Lawton v Redemptech Holdings Pte Limited
[2017] NZHC 3104
•13 December 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2015-404-002634 [2017] NZHC 3104
BETWEEN KENNETH GEORGE LAWTON
Plaintiff/Respondent
AND
REDEMPTECH HOLDINGS PTE LIMITED
Defendant/Applicant
Hearing: 30 November 2017 Appearances:
M C Black for Plaintiff/Respondent
J M Airey for Defendant/Applicant
GAD Neil for Sheriff of the High Court of New ZealandJudgment:
13 December 2017
JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J
This judgment is delivered by me on 13 December 2017 at 1.00 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
..................................................... Registrar / Deputy Registrar
Counsel/Solicitors:
Michael Black, Barrister, Auckland
Inder Lynch, Manukau (J M Airey) Meredith Connell, Auckland (GAD Neil)
LAWTON v REDEMPTECH HOLDINGS PTE LTD [2017] NZHC 3104 [13 December 2017]
Introduction ..........................................................................................................[1] Enforcement processes.........................................................................................[6] Background.........................................................................................................[14] Redemptech’s grounds for setting aside enforcement process .......................[22] Analysis ...............................................................................................................[28]
—misdescriptions [28]
—enforcement processes [29]
—‘issuance’ of enforcement processes [30]
—a duty of care? [33]
—“contrary to good faith” [37] Result ...................................................................................................................[40] Costs ....................................................................................................................[42]
Introduction
[1] In early 2014, the plaintiff, Mr Lawton, lent the defendant (“Redemptech”)
$350,000, raised on a mortgage of Mr Lawton’s house. Redemptech is a Singaporean energy technology company. The loan was made by Mr Lawton acquiring partnership interests in an associated limited partnership, with an option to require Redemptech to buy back the interests at twice the purchase price.
[2] In April 2014, Mr Lawton exercised the option, but Redemptech did not comply. Mr Lawton sold his house to repay the mortgage and to avoid a potential mortgagee sale. Unable to engage in his usual employment as a carpenter by reason of injury and medication, Mr Lawton views Redemptech’s liability to him as his principal asset.
[3] Mr Lawton issued the present proceeding. Taken together with other
liabilities to Mr Lawton, Redemptech admitted Mr Lawton’s claim in the amount of
$823,917.32, on which judgment was entered. The judgment was later partially
enforced by sale and transfer of Redemptech’s property to Mr Lawton in May 2016.
[4] Redemptech now applies to set aside Mr Lawton’s enforcement process. Redemptech says its property was misidentified in Mr Lawton’s charging and sale orders, and inadequately described in subsequent notice of sale and transfer notice.
[5] HCR 17.30 entitles the court to set aside enforcement processes issued contrary to good faith. The primary issue for my determination is whether the alleged failures in identification and description, if part of an enforcement process, establish it as issued contrary to good faith. If so, I must decide whether to exercise my discretion to set aside the enforcement process.
Enforcement processes
[6] Part 17 of the High Court Rules provides for the enforcement of this court’s judgments or orders. Enforcement may be achieved by issue of specified “enforcement processes”, being attachment, charging, sale, possession, arrest, and sequestration orders.1 ‘Enforcement process’ is defined only as “including” those orders.2
[7] Subpart 2 of Part 17 enables a judgment creditor to obtain information from the judgment debtor for enforcement purposes by issuance of a ‘questionnaire’ about the debtor’s income and assets.3 The subpart also provides for the court’s issue of
orders for examination.4
[8] HCR 17.21 requires an enforcement process to “strictly conform with the judgment or order it is enforcing or state why it does not”. The authors of McGechan on Procedure observe:5
An enforcement process which does not conform with the judgment or order it is enforcing is not void but merely irregular. For example if the judgment debtor’s name is mis-spelt or his or her assets are incorrectly described. The irregularity can be waived, or the Court may amend the process: In re Mehaffy [1919] NZLR 113, [1918] GLR 752 (endorsed by Downley Properties Ltd v Stirling (1993) 7 PRNZ 241).
1 HCR 17.3.
2 HCR 17.1.
3 HCR 17.10.
4 HCR 17.11-17.17.
5 McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [HR17.21.01].
[9] HCR 17.29 entitles a judgment debtor to apply to the court for a stay of enforcement or other relief against the judgment “upon the ground that a substantial miscarriage of justice would be likely to result if the judgment were enforced”.
