| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA410/2017 [2018] NZCA 25 |
| BETWEEN | YOON LEE |
| AND | DISTRICT COURT AT NORTH SHORE YASUKI KONISHI AND MAKIKO KONISHI |
| Court: | Winkelmann, Venning and Duffy JJ |
Counsel: | Appellant in person |
Judgment: (On the papers) | 28 February 2018 at 10.30 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for recall is declined.
BThe second respondents’ application for costs on the recall application and on the release of security for costs is also declined.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Winkelmann J)
On 20 December 2017, this Court dismissed Mr Lee’s appeal against a judgment of Gilbert J awarding the Konishis indemnity costs which Mr Lee was ordered to pay personally as counsel.[1]
Mr Lee now applies for recall of this Court’s judgment dismissing the appeal. He does so on the grounds that the judgment was wrong in various respects and that he was not heard on some issues.
The test for recall of civil judgments is as stated by Wild CJ in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2):[2]
Generally speaking, a judgment once delivered must stand for better or worse, subject, of course, to appeal. Were it otherwise there would be great inconvenience and uncertainty. There are, I think, three categories of cases in which a judgment not perfected may be recalled –— first, where since the hearing there has been an amendment to a relevant statute or regulation or a new judicial decision of relevance and higher authority; secondly, where counsel have failed to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance; and thirdly, where for some other very special reason justice requires that the judgment be recalled.
[2]Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633.
Mr Lee argues the grounds he advances in support of the recall are very special reasons for the purposes of the test set out in Horowhenua County.
While there is no single definition of the third category identified in Horowhenua County, the discretion to recall must be exercised with circumspection, and must not be used as a substitute for appeal.[3] It does not extend to a challenge to any substantive findings of fact or law in the judgment, nor to a recasting of arguments previously given and re-presented in a new form.
[3]Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) 22 NZTC 19,832 (HC) at [13].
Re-running or recasting the arguments adduced at hearing is just what Mr Lee seeks to do. At times Mr Lee says he seeks clarification but again is simply seeking to advance further arguments in support of an appeal that has already been argued and dismissed. Mr Lee also claims some of his arguments were not addressed in the judgment, but we are satisfied that all arguments of any relevance to the appeal…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Lee v District Court at North Shore and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] NZCA 25
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the grounds for recall were established and whether the second respondents were entitled to costs for the recall application and the release of security for costs. The Court considered whether the grounds for recall fell within the three categories identified in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2). The Court found that Mr Lee's grounds did not fall within any of the categories and were not very special reasons. The Court also found that Mr Lee had been heard on all relevant issues.
The Court declined Mr Lee's application for recall and the second respondents' application for costs. The Court found that Mr Lee's application was an attempt to re-run or recast the arguments adduced at the hearing. The Court also found that Mr Hickson's response to the recall application was excessive and that the attendances for which he sought recompense were minor.
The final orders of the Court were that the appellant's application for recall was declined and that the second respondents' application for costs on the recall application and on the release of security for costs were also declined. The Court did not see any basis for referring the proceedings to the Attorney-General.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi