Leao v Auckland City Council

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2014-404-00211 [2014] NZHC 2056

BETWEEN

VINAL NILESH KUMAR

Applicant

AND

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL

First Respondent

MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION Second Respondent

Hearing: 27 August 2014

Counsel:

M Clark for Applicant
A Longdill and O Klaassen for Second Respondent

Judgment:

28 August 2014

JUDGMENT OF FOGARTY J

This judgment was delivered by me on 28 August 2014 at 4.30 p.m., pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date: ………………………….

Solicitors:           Vallant Hooker & Partners, Auckland

Meredith Connell, Auckland

KUMAR v IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL [2014] NZHC 2056 [28 August 2014]

Introduction

[1]      The applicant has applied for leave to apply judicial review proceedings.  It is normally not necessary to apply for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. A statutory restriction has been imposed in the Immigration Act 2009, s 247 which provides:

247     Special provisions relating to judicial review

(1)       Any review proceedings in respect of a statutory power of decision arising out of or under this Act must be commenced not later than 28 days after the date on which the person concerned is notified of the decision, unless the High Court decides that, by reason of special circumstances, further time should be allowed.

(2)       Where a person intends to both appeal against a decision of the Tribunal under this Act and bring review proceedings in respect of that same decision,—

(a)       the person must lodge both the application for appeal and the application for judicial review together; and

(b)       the  High  Court  must  endeavour  to  hear  both  matters together, unless it considers it impracticable in the particular circumstances of the case to do so.

(3)       In this section, statutory power of decision has the same meaning as in section 3 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972.

(4)       Nothing  in   this   section  limits   the  time   for   bringing  review proceedings challenging the vires of any regulations made under this Act.

[2]      The  application  for  judicial  review  was  filed  later  than  28  days  after

4 December,  upon  which  date  the  applicant  was  notified  of  a  decision  of  the Immigration and Protection Tribunal declining the applicant’s appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds.   Notice of application for leave to file judicial review proceedings was lodged on 5 February 2014.  This is more than 28 days from 4 December 2013.

[3]      Mr  Kumar  was  served  with  the  deportation  order,  consequent  upon  the decision of the Tribunal, on 15 January and deported to Fiji on 16 January.

[4]      The applicant argues in this proceeding that reference to 28 days in s 247 is

28 working days by reason of the application of s 6 of the Immigration Act which provides:

6        How periods of time to be calculated

(1)       A  period  of  time  prescribed  in  this  Act  for  the  making  of  an application under the Act must be calculated excluding any day that is—

(a)      a public holiday or a Department holiday determined by the chief executive; and

(b)      not a…

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Details
Case
[2014] NZHC 2036
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Auckland Registry, the case of Leao v Auckland City Council was heard, with the applicant, Vinal Nilesh Kumar, seeking leave to apply for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration and Protection Tribunal. The Tribunal had declined Kumar's appeal against a liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds, and Kumar argued that the statutory time limit for initiating judicial review proceedings should be interpreted as 28 working days, as per section 6 of the Immigration Act. The Minister of Immigration contended that the statutory time limit of 28 days was intended to be a strict, unqualified period and should not be subject to adjustments for public holidays or weekends.

The court needed to determine whether the statutory time limit for initiating judicial review proceedings under section 247 of the Immigration Act should be interpreted as 28 working days, excluding public holidays and weekends, or as an unqualified 28-day period. The court's reasoning was that judicial review proceedings are not applications made under the Immigration Act but are brought pursuant to the provisions of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The court found that section 247 does not attempt to set a time limit on the application for judicial review but reserves to the High Court the ability to receive an application for judicial review after 28 days in special circumstances. The court agreed with the Crown's interpretation that section 6 does not apply, and the application for review was more than 28 days from the date of the decision, rendering it outside the 28-day period provided in section 247(1) of the 2009 Act.

The court then considered whether special circumstances existed to allow for an extension of the time limit for initiating judicial review proceedings. The court granted Kumar ten working days to file any affidavits in support of a special circumstances argument, with the Minister of Immigration having a further ten working days to file affidavits in reply. The court also provided Kumar with five working days to file an affidavit in reply to the reply affidavit, if necessary. The Registry was directed to set the case down for a hearing before the court for half a day.

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Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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