Langridge v The Queen

[2013] NZCA 93

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA44/2013
[2013] NZCA 93

BETWEEN  MICHAEL ANDREW LANGRIDGE
Applicant

AND  THE QUEEN
Respondent

Telephone conference:   6 March 2013

Counsel:         A G Jackson and A M McCormick for Appellant
M J Lillico for Respondent

Judgment:      27 March 2013 at 4 pm

(On the Papers)

JUDGMENT OF ELLEN FRANCE J

The application for bail is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Introduction

1. The applicant, Michael Langridge, pleaded guilty to charges of male assaults female and common assault.  He was convicted after trial of one count of sexual violation by rape.  Mr Langridge was acquitted of a count of sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection and of male assaults female.  All but one of the charges (common assault) related to the same complainant.  Mr Langridge has appealed against his conviction.  He seeks bail pending his appeal.[1]

   [1]      Bail Act 2000, s 70.

2. I have personally considered the application under s 393(2)(d) of the Crimes Act 1961.

The bail application

1. Bail pending an appeal is governed by s 14 of the Bail Act 2000.  In terms of s 14(1), bail must not be granted unless the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it would be in the interests of justice to do so.

2. In seeking bail, Mr Langridge relies on two grounds.  First, he says that his appeal has real merit.[2]  Secondly, he is concerned that the length of time until the appeal is heard may render nugatory his appeal right.[3]

   [2]      Bail Act, s 14(3)(a).

   [3]      Bail Act, s 14(3)(c).

3. I deal first with the apparent strength of the appeal.

4. Mr Jackson for Mr Langridge explains that the focus on appeal will be on the impact of the Judge’s answer to a question about the withdrawal of consent from the jury.  It will be argued on appeal that although the trial Judge, Judge MacAskill, correctly answered the question, the content of the question showed the jury was not focusing on the evidence.  The argument will be that the jury should have been redirected to ensure that they did not deal with an issue in isolation from the evidence at trial.  I understand it will be submitted that this has had a flow on effect to the verdicts which it will be said are inconsistent.

5. It is not appropriate for me to reach any firm views about the strength of the appeal at this stage.  However, I note that the Judge in answering the jury question began by explaining the legal impact of withdrawal of consent.  Judge MacAskill went on to tell the jury, first, that withdrawal was not an issue for them because there was no evidence on which the jury could conclude that consent was withdrawn.  Secondly, the Judge expressed concern that the jury was straying from the evidence and emphasised the importance of deciding the case on the evidence.  Given it appears there will be no challenge to the correctness of what was said, what more may have been required by way of direction will be a matter for discussion at the appeal.  However, nothing is raised at this point that is sufficiently compelling to make bail in the best interests of justice.

6. The appeal has now been allocated a fixture date of 16 April 2013.  The time to hearing is accordingly minimal.[4] There are no other relevant considerations.

Result

[4]The appellant is to be sentenced on 28 March 2013.  Bail could have been sought from the District Court pending sentence.  If there is to be a sentence appeal, counsel will need address that in submissions on the appeal and be ready to deal with that aspect on 16 April 2013. 

1. For these reasons, I have concluded that the interests of justice do not warrant a grant of bail.  The application for bail is declined.

Solicitors:
Brandts-Giesen McCormick, Rangiora for Appellant
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent