Landrein v The Queen
[2018] NZHC 2511
•25 September 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2018-404-132 [2018] NZHC 2511
BETWEEN MICHEL LANDREIN
Appellant
AND
THE QUEEN Respondent
Hearing: 6 August 2018 Appearances:
C J Tennet for Appellant
C D Piho for RespondentJudgment:
25 September 2018
JUDGMENT OF PAUL DAVISON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 25 September 2018 at 3:00 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Kayes Fletcher Walker, Auckland
LANDREIN v R [2018] NZHC 2511 [25 September 2018]
Introduction
[1] Michel Landrein pleaded guilty to one charge of importing methamphetamine and one charge of possessing methamphetamine for supply.1 He was sentenced on 26
January 2018 to 10 years and six months’ imprisonment, and required to serve a minimum period of 50 per cent of that sentence.2 Mr Landrein now appeals that sentence on the grounds it is manifestly excessive.
Background
[2] Mr Landrein is a French national. On 2 September 2017, he arrived at Auckland International Airport carrying an upright trolley case. The case weighed 5.3 kilograms, yet an X-ray scan indicated it was empty. Closer inspection revealed a false bottom, and in the secret compartment, approximately 1.9 kilograms of methamphetamine, with a purity of 80 percent. Its street value is estimated to be between $665,000 and $2,280,000.
[3] Mr Landrein is 45 years old and has no previous convictions in New Zealand or elsewhere. The pre-sentence report states that he regrets his offending, and was motivated by a desperate need for money. He has written a letter of apology to the Court.
[4] Judge Andrée Wiltens in the District Court adopted a starting point of 14 years’ imprisonment, and reduced the starting point by 25 per cent to reflect Mr Landrein’s early guilty plea. He did not make any other reductions, so the end sentence was 10 years and six months’ imprisonment. The Judge also imposed a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of 50 per cent.
Grounds of appeal
[5] Mr Tennet for Mr Landrein raises issues concerning:
1 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, ss 6(1)(a) and 6(2)(a) (the importation charge); and 6(1)(f) and 6(2)(a) (the possession for supply charge). Both charges carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
2 R v Landrein [2018] NZDC 1419.
(a)the starting point (given the amount of methamphetamine and the role played by Mr Landrein);
(b)the Judge’s refusal to grant a discrete credit for remorse, for medical difficulties, and for Mr Landrein’s ‘dislocation’ (that is, for being a foreign national with no connections in New Zealand); and
(c) the Judge’s imposition of an MPI in these circumstances.
Approach to appeal
[6] I must allow Mr Landrein’s appeal if I am satisfied – whether in relation to one of these stated issues, or otherwise – that there is an error in the sentence imposed on him, and a different sentence should be imposed. Otherwise, I must dismiss the appeal against sentence.3
[7] The approach previously taken by courts on sentencing appeals continues to apply,4 so that the sentence must be “manifestly excessive” if the appeal is to be allowed.5 The Court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles. Whether a sentence is manifestly excessive is to be assessed in terms of the sentence given, rather than the process by which it is reached.6
[8] With that framework in mind, I address each stated issue in turn.
Starting point
[9] Judge Andrée Wiltens arrived at a starting point of 14 years’ imprisonment. His Honour was orthodox in his reliance on the guideline judgment of R v Fatu,7 describing Mr Landrein’s offending as “a fair way up” within band four on the basis of the significant quantity of methamphetamine involved.8
3 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(3).
4 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26]–[27].
5 At [33], [35].
6 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
7 R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA).
8 R v Landrein [2018] NZDC 1419 at [3].
[10] R v Fatu describes the bands in these terms:9
(a) Band One – low-level importing (less than 5 gms) – 2 years 6 months’
to 4 years 6 months’ imprisonment;
(b)Band Two – importing commercial quantities (5gms to 250gms) – 3 years, 6 months’ to 10 years’ imprisonment;
(c)Band Three – importing large commercial quantities (250mgs to 500 mgs) – 9 to 13 years’ imprisonment.
(d)Band Four – importing very large commercial quantities (500 gms or more) – 12 years to life imprisonment.
[11] Mr Landrein’s importation of 1.9 kilograms clearly falls within band four. Contrary to Mr Tennet’s submission, the fact the methamphetamine had a purity of 80 percent does not justify a reduction in the overall quantity to be assessed under the Fatu bands. The Court of Appeal held those bands are set by reference to “P”, “a form of the drug in which the purity is of the order of, or exceeds, 60 percent”.10
[12] I accept the bands overlap and there is some flexibility in applying them,11 particularly with reference to the culpability involved in the specific role played by the offender.12 Courts have made distinctions between the roles played by the mastermind at the highest level, a crucial player at an in-between level, and a mere courier at the lower end of the scale.13 Here, counsel contends the Judge should have acknowledged the lower culpability inherent in Mr Landrein’s role as a ‘mule’ or courier.
