Kronfeld v The King

Case

[2025] NZCA 435

29 August 2025 at 2.15 pm


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

CA235/2025

[2025] NZCA 435

BETWEEN ROSABEL DANIELLA CATHERINE
KRONFELD
Appellant
AND THE KING
Respondent
Hearing:  31 July 2025
Court:  French P, Jagose and Gault JJ
Counsel:  G H Vear and J F McPherson for Appellant
T Zhang and R K Thomson for Respondent
Introduction 
  1. The appellant Ms Kronfeld pleaded guilty in the District Court to one charge

of aggravated burglary.[1] She was convicted and sentenced by Judge Webby to a prison

[1]        Crimes Act 1961, s 232(1)(a).

term of five years and six months.[2]

[2]        R v Kronfeld [2025] NZDC 6523 [sentencing notes] at [15].

  1. Ms Kronfeld now appeals the sentence.[3]

    [3]        Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 244(1) and 247(1)(d).

Facts of the offending

  1. Shortly after 2.15 am on 19 August 2023, Ms Kronfeld and four other women

arrived uninvited at the victim’s home and began screaming and yelling abuse. The

group was angry with the victim for having disclosed on social media that one of the

group, a Ms Kamoe, had been unfaithful to her partner. The identities of the other

three women were never established, only that they were known as “Jayda”, “Twista

Queen” and “Des Joyce”.

  1. The victim was alone in the house and asleep. She was woken by the noise,

including the noise of Ms Kamoe smashing a bottle outside near the back door. As the

victim went to the back door, Ms Kronfeld kicked down the front door and entered the

house. She approached the victim and repeatedly attempted to punch her in the face

before letting the others in.

  1. Once inside, the group embarked on a prolonged and terrifying attack on the

victim, during the course of which the victim believed she was going to die. It lasted

some 10 to 15 minutes.

  1. It began with Twista Queen wrapping an extension cord around the victim’s

neck and then proceeding to drag her around the house, impeding her breathing. As

this was happening, Ms Kronfeld and the others continued to hit and taunt the victim.

[7] At some stage during the attack, Ms Kamoe signalled for the group to stop, saying “this is my kill, this is my shit”. She then grabbed the victim by the hair, “ragdoll[ing]” her around the house. The victim begged her to stop, but to no avail.

The others, including Ms Kronfeld, resumed their attack. One of them tried to cut the

victim’s hair with scissors, while another started to record the assault on her phone.

  1. At another point, Ms Kronfeld left the group. She went first to the victim’s

bedroom. There, she attempted to remove footage from the victim’s security camera,

damaging $3000 worth of electronic equipment in the process. From the bedroom,

she moved to the kitchen, and picked up a serrated bread knife. She handed the knife

to one of the group who proceeded to strike the victim with it, while Ms Kronfeld held

the victim by her hair. The victim sustained a deep four centimetre wound to her upper

shoulder, just below her neck.

  1. Once Ms Kamoe finally relinquished the victim’s hair, the victim managed to

escape to a neighbour’s house and get help.

  1. When interviewed by police, Ms Kronfeld made some admissions, but also

attempted to minimise her involvement in the offending.

  1. In October 2023, Ms Kronfeld was charged with wounding with intent to cause

grievous bodily harm, and also with intent to commit burglary while armed with a

weapon. The latter charge was amended in November 2023 to a charge of aggravated

burglary. In August 2024, Ms Kronfeld rejected a sentence indication of five years

and eight months’ imprisonment that she had been given for both charges, subject to

further discounts at sentence.

  1. In October 2024, the Crown offered to resolve the matter on the single charge

of aggravated burglary, combined with one amendment to the summary of facts which

recorded the lack of force involved in Ms Kronfeld’s initial punches.

The sentencing decision

  1. In arriving at the end sentence of five years and six months’ imprisonment, the

Judge adopted the following reasoning.

  1. First, he adopted a starting point of eight years’ imprisonment in light of the

aggravating features of the offending.[4] These he identified as being the number of

attackers, the significant degree of premeditation, the element of home invasion, the

vulnerability of the victim, the use of weapons and the significant harm caused.[5]

[4]        Sentencing notes, above n 2, at [14(a)].

[5] At [12].