[10] Last, HCR 17.30 entitles the court to set aside an enforcement process “if it is issued contrary to” any order of the court, the agreement of the judgment creditor, or good faith. In Harnish v Bruce,6 Gilbert J rejected any bad faith in Mr Harnish’s enforcement of his judgment against Mr Bruce. The unresolved attempts between the parties to negotiate a settlement meant enforcement was not contrary to any agreement between them (as no such agreement existed).7 The judge was addressing an application to set aside the enforcement process as being issued contrary to Mr Harnish’s alleged agreement “not to pursue any enforcement process until the end of February 2014”,8 rather than one issued contrary to good faith. The authors of McGechan on Procedure say “The rule is straightforward and there appear to be no relevant authorities”.9
[11] Subpart 5 addresses charging orders. A charging order is initially interim,10 serving as notice to the affected person not to dispose of the charged property.11 After the order is made final, sale orders are available to the judgment creditor. HCR 17.44 enables anyone prejudicially affected by a charging order to apply to the court to
vary or rescind the order.
[12] Subpart 6 addresses sale orders (and possession orders). A sale order enables an enforcing officer to seize all the judgment debtor’s personal property (as defined at s 16 of the Personal Property Securities Act 1999),12 and sell so much of it as is
necessary to satisfy the judgment debt (if any money seized is insufficient).13 Sale is
to be conducted in the place the enforcing officer “considers best”.14 Notice of the
sale is to be published “in whichever newspaper or newspapers the officer considers
6 Harnish v Bruce [2014] NZHC 302.
7 At [20]-[25].
8 At [3].
9 McGechan on Procedure, above n 5, at [HR17.30.01].
10 HCR 17.54.
11 HCR 17.55.
12 HCR 17.1.
13 HCR 16.2.
14 HCR 17.70.
sufficient”, and must contain specified information but otherwise “be in the form and give the particulars the officer considers sufficient”.15 The specified information is that the notice:16
(a) must state that the sale is made on behalf of the [judgment creditor];
and
(b) must specify—
(i) the chattels, or the right or interest in the chattels, or the land, or the estate, right, title, or interest in the land, intended to be sold; and
(ii) the name of the enforcing officer; and
(iii) the name of the solicitor (if any) for the [judgment creditor].
[13] On sale, the purchaser is to prepare a valid instrument of transfer for the enforcing officer’s execution,17 on which the instrument:18
(a) is equally effective for all purposes as if it had been executed by the liable party; and
(b) is prima facie evidence of—
(i) the existence of a valid judgment and sale order supporting the seizure by the officer; and
(ii) all necessary notices having been given and published; and
(iii) a valid seizure; and
(iv) a sale having taken place according to law.
Background
[14] In December 2015, Mr Lawton obtained judgment in the amount of
$823,917.32 on Redemptech’s admission of Mr Lawton’s claim for that sum.
[15] An interim charging order was made in Mr Lawton’s favour at the time over
Redemptech’s “estate, right, title, interest and beneficial interest (whether vested or
15 HCR 17.71.
16 HCR 17.73.
17 HCR 17.79.
18 HCR 17.79(3).
contingent) in any money, shares or other personal property, including held under or because of any express or implied trust”. A final charging order was made in similar terms in February 2016. In March 2016, this Court ordered the Sheriff to sell Redemptech’s property to meet the judgment sum.
[16] The interim charging order charged Redemptech’s identified property with payment of its judgment debt to Mr Lawton. The interim charging order provided:
1. THIS COURT ORDERS that until it discharges or finalises this order, your estate, right, title, interest and beneficial interest (whether vested or contingent) in any money, shares or other personal property, including held under or because of any express or implied trust for REDEMPTECH HOLDINGS PTE LIMITED the liable part in the following.
(a) Redemptech Holdings Pte Ltd’s 32.050% ownership and interest (as the General Partner) in REDEMPTECH SUPPORTERS LP a duly incorporated company having its registered office at BDS Chartered Accountants Ltd, Auckland, which is confirmed in Redemptech Supporters LP’s Compilation Report for the year ended 31st March 2014.
(b) The one hundred percent (100%) one share in REDEMPTECH GP LIMITED (company number 5598490), a duly incorporated company having its registered office at level 12, 17 Albert Street, Auckland 1010.