[13] Fatu is explicit, however, that its bands are equally applicable to ‘mules’,14 and in R v Tyniec, Wylie J notes that this role remains “an important one”:15
9 R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA) at [36].
10 R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA) at [30]. The Court makes a different point at [27], observing
“the weight calculations [should] proceed on a basis that is referable to purity … So a mixture containing 12 g of a controlled drug and 6 g of baking soda is treated as 12 g and not 18 g of the controlled drug for the purposes of the Act.” In this case, Customs officials initially found 2.376
kilograms of a “white crystalline substance”, which on field testing was found to contain only 1.9
kilograms of 80 percent purity of methamphetamine.
11 R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA) at [31]. I note, however, the standard approach will be to vary the sentencing levels within the bands in light of other relevant factors: see at [36].
12 R v Iwu [2015] NZHC 1438 at [27]–[28]; and R v Martel [2017] NZHC 1878 at [16].
13 R v Wickremasinghe HC Auckland T013408, 28 March 2003.
14 At [36].
15 R v Tyniec HC Auckland CRI-2011-092-6373, 9 August 2011 at [21].
Without a courier, the importation of methamphetamine and other drugs into New Zealand would be very difficult indeed. Mules or couriers are an integral part of international drug dealing operations. The community is entitled to expect protection from people who act as couriers or mules, and this Court must impose sentences which deter couriers from trying to import into this country.
[14] Judge Andrée Wiltens reasoned along similar lines when – after recording the amount and purity of the methamphetamine found on Mr Landrein’s person – his Honour stated:16
What that means so far as I am concerned is that a significant number of our population could have access to this for somebody’s enormous profit. There are two sides to the equation. One is the profit that is derived from this activity. The other is the harm that caused to our community. Because of those two factors this is very serious offending.
[15] Tyniec is instructive more generally as a close analogy to the present offending. Mr Tyniec pleaded guilty to the same charges, involving a comparable quantity of methamphetamine (1.99kg), which was similarly concealed in a secret compartment in his travel luggage. Wylie J adopted a starting point of 14 years’ imprisonment.
[16] The Crown submits Mr Landrein’s culpability is greater than that of Mr Tyniec because the former had undertaken a similar drug run in a different country some four years earlier (although there is no evidence that drug was methamphetamine). I note, however, that the statement of facts records Mr Landrein volunteered that information to Customs Officers in his formal interview, in the course of providing what appears to be a comprehensive divulging of his (limited) knowledge of the drug operation. In those circumstances – and in recognition of his frankness and cooperation – I do not regard his culpability in relation to the present offending as greater than that of Mr Tyniec.
[17] I consider the Judge was properly mindful of Mr Landrein’s lesser role in the overall drug operation. As the Crown points out, it is helpful to compare his 14-year starting point with the higher starting points imposed in cases such as R v Wong.17 In
that case, the Court of Appeal considered a 15-year starting point appropriate for an
16 At [2].
17 R v Wong [2009] NZCA 332.
offender who played a role in organising and “catching” as well as couriering methamphetamine.
Discounts
[18] In Tyniec, Wylie J gave generous discounts for good character, remorse, an early guilty plea, and the fact Mr Tyniec, a Polish national, would “suffer from cultural and language difficulties” in prison.18 His Honour reduced the overall sentence by 50 percent for these mitigating factors.
[19] Here, however, Judge Andrée Wiltens held that the “only mitigation that is available to [Mr Landrein] is the fact that you pleaded to this at a very early stage”, for which his Honour granted the full 25 percent credit.19 Every case turns on its own facts, of course, particularly when it comes to the highly discretionary exercise of applying discounts for personal mitigating factors. The issue is whether further discounts were warranted in this case.
[20] I begin by acknowledging the Judge was mindful of wider personal circumstances, noting that Mr Landrein has no prior convictions in New Zealand or elsewhere, and further:20
… that life in prison in New Zealand is not going to be easy for you because of the language issues and because of lack of family and support.
[21] But his Honour emphasised the importance of the sentencing purposes of denouncing the offending, and deterring future couriers from importing methamphetamine into New Zealand:21
When you agreed to do this you knew that was the risk, and you took it. Now you have to face the consequences …
Tell all your friends do not take the risk of going to New Zealand because there are real consequences if you are caught.
18 At [30].
19 At [5].
20 At [4].
21 At [4] and [8].
[22] This emphasis was not misplaced. In R v Jarden,22 the Supreme Court restated the principle that in sentencing those convicted of dealing commercially in controlled drugs, the personal circumstances of the offender must be subordinated to the importance of deterrence. The Court did acknowledge, however, that it would, in appropriate cases, take personal circumstances into account if they contributed to the offending or provided particular reasons for compassion.23
[23] Aside from his own claim that he desperately needed money, there is no real suggestion Mr Landrein’s personal circumstances have materially contributed to his offending. But Mr Tennet says that nevertheless there is reason for compassion, characterising his client as “a regretful and remorseful defendant who pleaded guilty at the first opportunity and was cooperative”.
