Lane v Goldson - [2025] NZSC 87

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

SC 32/2025
[2025] NZSC 87

BETWEEN	REBECCA ELIZABETH LANE Applicant
AND	ANNE VERONICA GOLDSON AND BENJAMIN JAMES GOLDSON (AS EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF DONALD ALGERNON GIFFORD) Respondents

Court:	Ellen France, Williams and Kós JJ
Counsel:	M I S Phillipps and A J Steele for Applicant M L Barnes for Respondents
Judgment:	23 July 2025

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

BThe applicant must pay the respondents one set of costs of $2,500.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Introduction

This application for leave to appeal relates to Ms Lane’s unsuccessful application for an order under s 19(1) of the Administration Act 1969 calling on the respondents to show cause why probate in relation to the will of Donald Gifford should not be granted to the Public Trust.[1] Ms Lane then seeks to have the Public Trust bring a Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) claim against Mr Gifford’s de facto partner, Ms Goldson. Ms Lane wants the Public Trust to claim 50 per cent of the value of a property in Auckland (the Auckland property), formerly owned by Mr Gifford but owned by Ms Goldson when Mr Gifford died.[2] Ms Lane seeks to enlarge the estate of Mr Gifford to enable her to bring a claim against it. The High Court dismissed the application.[3] The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Lane’s appeal.[4]

Background

[1]The respondents are the executors of Mr Gifford’s estate.

[2]A 50 per cent share of the property has an indicated value range of $1.9 to $2.25 million. The estate is otherwise insolvent.

[3]Lane v Goldson [2023] NZHC 2620 (Downs J).

[4]Lane v Goldson [2025] NZCA 36 (Hinton, Mander and Walker JJ) [CA judgment].

We largely adopt the description of the background in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.[5] Ms Lane was raised by her mother, Ms Firth, and Ms Firth’s then husband. Her birth certificate records Ms Firth and her husband as her parents. The couple separated when Ms Lane was 16. Ms Lane and her mother lived in a property her mother had purchased.
[5]At [7]–[29].
Ms Firth began living with Mr Gifford in the Auckland property in 1982. The two had been in a relationship much earlier. Ms Lane was told that Mr Gifford was her father.[6] In 1983, Mr Gifford transferred a half share in the Auckland property to Ms Firth. This share was transferred back to Mr Gifford when the couple separated in 1992. Ms Firth was granted a mortgage instead.
[6]According to Ms Goldson, he said later in life that he was not certain of this.
The following year, Mr Gifford and Ms Goldson began a de facto relationship. They had one son born in 1995. The couple maintained separate homes but had a committed relationship. Ms Goldson was the main income earner.
After Ms Firth died in 2011, Ms Lane contested her mother’s will and received about $3 to $4 million…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Lane v Goldson

Details

AGLC: Lane v Goldson [2025] NZSC 87
Case: [2025] NZSC 87
Decision Date: 23 July 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Lane v Goldson, the Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed an application for leave to appeal by Ms Rebecca Lane against the executors of the estate of Donald Gifford. The central issue in this case was whether the respondents, executors of Mr Gifford’s estate, should be compelled to show cause why probate should not be granted to the Public Trust. Ms Lane sought to have the Public Trust bring a Property (Relationships) Act 1976 claim against Ms Anne Goldson, Mr Gifford’s de facto partner, for 50 per cent of the value of a property in Auckland formerly owned by Mr Gifford but owned by Ms Goldson at the time of his death.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed Ms Lane’s appeal, concluding that the application for leave to appeal did not meet the criteria for leave. The Court of Appeal found that the Administration Act 1969 was not an appropriate vehicle for what Ms Lane sought to achieve as the administration of the estate had been lawfully concluded. Additionally, the Court of Appeal found no evidence that the Public Trust would receive leave to bring a claim under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, nor was there evidence as to how the Public Trust would be funded if appointed. The Court of Appeal also noted that Ms Lane’s case did not demonstrate any merit or serious injustice under the Family Protection Act 1955 or section 77 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.

Ms Lane’s application for leave to appeal argued that the Court of Appeal had conflated the merits of the beneficiary’s claim against the deceased’s share of relationship property and the merits of the prospective Property (Relationships) Act 1976 claim. Ms Lane contended that the Court of Appeal erred in considering factors such as breach of moral duty or financial need, which were not relevant to her case. However, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal’s assessment followed the well-established principles in Public Trust v Whyman and did not conflate the tests. The Court also found that nothing raised by Ms Lane called into question the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the prospective merits of the case.

The Supreme Court concluded that this case did not provide an appropriate vehicle to consider the correct approach in such claims, as Ms Lane did not challenge the principles set out in Public Trust v Whyman. The Court found that the criteria for leave to appeal were not met. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Ms Lane was ordered to pay one set of costs of $2,500 to the respondents.

Orders