(c) The International Patent Application number PCT/US2012/069449; international filing date: 13 December 2012; the applicant being: Redemptech Holdings Pte Ltd and the patent title comprising (EN) High efficiency electric generator with electric motor forces. Publication number: WO/2013/090539.
(d) The exclusive global rights to licence the HEG Technology, for which regional licensees will be appointed on a non-exclusive basis following a competitive bid process held and or owned by REDEMPTECH HOLDINGS PTE LIMITED. The exclusive licensing entitlement is identified under Redemptech ‘The High Efficiency Generator’ report on 18th March 2011 from its director, Graham Vunkan.
The above shares, property, licence, patents and interests are charged with payment of the amount for which the entitled party, KENNETH GEORGE LAWTON, has obtained Judgment. The amount charged is EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEEN DOLLARS AND THIRTY TWO CENTS $823,917.32 as at 15 December 2015.
[17] For context, Redemptech is part of a group of related entities involved in the development and commercialisation of high efficiency generator technology (“HEG technology”). The HEG technology was invented by Dr Robert Holcomb,
who transferred his patents and intellectual property rights in the HEG technology to Redemptive Technologies Limited (“Technologies”), a company registered in the British Virgin Islands and beneficially owned by Dr Holcomb. Redemptech Supporters LP (NZ) (the “limited partnership”) is a New Zealand limited partnership, whose members provide capital for commercial development of the HEG technology, in anticipation of a 20 per cent share of licence fee revenue to be derived from the HEG technology’s commercial application. Technologies engaged Redemptech under a management services agreement as Technologies’ corporate manager, to undertake commercial development of the HEG technology. Redemptech was the general partner in the limited partnership until February 2015, and owned the single share in Redemptech GP Limited, the current general partner (the “general partner”).
[18] Redemptech was served with the interim charging orders in January 2016. In February 2016, Mr Lawton sought and obtained a final charging order over the property identified at the interim order’s paragraphs (a), (b), and (d), and leave “to apply further for orders to enforce the charging order over the International Patent Application referred to in the interim charging order”.
[19] In March 2016, this Court issued a sale order to the Sheriff at Auckland, authorising him to seize Redemptech’s land and chattels, and sell them to pay the judgment debt to Mr Lawton. The Sheriff approved the following notice of sale for publication in the business and public notices sections of the New Zealand Herald in April 2016:
NOTICE OF SALE
TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to a sale order dated the 23rd March 2016 in High Court Civil proceedings CIV-2015-404-2634, the title, interest and beneficial interest owned or held by REDEMPTECH HOLDINGS PTE LIMITED in REDEMPTECH SUPPORTERS LP a duly incorporated company having its registered office at Auckland shall be sold individually or together by the Court by way of tender. Information pertaining to the sale and the tender and enquiries relating thereto can also be obtained from John Whittfield, Insolvency practitioner of Whittfield and Associates, PO Box 548
Drury 2247, phone: (09) 239 0575, email ([email protected]).
The sale order is executed by Heather Bowles, Deputy Sheriff at Auckland and the sale will take place by tender at the High Court, Auckland, corner Waterloo Quadrant and Parliament St. The closing deadline is 4pm, Monday
the 2nd May 2016 for the acceptance of tenders. Settlement is on Monday the 16th May 2016.
All tenders shall be on the specification for tender available on application to John Whittfield. Tenders are to be submitted with a deposit of 15% of the purchase price tendered to John Whittfield on behalf of the Sheriff no later than 4pm on the 2nd day of May 2016 marked “Tender, for shares in Redemptech Holdings Pte Ltd.” The highest or any tender will not necessarily be accepted.
The sale of shares is made on behalf of the plaintiff Kenneth George Lawton whose solicitor is Christopher Lord of Craig, Griffin & Lord (187 Mt Eden Road, Auckland) but enquiries must be made to John Whittfield on behalf of the Sheriff.
The Sheriff also appointed John Whittfield, an insolvency practitioner, to issue and receive tender documents, and approved particulars and conditions of tender, which specified the subject property in identical terms to those set out at the interim order’s paragraphs (a), (b), and (d), except omitting the percentage figure at (a).