  1. The Judge then increased the starting point by two months to reflect the fact

that the offending had taken place while Ms Kronfeld was on bail,[6] before applying

discounts totalling around 33 per cent for personal mitigating factors. The relevant

discounts were specified as 20 months (20 per cent) on account of the guilty plea, six

months for youth (which equates to around six per cent), and another six months (six

per cent) for remorse, background factors, work done in prison and prospects for the

future.[7]

Grounds of appeal

[6]        At [14(b)].

[7]        At [14(c)–(g)].

  1. On behalf of Ms Kronfeld, Ms Vear argued that although the starting point of

eight years was within range, it was at the upper end of the range which, in turn, meant

that when combined with inadequate discounts for background factors and the guilty

plea, the end sentence was manifestly excessive.

  1. In her submission — having regard to Ms Kronfeld’s background which was

causally related to her offending, her tangible remorse and her efforts towards

rehabilitation, as well as her prospects for the future — a six month aggregate discount

was demonstrably inadequate. Ms Vear further argued that Ms Kronfeld was entitled

to the maximum available discount for the guilty plea (25 per cent) because it was

entered at the first reasonable opportunity following resolution discussions with the

Crown.
Analysis

  1. The Judge’s starting point of eight years for the one offence was the same

starting point he adopted at the sentencing indication for two offences.[8] That has

certainly given us pause for thought. However, a review of the relevant authorities on

sentencing for aggravated burglary has satisfied us that an eight year starting point was

available to the Judge on the basis of the summary of facts.[9] The summary was not

amended in any material way following the withdrawal of the other charge.[10]

[8]        Being aggravated burglary and wounding with intent. This was also acknowledged by the Judge:

[9]        We note that sentencing for aggravated burglary usually proceeds by analogy to R v Mako [2000]

[10]       See Jahnke v R [2024] NZHC 3093 at [13]–[14] and [18]–[22]. Like in Ms Kronfeld’s case, the

  1. Further, we consider that far from eight years being at the upper end of the

available range, the relevant authorities show that eight years can fairly be

characterised as middle of the range.[11] The case primarily relied on by Ms Vear is

R v Manuel, where a starting point of seven years was adopted.[12] Manuel certainly

involved more victims, but there were fewer offenders, no stabbing, limited

premeditation and Ms Manuel, unlike Ms Kronfeld, did not herself inflict any

violence.[13] Significantly too, a co-offender in the same case received an increased

starting point of seven and a half years, primarily because she had hit one of the victims

in the head with the handle of a knife.[14]

[11]       Sometimes the starting point has dropped as low as six and a half years: Tereora v R [2015] NZCA

[12]       R v Manuel [2021] NZHC 250 at [1] and [13]–[15].

[13]       At [4]–[7] and [14]–[15].

[14]       R v Nepia [2022] NZHC 198 at [38]–[39].

  1. We also do not accept that Ms Kronfeld was entitled to the maximum allowable

discount of 25 per cent for the guilty plea. It is well established that in calculating the

amount of a guilty plea discount, sentencing judges are entitled to take into account the strength of the Crown case.[15] Here, the Crown case was very strong, with

Ms Kronfeld’s thumb print being found in the house, and there being CCTV footage

of her outside the property at the relevant time. She was also identified by the

complainant as one of the attackers and had made admissions to the police. In coming

to this conclusion, we have not overlooked the withdrawal of the wounding charge.

However, for the reasons already explained, that concession was of limited relevance

and we do not attach the significance to it that Ms Vear would have us do. We conclude

that a 20 per cent discount was open to the Judge.

[15]       Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [74]. See also Karipa v R [2025] NZCA

  1. Nor do we consider that Ms Kronfeld was entitled to a greater discount for her

prospects of rehabilitation or her remorse.

  1. As to the latter, while Ms Kronfeld expressed remorse in various ways, we

consider the Judge was entitled to view those expressions with some scepticism given

that during an interval in the police interview, in an unguarded moment, she can be

heard muttering to herself that “I’m going to go and punch [the victim] after this,

fucking bitch”. Significantly too, Ms Kronfeld has continued to minimise her role by,

for example, falsely telling the pre-sentence report writer that she never touched the

victim, and affirming an affidavit for the purposes of sentencing in which she omits to

mention that she was the person who kicked down the front door and let the others in

through the back.

