Larason v The Queen
[2012] NZCA 253
•15 June 2012
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA157/2012 [2012] NZCA 253 |
| BETWEEN JEROME WALTER LARASON JR |
| AND THE QUEEN |
| Court: Ellen France, Harrison and Stevens JJ |
| Counsel: A Bailey for Appellant |
| Judgment: 15 June 2012 at 3 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for special leave to appeal is dismissed.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Harrison J)
Jerome Larason was charged in the District Court at Christchurch with failing to stop at a stop sign on a side road at its intersection with State Highway One.[1] He pleaded not guilty at a hearing before Justices of the Peace and defended the charge on a number of grounds. In a carefully reasoned decision the Justices found the charged proved and ordered Mr Larason to pay a standard infringement fee plus costs.[2]
[1] Land Transport Act 1998, s 40 and Land Transport (Road User) Rule 2004, r 4.1(1)(a).
[2]New Zealand Police v Larason DC Christchurch CRI-2010-009-1718, 17 November 2010.
French J dismissed Mr Larason’s appeal to the High Court at Christchurch.[3] The Judge later refused his application for leave to appeal to this Court on a point of law.[4] Mr Larason now applies for special leave to appeal to this Court under s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. The Crown opposes.[5]
[3] Larason v Police HC Christchurch CRI-2010-409-244, 21 October 2011.
[4] Larason v Police [2012] NZHC 259.
[5] Counsel have consented to the application being determined on the papers.
The question of law is framed by Mr Bailey, Mr Larason’s counsel, in this way:
Whether for the purposes of an alleged breach of the Land Transport (Road User) Rule 2004 involving a controlled intersection a prosecution can succeed in the absence of a record of the relevant road controlling authority having approved the installation of the traffic control device?
In order to obtain leave Mr Larason must satisfy three requirements – that there is a question of law; that it is a question which by reason of its general public importance or any other reason ought to be submitted to this Court; and this Court is of the opinion that it ought to be so submitted.[6] We agree with Ms Charmley for the Crown that the threshold for satisfaction of these requirements is high.
[6] R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211 (CA).
In support of Mr Larason’s application Mr Bailey relies on s 2 of the Land Transport Rule: Traffic Control Devices 2004, which materially provides:
2.1(1)A road controlling authority must:
(a)authorise and, as appropriate, install or operate traffic control devices:
(i)if required by or under this rule or other enactment; or
(ii)to instruct road users of a prohibition or requirement that it has made concerning traffic on a road under its control; or
(iii)to warn road users of a hazard; and
(b)remove a traffic control device if required by or under this rule or other enactment.
Mr Bailey submits that the prosecution failed to prove that the stop sign had been authorised by the relevant road controlling authority, whether it be the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) or the local authority. He apparently relies on a ground argued by Mr Larason in the District Court that the prosecution’s omission to produce a gazette notice was fatal. He says that these circumstances raise a question of law of importance to all prosecutions.
In our judgment the application does not satisfy the first or threshold requirement of identifying a question of law. We agree that where it is in dispute the prosecution must prove the necessary authorisation for a traffic control device such as a stop sign. But whether that requirement is satisfied in a particular case is purely a question of fact. The prosecution does not necessarily have to prove it by producing a gazette notice or other formal document. Authorisation can be established by inference from all the available evidence. Where the point is in issue, plainly a formal notice would be an effective means of proof.
The prosecution led evidence from Mr Anthony Spowart, the Canterbury Traffic Safety Manager of NZTA. His evidence was not in dispute and was accepted by the Justices. One of Mr Spowart’s duties is to establish whether a road intersection should be classified as an intersection controlled by a compulsory stop sign. He was satisfied that the intersection qualified for classification in that way and met the best practice criteria required. He produced a spreadsheet derived from the NZTA management database which showed that the intersection was listed as having a compulsory stop sign. And in the absence of contrary evidence the sign is, of itself, evidence that it was authorised by NZTA.
On this evidence the District Court was entitled to find that NZTA had given the necessary authority to install the stop sign. The prosecution had established a disputed element of the charge. There is no question of law which could possibly arise for our consideration.
Mr Larason’s application for special leave to appeal is dismissed. There will be no order for costs.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent
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