[24] There is justification for his submission. Mr Landrein pleaded guilty, has written a letter of apology to the Court, and was highly co-operative with officials, explaining what he knew of the drug operation. He has already received credit for his plea. While his letter, of itself, does not provide “hard evidence of genuine regret and remorse”,24 in my view it warrants a modest discount when considered in light of his cooperation with officials.
[25] In reliance on the recent Court of Appeal decision in Gao v R (post-dating Judge Andrée Wiltens’ decision), Mr Tennet also contends a discrete discount should have been given for ‘dislocation’. As the Court of Appeal explains:25
… the effects of dislocation from family and culture may result in a sentence being disproportionately severe on a foreign national … Anne Owers, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, noted in 2006:
As the report makes clear, foreign nationals, though a divergent group, have a recognisable cluster of specific needs. Our research identified three that are both serious and prevalent, across all groups. They are: language, family links and immigration. The three are interlinked, and can result in isolation, depression and confusion. Family links were particularly important for women prisoners, many serving long sentences for drug importation; while young prisoners
22 R v Jarden [2008] NZSC 69, [2008] 3 NZLR 612.
23 At [12].
24 R v Senior (2000) 18 CRNZ 340 (HC) at [21], citing R v Brewster [1998] 1 Cr App R 220 (CA).
25 Gao v R [2018] NZCA 69 at [21]–[22].
tended to be unaware of the serious potential consequences of their sentences.
Simple things also impact more severely on a foreign prisoner, including diet, religious needs and telephone costs. Cultural indifference or, worse, racism is another problem.
(footnotes omitted)
Yet as the Crown points out, Mr Tennet did not refer to the following two paragraphs, where the Court goes on to say:
[23] But without in any way criticising Mr Chisnall’s helpful submissions, this is not the proper case for formulating general guidance on discounts for dislocation effects. There is no evidence before us on the effects of dislocation on foreign nationals in New Zealand and there is scant evidence to show that imprisonment will be disproportionately severe for Mr Wu because of dislocation effects.
[24] Another difficulty is that Mr Wu, more than most, engages the need for deterrence. He has come to New Zealand for the sole purpose of importing methamphetamine and has recruited others in New Zealand to do the same.
[26] It is accordingly clear that the Court of Appeal is not emphatically saying that a discount for dislocation will never be warranted, but rather that this was not the case to provide broad appellate guidance on the subject. In Tran v R – another case involving the importation and possession of methamphetamine – the Court of Appeal reduced a starting point of 13 years by six months to reflect the effects of a prison sentence on Ms Tran in New Zealand, including the fact that her family overseas suffered serious health issues.26 The need for deterrence will therefore not always or necessarily trump the granting of a discount for dislocation in appropriate cases. In the present context, it is relevant that Mr Landrein’s offending is less serious than that of Mr Wu in Gao v R, and the requisite requirement of deterrence is correspondingly less.
[27] Nevertheless, “care is needed before too much weight is attributed in these situations to the impact of jail in a foreign country”,27 especially where no clear evidence has been put before the Court to establish the level or nature of the unique harm Mr Landrein will face as a result of his dislocation.
[28] As for Mr Landrein’s health, Mr Tennet advised that Mr Landrein had contracted hepatitis and there were difficulties with treatment in New Zealand. However, there was a paucity of evidence on this subject and so I directed the filing of further memoranda following the hearing. Mr Tennet has now filed several pages selected from Mr Landrein’s medical file. A letter from a nurse specialist dated 16
October 2017 confirms Mr Landrein’s diagnosis of chronic hepatitis C, genotype 3. There is a further letter from Corrections, which is undated and unsigned, in which a Mr Warwick Beever states that Mr Landrein is not currently eligible for treatment of his hepatitis C as it is only funded for “Type one genotype”. The letter is not printed on any form of letterhead, but the designatory letters after Mr Beever’s name indicate that he is the health centre manager at Mount Eden Corrections Facility.
[29] Mr Tennet relies on R v Verschaffelt, a sentence appeal concerning supply and conspiracy to import Class A and B drugs.28 Mr Verschaffelt suffered from an unusual medical condition in which he developed certain symptoms (including internal and external swelling) upon exposure to cold. He was kept in a special needs unit in prison, but despite the efforts of prison authorities the cell was too cold for him and he became ill several times. The Court of Appeal recognised the humanitarian principle that where prison would constitute a more severe penalty for the particular offender due to a medical condition or disability, some leniency may be shown in sentencing. A combined discount of 50 per cent was awarded to reflect Mr Verschaffelt’s medical condition as well as his plea of guilty and other factors (which are not specified). In my view the evidence regarding the disproportionately severe impact of imprisonment on Mr Verschaffelt as a result of his medical condition is much more compelling than the limited evidence available regarding Mr Landrein.