  1. As regards rehabilitation prospects, it is correct that Ms Kronfeld has engaged

in several programmes while in custody. However, rehabilitation prospects are

generally viewed as part of a youth discount which was given to Ms Kronfeld, despite

her being aged 25 years at the time of the offending.[16] The giving of any discount for

[16]       See, for example, R v Ormsby-Turner [2023] NZCA 601 at [85].

youth was arguably generous and, in our view, outweighs any argument about the

insufficiency of the limited discount for rehabilitation prospects.

[24] Where we consider Ms Vear to be on stronger ground is in relation to what are sometimes loosely called background factors. As mentioned at sentencing, the Judge was provided with an affidavit from Ms Kronfeld. The affidavit detailed a deprived

childhood characterised by neglect and regular beatings. Effectively abandoned by

her mother, she entered into a violent relationship with no one to turn to for help, and

became pregnant at age 16. That child was uplifted by the authorities, leading to a

downward spiral into substance abuse. Ms Kronfeld became a heavy user of

methamphetamine. Later, a second child was also uplifted. Ms Kronfeld eventually

regained custody of both children and obtained employment. However, after losing

custody because she had allowed her ex-partner to see the children, she relapsed into

using methamphetamine again, and ended up losing her job.

  1. Although this is all self-reported and contained in an affidavit where there are

demonstrable half truths about other matters, the fact it is self-reported is not of itself

a disqualifying factor, although it may bear on the weight to be attached to it.[17] What

[17]       Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509 at [129].

is significant is that most of Ms Kronfeld’s conviction history including the index

offending occurred during what Ms Vear described as a dark period following the loss

of both children. To that extent, we consider those background factors can properly

be viewed as a contributor to the offending in the Berkland v R sense, even if they are

a more diffused driver for the offending.[18]

[18] At [109].

  1. Given that conclusion, we consider that greater credit should have been given

for background factors. As to what that greater credit should be, Ms Vear referred us

to cases where discounts of around 15 per cent have been given.[19] However, there are

[19]       Davidson v R [2020] NZCA 230 at [30]–[34]; and Harris v R [2021] NZCA 143 at [7]–[10] and

also other decisions that are closer to 10 per cent.[20] Taking into account the seriousness

[20]       See, for example, Aramoana v R [2021] NZCA 558 at [14].

of the offending, which it is well established may temper discounts that might

otherwise be given,[21] we consider that a further reduction of six months resulting in

[21]       Berkland v R, above n 17, at [111].

an end sentence of five years’ imprisonment is appropriate. That recognises the

seriousness of the offending while aligning with the case law.
Outcome

  1. The appeal is allowed and the sentence imposed in the District Court of five

years and six months’ imprisonment is quashed and replaced with a sentence of five

years’ imprisonment.

Solicitors:

Public Defence Service | Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui, Auckland for Appellant

Crown Law Office | Te Tari Ture o te Karauna, Wellington for Respondent

Judgment:  29 August 2025 at 2.15 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal is allowed and the sentence imposed in the District Court of five years

and six months’ imprisonment is quashed and replaced with a sentence of five

years’ imprisonment.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by French P)

KRONFELD v R [2025] NZCA 435 [29 August 2025]

see at [11], [13] and [14(a)], n 3.

2 NZLR 170 (CA), being the tariff case for aggravated robbery: Pohutuhutu v R [2017] NZCA

501 at [61].

sentencing Judge in that case had adopted the same starting point that was indicated at a sentencing

indication, notwithstanding the reduction in charges since that time. However, contrary to the

appellant’s submission that the reduction in the charges reduced the gravity of the offending, the

High Court concluded that the starting point was well within range, and found no error in the

Judge’s approach.

120 at [32]–[33]. However, in general, at least seven years’ imprisonment will be required for

home invasion offending: R v Mako, above n 9, at [58]. Sentences between eight and 11 years’

imprisonment are commonly selected for aggravated robberies involving home invasions, multiple

offenders, the use of disguises and weapons, planning and premeditation, as well as injuries to

victims: see Pearson v R [2020] NZCA 573 at [28].

274 at [30(b)].

[28].

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