[20] In May 2016, on conclusion of the tender, the Sheriff issued a transfer notice confirming sale and transfer to Mr Lawton of the property set out at the interim order’s paragraphs (a), (b), and (d), now specifying the percentage figure in (a) at
27 per cent. Mr Lawton paid $180,000 for the transfer.
[21] In July 2016, Mr Lawton obtained a summons for Redemptech’s director, Stephen Bennett, to attend this Court for examination on Redemptech’s means of satisfying the judgment debt to Mr Lawton. The examination occurred in September
2016.
Redemptech’s grounds for setting aside enforcement process
[22] Redemptech complains Mr Lawton’s enforcement process misidentified Redemptech’s assets, used an “unspecific and self-contradictory” Notice of Sale, and was inconsistent in its description of what was offered for sale and what was sold. In particular, it says:
(a) its only assets at the time of the enforcement processes were the single share in the general partner; its rights under the management services agreement with Technologies; and a 27.191 per cent partnership
interest in the limited partnership, subject to a debt back to
Technologies of US$27.191m;
(b)the charging orders described it as having a 32.050 per cent interest in the limited partnership (which they described as an incorporated company); and exclusive global rights to licence the HEG technology (which rights were Technologies’);
(c) the notice of sale misdescribed its partnership interest in the limited partnership as a 27 per cent interest in a limited liability company, and indicated tenders should be marked “tender for shares in Redemptech Holdings PTE Ltd”, when limited partnerships are not constituted by shares and shares in Redemptech were not on offer; and
(d)the transfer notice purported to transfer exclusive global rights to licence the HEG technology, which were not Redemptech’s property to sell, and transferred Redemptech’s share in the general partner and its rights under the management services agreement, neither of which were specified in the notice of sale, and the latter requiring Technologies’ consent to assign, which was not obtained.
[23] Redemptech’s counsel, Julian Airey, contended these errors meant Mr Lawton’s enforcement processes were not conducted in good faith. He noted HCR 17.21’s obligation for strict conformity of the process with the order, which he submitted was not met by the misdescriptions in the charging and sale orders, and the divergences between them and the notice of sale and transfer notice. He said the requirement for correctness of the latter was reinforced by HCR 16.73’s “specify”. He further argued, given the “draconian” nature of forced seizure and sale of another’s property without their consent, HCR 17.30 was to be construed analogously with the duty of a mortgagee in the exercise of a power of sale – that is, to act in good faith, and to take reasonable care to obtain the true market value of the
property at the time sold.19
19 Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] Ch D 949 at 968.
[24] Mr Lawton unsurprisingly opposes Redemptech’s application. He says each of the contended misdescriptions were drawn from Redemptech’s own documents, including the description of its management service agreement rights as providing “exclusive global rights to licence the HEG technology”. At various points throughout the enforcement process commencing in June 2014, Redemptech was asked by Mr Lawton to confirm correctness of various details, and also had prior notice of the charging orders and notice of sale, as well as being provided with the transfer notice. In the course of his subsequent examination, Redemptech’s Mr Bennett acknowledged taking formal service of the enforcement process, and taking legal and accounting advice following service. Yet Redemptech did nothing to dispute the process until 28 July 2016, nearly three months after transfer to Mr Lawton.
[25] Mr Lawton’s counsel, Michael Black, makes the point the initial orders expressly charge Redemptech’s “estate, right, title, interest and beneficial interest” in the assets: misdescriptions of those interests are not liable to upset the charge over the assets, and are besides capable of correction.20 In other words, the transfer cannot affect assets not owned by the judgment debtor. He says, given the complexity of the interests at issue, the form of the notice of sale was necessarily indicative rather than
comprehensive, but made adequate provision for further information to be obtained from the Sheriff ’s agent, Mr Whittfield. He points out Mr Lawton’s opposition to Redemptech’s application is supported by the technology’s inventor, Dr Holcomb. Further, Mr Black says Redemptech is estopped – by HCR 17.79(3), and by Redemptech’s delay in disputing and acquiescence in Mr Lawton’s enforcement process – from disputing the processes’ validity now. If third parties (eg, Technologies) dispute the effectiveness of the process to transfer property to Mr Lawton, it is open to them to take that up with Mr Lawton. And, Mr Black says, there is no evidential basis for any contention Mr Lawton’s enforcement processes were issued contrary to good faith.
