms Helmbright’s Kiwibank account. Accordingly, Ms Helmbright is required to discover bank statements for any of her bank accounts into which Mr Lipsham paid funds, and/or into which Ms Helmbright transferred those funds, for the period 1 October 2019 to 31 May 2020. Mr Lipsham has leave to approach the Court to request bank statements for a longer period if necessary.

[65]   I consider that a restriction on inspection of these documents is justified to protect Ms Helmbright’s privacy in details of other, unrelated transactions. Accordingly, only Mr Lipsham’s counsel and solicitor may view the bank statements.

Category 9 – services provided

[66]   Finally, Mr Lipsham seeks discovery of any documents relating to services provided by Ms Helmbright to him, including correspondence with third parties regarding his affairs, and receipts, credit card statements, and/or other documentation concerning expenses incurred by Ms Helmbright when performing the alleged services, and any time and attendance records. Mr Cogan submits that there are some limited documents provided in this category, but one would expect a considerably greater volume of correspondence and documentation for $2.8 million of services over a short period.

[67]   Mr Cogan explains that Mr Lipsham’s primary case is that the $2.8 million was paid to Ms Helmbright to purchase properties for him. However, if payments were made under the Freelancing Agreement (which he denies), the extent and nature of the services Mr Lipsham received for the payment is relevant to his causes of action for unconscionable bargain and undue influence.

[68]   Ms Helmbright’s objection appears to be that she has already provided all documents within this category. She also states that she gave all her documents to the former solicitor acting for her on this proceeding.

[69]   I have reviewed Ms Helmbright’s first affidavit of documents, prepared by herself and sworn on 1 December 2021. In this affidavit, Ms Helmbright does not discover any documents of the kind sought in this category.

[70]   Her second affidavit of documents, sworn on 11 March 2022, contains a small number of documents, mainly comprising screenshots of text messages and documents relating to the ownership of motor vehicles.

[71]   Accordingly, there are grounds for believing that there are more documents and records than those that have been discovered. It does not appear that the documents Ms Helmbright provided to her former solicitors, Gaze Burt, have been discovered.

[72]   There is no reason why Ms Helmbright should not provide discovery of all the documents sought in Category 9. If Gaze Burt holds documents that fall within this category, or any of the other categories discussed, she must retrieve them and provide them.

Result

[73]I order that:

(a)Ms Helmbright must undertake a search for all of the documents in the categories listed in the schedule to this judgment, including on all computers and devices and, to the extent that any laptops or devices are no longer in use, on any backup of those devices including cloud-based backup;

(b)Ms Helmbright must retrieve documents in these categories from her solicitors and former solicitors, and any other third parties, including real estate agents, lenders, valuers, building inspectors or insurers;

(c)she must swear a further affidavit, file the original with the Court and serve a copy on Mr Lipsham’s solicitor and counsel within 25 working days listing all the documents she has found and retrieved, and in

relation to any documents that did exist but which she has been unable to locate or retrieve, explaining what has happened to those documents;

(d)she must make any documents listed available for inspection within

a further 10 working days;

(e)the documents in Category 8, being her bank statements, are not to be inspected by anyone other than Mr Lipsham’s solicitor and counsel in this proceeding.

[74]   Mr  Lipsham  seeks costs in  relation to this application and has requested   the opportunity to make submissions after determination of the application. I invite submissions  by  way  of  memorandum  of  no  more   than   three   pages   within  15 working days. Ms Helmbright may make any submissions in reply within a further 10 working days.

Associate Judge Gardiner

SCHEDULE

[1]    Documents relating to the alleged Freelancing Agreement between the Defendant and the Plaintiff dated 4 October 2019 (Agreement), including (without limitation):

(a)Documents relating to the negotiation of the alleged Agreement;

(b)Any drafts of the alleged Agreement in their native electronic form including metadata as to when the document was created;

(c)Any invoices, credit cards, bank statements, receipts, emails, or other documents relating to the purchase and download of the template for the alleged Agreement; and

(d)Any record of the download of the Agreement or the template used for the Agreement.

[2]Income tax and/or GST returns of the Defendant for the 2018-2021 tax years.

[3]    All communications between the Defendant and any third parties (including but not limited to the Defendant’s accountants and the Inland Revenue Department) regarding the payments received by the Defendant from the Plaintiff and/or any income tax or GST paid and/or claimed in respect of them.

[4]To the extent not already discovered, sale and purchase agreements for:

(a)the Horeke Road property;

(b)the Pungaere Road property;

(c)the Aucks Road property;

(d)the Opito Bay Road property; and

(e)any other properties purchased using any part of the $2.8 million paid to the Defendant by Mr Lipsham.

[5]    All communications between the Defendant and any third parties (including but not limited to real estate agents, solicitors, lenders, valuers, building inspectors and/or insurers) regarding the Properties and/or the sale and purchase of them.

[6]    The Defendants’ solicitors’ trust account statements for any sale and purchase transactions (whether completed or not) for any of the Properties.

[7]    Customer due diligence information, including (without limitation) source of funds information, provided by the Defendant to her solicitors, accountants and/or other professional advisers in connection with the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 in relation to any transactions using any part of the funds paid to the Defendant by the Plaintiff.

[8]    Bank statements for any of the Defendant’s bank accounts into which the Plaintiff paid funds and/or to which the Defendant transferred those funds, covering the period 1 October 2019 to 31 May 2020.

[9]    Documents relating to the services allegedly provided by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, including, without limitation:

(a)Correspondence with third parties regarding the Plaintiff and/or his affairs;

(b)Receipts, credit card statements and/or other documentation relating to expenses incurred by the Defendant in the performance of the alleged services; and

(c)Time and attendance records for any work allegedly carried out by the Defendant in the alleged performance of the services.