Lee v District Court at North Shore

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA410/2017
[2018] NZCA 25

BETWEEN

YOON LEE
Appellant

AND

DISTRICT COURT AT NORTH SHORE
First Respondent

YASUKI KONISHI AND MAKIKO KONISHI
Second Respondents

Court:

Winkelmann, Venning and Duffy JJ

Counsel:

Appellant in person
First Respondent abides
D B Hickson for Second Respondents

Judgment:

(On the papers)

28 February 2018 at 10.30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for recall is declined.

BThe second respondents’ application for costs on the recall application and on the release of security for costs is also declined.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Winkelmann J)

  1. On 20 December 2017, this Court dismissed Mr Lee’s appeal against a judgment of Gilbert J awarding the Konishis indemnity costs which Mr Lee was ordered to pay personally as counsel.[1]

  2. Mr Lee now applies for recall of this Court’s judgment dismissing the appeal.  He does so on the grounds that the judgment was wrong in various respects and that he was not heard on some issues. 

  3. The test for recall of civil judgments is as stated by Wild CJ in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2):[2]

    Generally speaking, a judgment once delivered must stand for better or worse, subject, of course, to appeal.  Were it otherwise there would be great inconvenience and uncertainty.  There are, I think, three categories of cases in which a judgment not perfected may be recalled –— first, where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statute or regulation or a new judicial decision of relevance and higher authority; secondly, where counsel have failed to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance; and thirdly, where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment be recalled.

  4. Mr Lee argues the grounds he advances in support of the recall are very special reasons for the purposes of the test set out in Horowhenua County. 

  5. While there is no single definition of the third category identified in Horowhenua County, the discretion to recall must be exercised with circumspection, and must not be used as a substitute for appeal.[3]  It does not extend to a challenge to any substantive findings of fact or law in the judgment, nor to a recasting of arguments previously given and re-presented in a new form.

    [3]Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,832 (HC) at [13].

  6. Re-running or recasting the arguments adduced at hearing is just what Mr Lee seeks to do.  At times Mr Lee says he seeks clarification but again is simply seeking to advance further arguments in support of an appeal that has already been argued and dismissed.  Mr Lee also claims some of his arguments were not addressed in the judgment, but we are satisfied that all arguments of any relevance to the appeal…

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Details
Case
[2018] NZCA 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Lee v District Court at North Shore, the appellant, Mr Lee, sought recall of the Court of Appeal's judgment which dismissed his appeal against a judgment awarding indemnity costs to the Konishis. Mr Lee contended that the judgment was incorrect and that he was not heard on some issues. The second respondents, represented by D B Hickson, opposed the recall and sought indemnity costs for the recall application and costs for the release of security for costs.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the grounds for recall were established and whether the second respondents were entitled to costs for the recall application and the release of security for costs. The Court considered whether the grounds for recall fell within the three categories identified in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2). The Court found that Mr Lee's grounds did not fall within any of the categories and were not very special reasons. The Court also found that Mr Lee had been heard on all relevant issues.

The Court declined Mr Lee's application for recall and the second respondents' application for costs. The Court found that Mr Lee's application was an attempt to re-run or recast the arguments adduced at the hearing. The Court also found that Mr Hickson's response to the recall application was excessive and that the attendances for which he sought recompense were minor.

The final orders of the Court were that the appellant's application for recall was declined and that the second respondents' application for costs on the recall application and on the release of security for costs were also declined. The Court did not see any basis for referring the proceedings to the Attorney-General.

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