[26] Counsel for the Sheriff, Gareth Neil, submitted HCR 17.30 was only effective to set aside the defined enforcement processes – in the present case, the charging or
sale orders. He submitted ‘good faith’ meant to act “honestly and without
20 See [8] above.
impropriety”.21 He said there was no evidence Mr Lawton or the Sheriff issued the enforcement processes “contrary to… good faith”.
[27] In reply, Mr Airey said Mr Lawton bore the risk of any failure of due diligence in issuing the orders; it was not for Redemptech to make up for any shortfall. The purpose of service was not to require Redemptech to engage in the process, which was essentially unilateral, but to enable it to meet the debt, if it could,22 before interim charging orders were finalised and acted upon. ‘Issuing’ included actions taken in execution of the orders, and therefore the notice of sale and transfer notice. Pressed to identify what he contended was contrary to good faith in the orders’ issuance, he pointed to Mr Lawton’s recklessness in issuing the orders
without confirmation of the correctness of the information to be contained in them by, for example, examination of the judgment debtor.
Analysis
—misdescriptions
[28] HCR 17.21 is not apt to capture contended misdescriptions of the liable party’s property in themselves. The rule is focussed instead on obtaining either strict conformity “with the judgment or order it is enforcing”, or a statement “why it does not”. In the present case, that conformity is with the judgment in the amount of
$823,917.32 on Redemptech’s admission of Mr Lawton’s claim for that sum. Nothing in his enforcement processes, which are articulated precisely in terms of the judgment, lacks conformity with the judgment.
—enforcement processes
[29] I agree with Mr Neil, in the present case, the only enforcement processes at issue are the charging and sale orders. Although HCR 17.1 defines ‘enforcement process’ inclusively, it is only allowing for the availability of other means of enforcement, and does not encompass steps taken in execution of enforcement
processes.
21 McVitty v Waewaepa Station 2002 Ltd [2016] NZHC 756 at [20]; Central Estate v Woolgar
[1972] 2 QB 48 at 55 (per Lord Denning MR) and 57 (per Megaw LJ).
22 HCR 17.57.
—‘issuance’ of enforcement processes
[30] I do not accept HCR 17.30’s ‘issuance’ has effect to capture downstream conduct in execution of the orders, as part of the enforcement process.
[31] HCR 17.22 identifies ‘issuance’ is by the entitled party, through the Registrar, to an enforcing officer (defined as “the court officer to whom an enforcement process is issued”)23. If the enforcement officer returns the enforcement process unenforced, HCR 17.28 enables the entitled party to “request that it be issued again to an enforcing officer”.
[32] It is plain, despite multiple parsings of ‘enforce’ in those rules (for some of which Mr Airey’s ‘execute’ may have been a better word),24 issuance of the enforcement process is only to the enforcing officer. The notice of sale and transfer notice, which are expressly respectively for performance and approval by the enforcing officer,25 are not susceptible to being set aside under HCR 17.30. In performing its obligations under an enforcement process, an enforcement officer is not ‘issuing’ an enforcement process. Nothing the Sheriff did in enforcement of Mr Lawton’s enforcement processes is subject to being set aside under HCR 17.30.
—a duty of care?
[33] Neither do I accept HCR 17.30’s obligation is analogous with the duty of care had by a mortgagee in the exercise of a power of sale.
[34] In Apple Fields Ltd v Damesh Holdings Ltd,26 the Court of Appeal held the
1994 introduction of ss 103A and 103B into the Property Law Act 1952 was
“legislative affirmation of the scope of the duty of care in negligence owed by a
mortgagee who has decide to sell”.27 The Court continued:
23 HCR 17.1.
24 Paramount Export Ltd v The New Zealand Meat Board HC Wellington CIV-1996-485-5, 11
August 2003 at [48].
25 HCR 17.71 and HCR 17.79.
26 Apple Fields Ltd v Damesh Holdings Ltd [2001] 2 NZLR 586 (CA).
27 At [47].
In our view that duty of care coexists with the equitable duty of good faith, but, in most cases, including the present, the duty of care will be the more onerous obligation….
The Privy Council affirmed the distinction, noting:28
There is no issue in the present case of good faith. The only question is as to the reasonable precautions, or reasonable steps, taken by the mortgagee to obtain the best price.
