Kor v The King
[2025] NZHC 3316
•3 November 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2025-404-000471
[2025] NZHC 3316
BETWEEN CHAMROEUN KOR
Appellant
AND
THE KING
Respondent
Hearing: 3 November 2025 Counsel:
CHB Megala for Appellant KDJ Robinson for Respondent
Judgment:
3 November 2025
ORAL JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Auckland.
Public Defence Service, Auckland.
KOR v R [2025] NZHC 3316 [3 November 2025]
The appeal
[1] Chamroeun Kor received a sentence of six months’ home detention for twice money laundering.1 Mr Kor appeals that sentence.
[2] The appeal must be allowed if there is an error in the sentence and a different one should be imposed.2 The overarching concern is whether the sentence is manifestly excessive.3
Background
[3] This is best explained by adopting the sentencing remarks of Judge S J Bonnar KC:4
[1] Mr Kor, you are for sentencing today on two charges of engaging recklessly in money laundering transactions. The offences were committed by you on 14 and 17 February 2023. They involve two separate victims, whom I will refer to as “victim one” and “victim two”. The offence of engaging in a money laundering transaction carries a maximum available penalty of seven years’ imprisonment.
[2] In short, you received into a bank account controlled by you the proceeds of two fraudulent scams. Unknown offshore criminals set up a fake web page, purporting to be a broker for long-term deposits. They used the fake web page to extract money from victims who believed they were dealing with a legitimate deposit taking businesses and who were wanting to invest savings in a term deposit.
[3] There is no suggestion that you were involved in the overseas criminals’ scam as such. You were what is colloquially referred to as a “money mule”, in that you permitted the proceeds to be deposited into an account controlled by you and you then transferred a portion of those proceeds overseas, to Singapore.
[4] Victim one was looking online for term deposits. She entered her contact details into the fraudulent web page. In January 2023 a person called her, posing as someone named “Rupert Smith”. The caller claimed that he was an agent for HSBC bank in Auckland, specialising in term deposits. After engaging with victim one the scammers sent an email to her, instructing her how to make the investment payments. Believing that the proposal was legitimate, victim one completed the application form and was instructed to pay the investment funds to your bank account. Between 14 February and 21 February 2023 victim one made four transfers totalling $135,000 to your account.
1 Crimes Act 1961, s 243(2); maximum penalty, seven years’ imprisonment.
2 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).
3 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482.
4 R v Kor [2025] NZDC 18768.
[5] Similarly, victim two was looking online for term deposits and entered her contact details into the fraudulent web page on 9 February 2023. On 10 February 2023 a person calling themselves “Simon” contacted her. This person claimed to be from Citibank. What followed was similar to what had happened to victim one: an email was sent to her by the scammers instructing her as to how to make the investment. The email was ostensibly from a person named “Simon David” and holding themselves out to be a portfolio manager at Citibank in Auckland. Victim two, believing that it was a legitimate investment opportunity, completed the application and paid the investment funds to the same bank account controlled by you. She transferred $100,000 to that account on 17 February 2023.
[6] The account was held by your company, CK International Holdings Limited. You were the only signatory to the account.
[7] In terms of further agreed facts, you subsequently transferred the funds to Singapore. You sent a total of $167,200 to Singaporean bank accounts in four separate transfers.
[8] Your bank account was frozen by your bank on 21 March 2023, before any more funds could be transferred overseas. $67,800 of the funds transferred by the victims remained in your bank account. That account remains frozen at present.
[9] Victim two was subsequently reimbursed a total of $74,701 by banks involved in the transactions. Victim one has not been reimbursed by the banks. Victim one is presently out of pocket to the tune of the $135,000 that she transferred to your account. Victim two’s loss was $25,299.
[4] The Judge adopted a starting point “of around 20 months’ imprisonment”.5 The Judge deducted “a combined 40 percent discount”6 for Mr Kor’s late guilty pleas (entered on the morning of trial), remorse, and personal circumstances, including his previous good character.
[5]The Judge then commuted the sentence to home detention:
[40] For your guilty pleas, which were not early and were entered on the morning of trial, I apply a five per cent credit. For your previous good character, I apply a 10 per cent credit. For your remorse, which I accept is genuine, I apply five per cent. Because I am going to make reparation orders, I apply a further 20 per cent credit for reparation. That is a combined 40 per cent discount from the starting point, resulting in an end sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.
[41] I am satisfied that I can look at alternatives to imprisonment, particularly because you are a first offender, because of your age, and because I do not see that anything would be achieved by sending you to jail. I think your interests and the interests of the community are best served by you
5 R v Kor, above n 4, at [39].
6 At [40].
remaining in the community and, if possible, continuing to work, pay taxes, and contribute to society. For that reason, I consider that an appropriate alternative sentence is one of home detention. I consider that home detention is the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
A précis of the case on appeal for Mr Kor
[6] Mr Kor contends his sentence is manifestly excessive. On his behalf, Mr Megala argues the Judge should have imposed a sentence of community detention, not home detention.
[7] Mr Megala argued money laundering in a financial context is inherently less serious than money laundering to facilitate drug offending:
It is submitted that sentencing levels for drug related money laundering will axiomatically attract higher starting points and more restrictive end-points considering the personal culpability of the offender and the harm to society. It follows then that money laundering unrelated to drug dealing or a similarly serious offence, thus of lower gravity, ought to attract a lower starting point and a less restrictive outcome.
[8] Mr Megala said the most similar case — although also involving money laundering to facilitate drug dealing — is R v Bell.7 That defendant money laundered (once) $200,500. A starting point of 22 months’ imprisonment was commuted to a sentence of community detention.
[9] Finally, Mr Megala argued community detention provided sufficient deterrence in this context while also constituting the least restrictive outcome.
