Lakshman

[2023] NZHC 29

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2023-404-0130

[2023] NZHC 29

UNDER

the Habeas Corpus Act 2001

IN THE MATTER

of an application for a writ of habeas corpus

BETWEEN

LEAH MARIE LAKSHMAN

Applicant

AND

All Organisations and Individuals operating Under the “Crown” Entity as Authorising Parties of the Government/s and Ministries herein the country of residence and place of assignment under review New Zealand, excluding the entity known as the “Crown”.

Respondent

Hearing:	On the papers
Date of judgment:	26 January 2023

JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J

This judgment was delivered by me on 26 January 2023 at 3.00pm.

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Copy to:

L M Lakshman

RE LAKSHMAN [2023] NZHC 29 [26 January 2023]

[1]                 As duty judge during the Court’s long vacation, I have Leah Lakshman’s     23 January 2023 application, brought against:

All Organisations and Individuals operating under the “Crown” entity as Authorising Parties of the Government/s and Ministries herein the country of residence and place of assignment under review New Zealand, excluding the entity known as the “Crown”,

styled “for a Writ of Habeas Corpus”. A writ of habeas corpus is to “[restore] the liberty of persons unlawfully detained”.1

[2]                 If so, the application “must be given precedence over all other matters before the High Court unless a Judge of that court considers that the circumstances require otherwise”, “Judges and employees of the Ministry of Justice must ensure that every application … is disposed of as a matter of priority and urgency”, and “[t]he Registrar must allocate a date for the inter partes hearing of an application that is no later than 3 working days after the date on which the application is filed”.2

[3]                 While contending she “[has] and [has]  not  been  ‘detained’  unlawfully”,  Ms Lakshman’s application is not an application for habeas corpus. Rather, she pursues the application in fulfilment of her contended “assigned duty … to fully conduct a fair trial and process of [New Zealand’s] governing system … to ensure the Crown Laws were being justifiably executed and followed …”. In both that objective and its greater specificity,3 the application entirely is nonsensical. It is not required to be given any precedence, priority, urgency or inter partes hearing, despite its filing as a habeas corpus application.

[4]                 The application is instead a serious abuse of the process of the court — “improper use of [the court’s] machinery”;4 use of that process “for a purpose or in a way significantly different from its ordinary and proper use”5 — which I am

1      Habeas Corpus Act 2001, s 5.

2      Habeas Corpus Act 2001, s 9.

3      Including Ms Lakshman draws her authority from “a ‘Great power’, as a ‘Sovereign Entity’ residing in Aotearoa/New Zealand, through ‘hereditary’ assignment of the House of Lords, Security Council and Shadow Advisory through Special Signal Communications”.

4      Simon Goulding, DB Casson and William Blake Odgers Odgers on Civil Court Actions (24th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1996) at [10.15] as cited in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR 679 at [87].

5      Attorney-General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 (QBD) at 764.

empowered to strike out at least “to protect public confidence in the administration of justice by refusing to tolerate serious abuses”.6

[5]The application is struck out and the proceeding is dismissed.

—Jagose J

6      O’Neill v Commissioner of Police [2022] NZCA 501 at [22]–[23].