IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-Ā-TARA ROHE
CIV-2015-485-635
[2018] NZHC 1090
IN THE MATTER of an appeal under s 253 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 BETWEEN
PAPALI’I TOTI LAGOLAGO
Appellant
AND
WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE 2
Respondent
On the papers: Counsel:
A C Beck for Appellant
D R La Hood for Respondent
Judgment:
18 May 2018
JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J
Background
[1] On 2 May 2018, I heard an application by the appellant for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in relation to a costs decision given by Clifford J on 8 December 2017.
[2] The costs decision was the sequel to a judgment by Clifford J on the substantive appeal which had been delivered on 30 November 2016.
[3] The reason that the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in respect of the costs decision came before me was because Clifford J is now sitting in the Court of Appeal.
LAGOLAGO v WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE 2 [2018] NZHC 1090 [18 May 2018]
The present application
[4]On 2 May 2018, I heard the application for leave to appeal.
[5] By memorandum dated 4 May 2018, Mr Beck, counsel for Ms Lagolago, requested that I give consideration as to whether this was a case I could properly decide.
[6] By this stage I had already heard the case and had commenced preparing a decision.
[7] By minute of 7 May 2018, I directed that if the applicant wished to formally pursue a recusal application she was required to file and serve such an application along with any supporting affidavit.
[8] On 14 May 2018, a recusal application together with an affidavit by Ms Lagolago was received by the Court.
Grounds of application
[9] The principal grounds for the application were that in 2012, some six years ago, I had been a member of a panel which had processed applications by lawyers for appointment as legal services providers. It was alleged that during the course of discussions with other panel members I had “expressed firm views regarding the appellant’s professional conduct”.
[10] It was claimed that the appellant’s professional conduct is directly relevant to the current application and it was said to be “one of the factors considered by Clifford J to be relevant to his costs decision.”
[11] It was claimed that a fair-minded, fully informed observer would have a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the application for leave to appeal the costs decision.
[12] Counsel for the respondent has filed a memorandum on 16 May 2018 abiding the decision of the Court.
The relevant principles
[13] As required by s 171 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, the Chief High Court Judge, in consultation with the Chief Justice, has developed and published a recusal guidelines. The general principles in those guidelines are:
(a)a Judge has an obligation to sit on any case allocated…
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- Case
- [2018] NZHC 1090
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles of recusal under the Senior Courts Act 2016, focusing on whether a fair-minded, fully informed observer would have a reasonable apprehension of partiality. The court found that the 2012 application and the current costs decision were unrelated in subject matter and context. The court emphasised that a judge is not required to recuse themselves merely because they had previously dealt with a case. The opinion expressed in 2012 was specific to that application and based on the comments of two High Court judges regarding Ms Lagolago’s conduct in a judicial review case. The court concluded that the opinion did not disqualify Churchman J from hearing the current application as it was neither extreme nor unbalanced. Therefore, the application for recusal was dismissed.
Churchman J, after considering the grounds of the recusal application and the relevant legal principles, determined that there was no basis for recusal. The application was dismissed, and the court's earlier decision on the application for leave to appeal the costs decision remained in place.
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