The case for the respondent
[10] The Crown contends the sentence is not manifestly excessive. On its behalf, Mr Robinson questioned whether sentences for money laundering adequately reflect the seriousness of the offending, noting:8
Weak money laundering controls have come at a real cost for this country in the past. In 2012, New Zealand was removed from the European Union white list of countries over a perception of this country’s weak money laundering controls. This affected the ability of European Union trading partners to
7 R v Bell [2024] NZHC 2674.
8 Footnotes omitted.
accept and acknowledge customer identification performed in New Zealand, leading to increased compliance costs.
A strong response to money laundering offences is also required by other obligations New Zealand has assumed. New Zealand has ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. That Convention requires, at art 11(1), parties to “ensure that any discretionary legal powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences covered by this Convention [such as money laundering] are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences”.
Analysis
[11] Sections 240–245 of the Crimes Act 1961 criminalise money laundering. The offence has two different maximum penalties. A maximum term of seven years’ imprisonment arises for a defendant who engages in a money laundering transaction “knowing or believing that all or part of the property is the proceeds of an offence, or being reckless as to whether or not the property is the proceeds of an offence”.9
[12] A lesser maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment arises in relation to a defendant who has in their possession property that is the proceeds of an offence committed by another person with intent to engage in a money laundering transaction in relation to that property, and knowing or believing that all or part of it is the proceeds of an offence, or being reckless as to whether or not the property is the proceeds of an offence.
[13] An offence in this context “means an offence (or any offence described as a crime) that is punishable under New Zealand law, including any act, wherever committed, that would be an offence in New Zealand if committed in New Zealand”.10
[14] Readers will note (a) the definition of “offence” is not confined to drug dealing and (b) the maximum penalty is not influenced by whether the offence concerned drug dealing.
9 Crimes Act 1961, s 243(2).
10 Section 243(1).
[15] Given the statutory mix and the universal proposition that offence-seriousness ultimately turns on the circumstances of the offending, I am unable to accept Mr Megala’s first argument. In short, money laundering in connection with an offence other than drug dealing is not inherently less serious than money laundering to facilitate drug dealing.
[16] I accept Bell has some similarity to this case, including the broadly similar amount laundered. However, Mr Kor’s offending has a significant aggravating feature Bell does not: victim impact. On this aspect, I can do no better than repeat what the Judge said:
[10] I have received and read victim impact statements from both victims. Victim one tells me that her husband had died in March 2022. She was left to look after herself and her son. Her financial decisions were made with her son’s future in mind. She says that she has always been careful with money and lived within her means. When she began exploring investment options, she did so with care. She speaks of her interactions with the scammers and of being manipulated into believing that she was making a secure investment.
[11] She said that, when she discovered the truth about the scam, she felt her world collapse. She suffered a panic attack so severe that she could barely breath. She rushed to the police and to her bank in an effort to undo what had been done, but it was too late. She describes the loss as the loss of her life savings. She describes living with unbearable shame. She has not been able to tell her son what has happened to the money that his father and she worked so hard to save. She has not told anyone beyond a small support group because she is afraid of being judged as foolish or untrustworthy.
[12] There have been significant impacts on her. She says she no longer trusts people. She fears the internet. She has been prescribed antidepressants. Her work has suffered and her confidence is shattered. She says she must work far longer than she ever planned because of the loss of her savings.
[13] Victim two describes your guilty plea as coming as a relief, but says that it does not undo the devastation that was caused to her. She describes her hard-earned savings being lost. She also describes shame. She says that she has to look her child in the eyes and she carries the weight of fear and uncertainty. She describes the financial strain as crushing but says that the emotional toll runs even deeper. She has been left battling severe stress, sleepless nights, anxiety, and health issues stemming from the trauma.
[14] The scam has shaken her confidence in others, in institutions, and in herself. She chose to share her story publicly in the hope that it might help others. She says that the crime has forever changed her life and the ripple effects will be felt by her and her family for years to come.
[15] All of the impacts described by the two victims are, of course, completely understandable.
[17] Because of victim impact, I agree with the Judge the offending “is a moderately grave example of money laundering”.11 For the same reason, I see Mr Kor’s offending as more serious than the offending in Bell.
[18] These conclusions address Mr Megala’s argument a sentence of community detention should have been imposed. But for completeness, I add three points.
[19] First, the “least restrictive outcome” principle enshrined in s 8(1)(g) of the Sentencing Act 2002 is not freewheeling, meaning the principle does not necessarily outweigh the various other principles created by s 8. The provision itself makes this clear, for, it requires the Court to impose the least restrictive outcome “that is appropriate in the circumstances”. Or, as the Supreme Court observed in Berkland v R:12
These principles and factors in ss 8 and 9 can also pull in different directions. Again, the Act itself does not prioritise them or attribute to them any particular weight. Rather, their applicability, priority and weight will be a matter for the sentencing judge to evaluate based on a broad assessment of the seriousness of the harm, the culpability of the offender, the interests of the victim and the offender’s personal circumstances or background.
[20] Second, the circumstances of this case necessarily included victim impact. They also included the need for general deterrence.
[21] Third, and to dovetail back to money laundering in a financial context, it should not be overlooked that the offence can (a) be committed with relative ease and (b) cause great harm. This case is illustrative of both propositions.
[22] All of this makes it unnecessary to address the Crown’s contention that sentences in this area are unduly lenient having regard to the inherent seriousness of the crime.
[23] It follows there is no error in the sentence, hence no different sentence is required. Or, expressed in terms of the common law test, the sentence is not manifestly excessive.
11 R v Kor, above n 4, at [35].
12 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509 at [21].
Result
[24] The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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Downs J
0
3
0