Knowles v Queenstown Lakes District Council

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WAIHŌPAI ROHE

CIV-2018-425-000098

[2020] NZHC 1550

BETWEEN

LEONARD JOHN KNOWLES and SUSAN RAYMONDE FELS KNOWLES

First Applicant

AND

ANGELA JOAN WAGHORN

Second Applicant

AND

DAVID BRUCE CROW

Third Applicant

AND

BRUCE CHARLES MATHESON and FRANCES MARY MATHESON

Fourth Applicant

AND

QUEENSTOWN LAKES DISTRICT COUNCIL

First Respondent

AND

CSF TRUSTEES LIMITED

Second Respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Appearances:

P J Page, J J Y R Pierce, S R Peirce for the Applicants K L Hockly for the First Respondent

R B Enright for the Second Respondent

Judgment:

3 July 2020


JUDGMENT OF NATION J

As to costs


[1]    In a decision of 5 May 2018, the Queenstown Lakes District Council (the Council) publicly notified a decision to rezone an area of central Queenstown,

KNOWLES & ORS v QUEENSTOWN LAKES DISTRICT COUNCIL [2020] NZHC 1550 [3 July 2020]

including a site which CSF Trustees Ltd (CSF) were planning to develop as a low- density suburban residential (LDSR) zone.

[2]    In a decision of 8 October 2018, the Council granted consent to CSF to develop 1 York Street on a non-notified basis. The applicants brought judicial review proceedings to quash the Council’s non-notification and substantive decisions and the consents granted to CSF.

[3]    Through a judgment of 9 December 2019, the applicants were successful.1 The Council’s decisions were ruled invalid. CSF’s application was remitted to the Council for reconsideration.

[4]    In that judgment, I ruled the applicants were entitled to costs. In the absence of agreement, costs issues are now to be determined on the basis of memoranda filed for both the applicants and the Council. No memorandum was filed for CSF.

Relevant principles

[5]    Counsel for the applicants and the Council are agreed as to the principles to be applied, as set out by counsel for the applicants:

The principles governing the Court’s discretion are …:

(a)  The discretion has not been unfettered. It is qualified by the specific costs rules rr 14.2-14.10, and is exercisable only in situations not contemplated by those specific rules, or which are not fairly recognised by them.

(b)  The costs regime is of a regulatory character and it is important that its integrity be maintained.

(c)  There is accordingly a strong implication that the Court is to apply the regime in the absence of some reason to the contrary.

(d)  Any departure must be a considered and particularised exercise of the discretion.

(e)  Although the Court does not need to give reasons for a cost order that applies the regime, reasons (albeit brief) must be given for any departure.


1      Knowles v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2019] NZHC 3227.

[6]The general principles to be applied to a determination of costs are:2

14.2Principles applying to determination of costs

(1)   The following general principles apply to the determination of costs:

(a)the party who fails with respect to a proceeding or an interlocutory application should pay costs to the party who succeeds:

(b)an…

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Details
Case
[2020] NZHC 1550
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, the applicants, Leonard John Knowles and others, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Queenstown Lakes District Council (the Council) in relation to a rezoning of an area in central Queenstown. The Council had decided to rezone an area, including a site planned for development by CSF Trustees Ltd, to a low-density suburban residential zone. The applicants contested the Council's decisions and sought to quash them, as well as the consents granted to CSF. The applicants were successful in their claims, and the Council’s decisions were ruled invalid. The case was remitted to the Council for reconsideration.

The legal issues before the court included whether the applicants were entitled to costs on a category 2 basis, whether there should be an uplift to band C due to the inherent unfairness and added complexity in how the Council ran its case, whether there should be an allowance for the time involved in preparing written submissions and reply submissions, whether costs and disbursements should be allowed for the appearance of a second counsel, whether the costs incurred with an expert witness should be recoverable in full as a disbursement reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceedings, and whether there should be a reduction in the costs award because the applicants were unsuccessful on a number of issues they raised in the proceedings.

The court ruled that the applicants were entitled to costs on a band B basis, not band C, as the Council’s position in the proceedings did not add unnecessarily to the complexity of the proceedings. The applicants were entitled to costs for the preparation of submissions in relation to the hearing, but not for the preparation of written submissions and reply submissions. The court denied the allowance for second counsel, stating that the issues in the case and the evidence which had to be addressed were not of such complexity that the attendance of junior counsel was necessary. The court also ruled that the costs incurred with the expert witness were not recoverable in full, as the applicants succeeded on a ground that could be established without the need for expert evidence. Finally, the court decided that there should be no reduction in the costs award because the applicants were unsuccessful on a number of issues, as the pursuit of those arguments did not significantly or unnecessarily increase the costs incurred by the respondents.

The court concluded that the order for costs was against only the Council, as it had the primary role in opposing the applicants’ claim for relief. The parties were to bear their own costs in dealing with costs issues, and leave was reserved for them to file memoranda if there was any further issue on which they required a determination from the court.

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