[30] The Crown relies on M v Police, in which the appellant adduced evidence that he had recently been diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver and hepatitis C, genotype
3.29 The Court of Appeal considered that the evidence did not satisfactorily address
what treatment the appellant was able to receive in prison for his diagnosed medical condition. It cited ss 49, 51 and 75 of the Corrections Act 2004, which require the Department of Corrections to assess the prisoner’s medical needs upon arrival in
prison and which give the prisoner a right to receive medical treatment that is reasonably necessary. The Court considered it could assume medical treatment reasonably necessary to manage the appellant’s medical conditions would be provided,
and awarded no discount.
[31] As in M v Police, here too the evidence falls short of conclusively showing that medical treatment is unavailable for Mr Landrein in prison. Because of the unsigned, undated and unspecific nature of the contents of Mr Beever’s letter, I am unable to place significant weight on it, although I accept that Mr Landrein’s diagnosis has been confirmed. Nor do I have any evidence or information as to how his medical condition impacts on his day-to-day life in prison.
[32] While the various personal mitigating factors relied on by Mr Tennet are not compelling when considered in isolation, in my view taken together they warrant recognition, and I consider the Judge erred in not giving any credit on sentence for factors beyond Mr Landrein’s guilty plea. Stepping back to consider Mr Landrein’s overall culpability, and with a view to consistency with Tyniec, it is appropriate to take into account his remorse, co-operation with officials, dislocation, and medical issues by applying a modest global discount of 15 percent for his personal circumstances.
[33] Applying a 15 percent reduction to the starting point of 14 years’ imprisonment results in a sentence of 11.9 years. A further reduction of 25 per cent for Mr Landrein’s early guilty plea, results in an end sentence of eight years and 10 months. Accordingly I find that the sentence imposed by the District Court Judge, namely 10 years and six months’ imprisonment, was manifestly excessive.
Minimum period of imprisonment
[34] The final issue, then, is whether the Judge erred in imposing an MPI of 50 percent. The Judge made the following remarks in this context:30
It is appropriate, therefore, that I impose a minimum period of imprisonment. What that means is it is not a question of simply asking to be sent home. It means you are going to serve a significant part of the sentence before you are sent home, and that is necessary to hold you accountable for your actions, to
30 At [6].
denounce your offending, to deter you and others from doing this in the future and to try and protect our community. I have the power to impose up [to] two- thirds of the 10 and a half years by way of a minimum period of imprisonment. I will not do that. I am imposing it for 50 percent instead.
[35] No MPI was imposed in Tyniec. Wylie J considered that the offender was “unlikely to offend in this way again”, and so there was no need to protect the community from him.31 Here the Crown stresses Mr Landrein’s admission that he had undertaken a drug run before, and says that this implies he is more likely to do it again. I note however that Mr Landrein does not appear to have been convicted for that prior drug run, and I disregard that matter for present purposes.
[36] The Court of Appeal has said it is “almost invariable” that in cases of very serious drug offending the criteria for a s 86 order will be made out.32 Further, the Court of Appeal has observed:33
… foreigners should not be treated differently from New Zealand citizens where substantial drug dealing is involved: R v Zhou. More recently, this Court has held that the prospect of deportation is not a proper ground for refusing to impose a minimum sentence which is otherwise justified.
(footnotes omitted)
[37] Nevertheless the Court of Appeal appears to have taken account of this factor in deciding that an MPI was not warranted in Tran v R,34 and I shall proceed on the basis that the relevance of this issue will depend on the particular facts of each case. After all, an MPI is never automatic, and the test is always whether the usual non- parole period is insufficient to hold the defendant accountable, denounce their conduct, deter them and others, and protect the community.35
[38] In the present case I consider that an MPI was not warranted based on Mr Landrein’s personal circumstances and risk of re-offending. In my view the usual non- parole period of one third (given the lengthy end sentence) is sufficient to meet the purposes of accountability, denunciation, deterrence and protection of the community.
31 At [35].
32 R v Aram [2007] NZCA 328 at [78].
33 Olua v R [2014] NZCA 105 at [67].
34 Tran v R [2017] NZCA 146 at [33].
35 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86(1).
Result
[39] The appeal is allowed.
[40] The sentence of 10 years and six months’ imprisonment is quashed, and substituted by a lesser sentence of eight years and 10 months’ imprisonment on both charges, to be served concurrently. The usual minimum period of imprisonment (one third of the end sentence) is to apply.
Paul Davison J
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