Kraus v District Court at Queenstown

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

CIV-2013-425-000314 [2013] NZHC 3490

BETWEEN  PETER FRANZ KRAUS Applicant

ANDTHE DISTRICT COURT AT QUEENSTOWN

First Respondent

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND

Second Respondent

Submissions:            P J Magee for Applicant

No Submissions for First Respondent
S M Kinsler and E J Devine for Second Resondent

Judgment:                19 December 2013

JUDGMENT OF D GENDALL J

Background

[1]      This proceeding involved a judicial review application of a District Court decision  in  a minute dated 14  November 2013, issued in this proceeding,  after receiving a joint consent memorandum from counsel for the applicant and counsel for the second respondent.   I noted that it was agreed the first ground of judicial

review was made out.1   The second respondent did not concede however that any of

the other grounds of review were made out.   By consent, I made several different orders:   quashing the decision of Judge Phillips, directing the District  Court to remake its decision following the hearing of oral argument and vacating the judicial review hearing.  I then directed that the applicant could apply for costs, if he wished

to do so, and that is what has now occurred.

1      Kraus   v   The   District   Court   at   Queenstown   HC   Invercargill   CIV-2013-425-000314,

14 November 2013.

KRAUS v THE DISTRICT COURT AT QUEENSTOWN [2013] NZHC 3490 [19 December 2013]

The applicant’s position on costs

[2]      The applicant seeks costs here from the second respondent on a 2B basis. This is based on the fact that he was successful in his judicial review application without the necessity of considering the merits of the remaining causes of action.

[3]      As the party who effectively succeeded here, the applicant maintains that he is entitled to an award of costs from the second respondent.  It was accepted that if costs were to be paid, they would be reflected by a 2B award.

[4]      Counsel for the applicant provided the following 2B scale costs calculation here:  3 days for the commencement of the proceeding, 0.4 days for the preparation for the first case management conference, 0.2 days for the appearance at the mention hearing or callover, 0.3 days for obtaining judgment without appearance and 0.2 days for sealing order.   The applicant therefore seeks total costs of $8159.00.   The applicant also seeks payment of disbursements of $640 being the filing fee for the proceeding.

The First Respondent’s position on costs

[5]      The first respondent here, the District Court at Queenstown, noted that costs were not being sought against it and therefore the Court did not intend to make a submission on the issue.

The Second Respondent’s position on costs

[6]      The second respondent opposed the applicant’s present costs application.  It was noted that the applicant did not seeks costs against the first respondent, presumably on the principle that costs ought only to be awarded against courts in exceptional circumstances.

[7]      It was submitted that this case did not meet the exceptional circumstances threshold in Coroner’s Court v Newton.2    This was because the review application

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Details
Case
[2013] NZHC 3490
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved a judicial review application by Peter Franz Kraus against the District Court at Queenstown, with the Attorney-General of New Zealand as the second respondent. The review was initiated due to an acknowledged error in a District Court decision, which was rectified through a joint consent memorandum. The key legal issues revolved around the appropriate circumstances under which costs should be awarded in such judicial review proceedings. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the second respondent, the Attorney-General, should be held liable for costs given that the error was not of their making and they actively sought to correct the error.

The court considered the principle that costs should be awarded in exceptional cases where there is a clear failure by a party. The court acknowledged that the second respondent had not opposed the review application and had taken immediate steps to correct the error upon recognizing it. The court found that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a costs order against the second respondent. It was emphasized that such an order might create perverse incentives and undermine the principle that costs for judicial error should be awarded only in exceptional cases. The court also noted that the second respondent's proactive approach in correcting the error should not place them in a worse position than if they had remained detached.

In light of these considerations, the court concluded that it would be inappropriate and unjust to award costs against the second respondent. The court exercised its discretion under rule 14.7(g) to make no order as to costs, thereby allowing costs to lie where they fall.

The final orders of the court were to quash the original decision of the District Court, direct the District Court to remake its decision following a hearing of oral argument, vacate the judicial review hearing, and make no order as to costs. The court also allowed the applicant to apply for costs if they wished to do so, although no such order was ultimately made.