Apple Fields illustrates it is an exercise in subtraction to identify exactly where the less onerous duty of good faith transitions into the more onerous duty of care.
[35] HCR 17.30 is a new rule, coming into force with the High Court Rules 2016. Its predecessor was r 566 of the High Court Rules (contained in the Judicature Act 1908 Sch 2):
566 Execution may be set aside
If execution is issued contrary to any order of the Court or to the agreement of the party issuing it, or otherwise contrary to good faith, it may be set aside by the Court.
[36] The new rule determinedly updates the former, to introduce concepts of an
‘enforcement process’ and ‘entitled party’ in place of “execution” and “party issuing”. But “contrary to good faith” remains the criterion. There is no indication the legislature intended ‘good faith’ in issuing enforcement processes to encompass the “more onerous” obligations of a mortgagee’s duty of care on sale subsequently
identified in Apple Fields.29
—“contrary to good faith”
[37] As to the meaning of ‘good faith’, in Rhodes v Reid Development Co Ltd, the
Court of Appeal explained:30
The words “good faith” describe a state of mind, and the phrase can have no fixed or settled meaning because of the extreme variety of human contact to which it may be descriptively applied. The phrase is widely used in statutes and in contractual documents, with the result that its meaning in a given case must be controlled by the context in which it is found. The expression “in
28 Apple Fields Ltd v Damesh Holdings Ltd [2003] UKPC 54, [2004] 1 NZLR 721 at [25].
29 Apple Fields, above n 26, at [47].
30 Rhodes v Reid Development Co Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 721 at 725.
good faith” conventionally refers to the state of mind of someone who acts in the honest belief that his conduct is justified on legal or moral grounds. For that reason the phrase “contrary to good faith” normally connotes conduct which is dishonest or unconscionable….
[38] The context of HCR 17.30 includes:
(a) an entitled party issues an enforcement process in strict conformity with the judgment or order it is enforcing;31
(b)a liable party may seek a stay on the ground a substantial miscarriage of justice would be likely to result if the judgment were enforced;32 and
(c) as to charging orders specifically, a person alleging to be prejudicially affected thereby may apply to the court for relief.33
In that context, ‘good faith’ anticipates the entitled party issues the enforcement process, generally “as of right”,34 to recover the benefit of the judgment or order obtained against the liable party. It does not incorporate any obligation to have regard for the interests of the liable party, beyond compliance with those aspects of the enforcement process under which the liable party has an entitlement.35
[39] To paraphrase Collins J in McVitty,36 ‘good faith’ in the context of HCR 17.30 is “acting honestly, without impropriety and not attempting to misuse the powers conferred by” Part 17 of the High Court Rules. None of Redemptech’s evidence in support of its application to set aside Mr Lawton’s enforcement processes addresses
‘good faith’ in that sense. Mr Lawton’s contended “recklessness” does not suffice, even if made out. Redemptech needed to establish Mr Lawton issued the enforcement processes to the enforcing officer dishonestly, or for ulterior purposes.
Its evidence does not come close to that threshold. Indeed, pressed to identify
31 HCR 17.21.
32 HCR 17.29.
33 HCR 17.44.
34 HCR 17.8(1).
35 Eg, in relation to an interim charging order, as the person intended to be affected by the order, service thereof: HCR 17.54(2).
36 McVitty, above n 21, at [20].
Mr Lawton’s conduct ‘contrary to good faith’, Mr Airey distanced himself from any
allegation of impropriety on Mr Lawton’s part.
Result
[40] For those reasons, I dismiss Redemptech’s application.
[41] Given my decision to dismiss Redemptech’s application, I do not need to, and do not, decide Mr Lawton’s claim of estoppel.
Costs
[42] I record the Sheriff does not seek costs. In my preliminary view, in the ordinary course, Redemptech should be liable to Mr Lawton for 2B costs on all steps taken in opposition to the application. If that is not accepted by the parties, costs are reserved for determination on short memoranda of no more than five pages – annexing a single-page table setting out any contended allowable steps, time allocation, and daily recovery rate – to be filed and served by:
(a) Mr Lawton within ten working days of the date of this judgment;
(b) Redemptech within five working days of service of Mr Lawton’s
memorandum; and
(c) Mr Lawton strictly in reply within five working days of service of
Mr Beasley’s memorandum.
—Jagose J
2