Knight v Police
[2025] NZHC 2999
•10 October 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND BLENHEIM REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WAIHARAKEKE ROHE
CRI-2025-406-10
[2025] NZHC 2999
TRINITY DAVID KNIGHT v
THE NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Hearing: 8 October 2025 Appearances:
S J Jessop for Appellant
J A L Lao for Respondent
Judgment:
10 October 2025
JUDGMENT OF GWYN J
[Sentence appeal]
Introduction
[1] On 9 July 2025,1 Trinity Knight was sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment on two charges of burglary2 and one charge each of theft,3 being found without a reasonable excuse in a building4 and breach of prison release conditions.5
[2] Mr Knight now appeals his sentence on the basis that District Court Judge Snell gave an insufficient discount for personal mitigating factors that was not reflective of
1 Police v Knight [2025] NZDC 14748 [Decision under appeal].
2 Crimes Act 1961, s 231(1)(a); maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.
3 Sections 219 and 223(d); maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment.
4 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 29(1)(a); maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment or
$2,000 fine.
5 Parole Act 2002, s 71(1); maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment or $2,000 fine.
KNIGHT v POLICE [2025] NZHC 2999 [10 October 2025]
his rehabilitative, work and personal circumstances. He says a larger discount should be afforded.
[3] Mr Knight’s counsel, Ms Jessop, seeks leave to proceed out of time. The appeal was filed on 12 August 2025, four working days past the statutory deadline.
The offending
[4] Between 22 and 25 September 2024, the victim of the burglaries was moving from an address in Picton (Address A). In the early hours of 23 September, the appellant went to Address A and searched the property using a torch. He forced entry to the locked garage inside the section and, without claim of right, uplifted two chainsaws owned by the victim.
[5] On the evening of 24 September and the early hours of the 25th, the appellant returned to Address A. He removed a large amount of property, including a lawnmower and weed eater from the garage. In the process, he tried to open the garage to remove large items and bent the garage door. He then went through an attached room to a sleepout and removed a large number of items that were transferred into a blue wheelie bin.
[6] The appellant hid most of the property inside the garage of another address one block away from Address A, aside from two items, which he attempted to conceal with a mat outside the garage. Given the quantity of items taken, the appellant must have taken several trips between the addresses.
[7] Between 12.30 and 6.30 am on 9 October 2024, the appellant went to his mother’s address to uplift some of his own belongings. However, he also took, without claim of right, items belonging to her with a combined value of $400, namely bedding, a Bluetooth speaker and toiletries.
[8] At about 4.00 pm on 9 October 2024, the appellant went inside a different building in Blenheim. Inside, he walked around in an aggressive manner, rummaging through the cupboards inside the garage and kitchen of the address, helping himself to
the victim’s food and a glass of water. He is unknown to any of the occupants at that address.
[9] In respect of the breach of prison release conditions, on 27 June 2024 the appellant had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for dishonesty offending. He was released on conditions on 14 August 2024. However, he almost immediately did not abide by the conditions of release and, after receiving numerous warnings, breached his conditions by failing to report to his probation officer or undergo a urine test.
Previous convictions
[10] The appellant has 150 previous convictions, largely for dishonesty and noncompliance, but also for violence, drugs and driving offences. The appellant was on release conditions for dishonesty offending that had been committed on 26 March 2024 when he committed the offending which is subject of this appeal. The previous year, in 2023, he had been sentenced for wounding and driving charges, which appear also to have been committed shortly after being released from prison for shoplifting and driving offences.
[11] The appellant has been sentenced to many short-term sentences of imprisonment — his longest sentence of imprisonment prior to this offending was nine months, for a string of dishonesty offending and contravening a protection order in 2021. The last time the appellant was subject to a non-custodial sentence was 2018, when he was sentenced to nine months of supervision; he breached his supervision conditions two months later.
PAC report
[12] A Provision of Advice to Courts (PAC) report was prepared, dated 21 May 2025. The report noted the appellant’s explanation of the burglary being that he saw the victims had items left out the front of their property to be taken for free, but that he went too far and took other items that were obviously not free. With regard to the unlawfully in a building conviction, he explained that he has limited memory of
entering the house, due to the effects of sleep deprivation and heavy methamphetamine use.
[13] The appellant advised that he tends to be very impulsive. He has ADHD and self-medicates with methamphetamine. He has at times managed to abstain from using, but he is always waiting for an excuse to give in and allow himself to start using again. The appellant said he is open to engaging with a residential rehabilitative programme but may find it difficult to manage a programme longer than three months. Although he has previously participated in rehabilitative programmes so has good insight into his rehabilitative needs, when he makes one mistake or reoffends, he gives up trying to make good decisions and spirals.
[14] The report noted the appellant’s lengthy criminal history. The Corrections departmental static risk assessment tool found him to be in the high-risk band, and as such he was considered better suited to psychological treatment or intensive custodial interventions rather than general group rehabilitative programmes.
[15] The report noted the appellant’s previous convictions for non-compliance, thirty convictions whilst subject to bail and that the offending occurred while subject to release conditions, and assessed his likelihood of compliance with a community-based sentence as low. The report also assessed him to be of a high likelihood of reoffending and a high risk of harm to others.
[16] The appellant advised that he did not have any address to propose for electronic monitoring. Although he wanted to be able to spend time with his family in Palmerston North because he is getting older, he advised that he did not want to reconnect with them in person until he feels more confident about being able to maintain a more stable lifestyle. Taking the recidivist nature of the offending into account, the sentencing recommendation was imprisonment.
Judgment under appeal
[17] Judge Snell noted the facts of the offending, the appellant’s previous convictions and the contents of the PAC report. The Judge also noted an Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) report, dated 16 June 2025, which notes the appellant has a
methamphetamine addiction which requires residential treatment. His Honour also noted certificates of courses the appellant had completed in prison, an apology letter, and a cultural report:6
[19] I note your certificates of the courses that you have done in prison and that is well done to you for doing that. I note that you have written an apology and I have read that. You blame the ADHD and your methamphetamine addiction.
[20] I note the s 27 report, that would appear to have been prepared some time ago for your sentencing in Palmerston North, but it goes through the family background and your historical background and there is no doubt that you have had a difficult upbringing, the familial suicides, the violence, the drug offending, your, I guess, journey into the Mongrel Mob and movement from there and lifestyle are explained well in that report.
[18] The Judge then said that he had regard to all of the purposes of sentencing, but that as the appellant was a recidivist offender, the key considerations were denunciation, deterrence and protection of the community.7 The Judge also noted his concern about the appellant’s rehabilitation and reintegration back into the community, and his hopes that the appellant’s needs would be met through treatment.
[19]The Judge adopted a starting point of 30 months for all of the offending:
[28] I consider that, given all of these circumstances, looking at the burglaries, I need to take into account finally that they were committed on release conditions from prior dishonesty. I see the burglaries as having a starting point, or the lead burglary, first burglary, of 20 months’ imprisonment. There should be an uplift of eight months for the second burglary; the unlawfully on premises and the theft. It gives you an overall starting point of 28 months for all of the dishonesty and I think that that, in some ways, is probably generous to you in the circumstances.
[29] I consider that the breach of your prison release conditions is a relatively serious one and I uplift by two months discretely for that to give you an overall start point of 30 months. I consider when I look at everything in totality that that is appropriate and that is where we will be.
[20] The Judge then applied an uplift of six months for the fact the appellant was subject to release conditions and his criminal history, which the Judge assessed as “one of the worst that I have seen for a long time.”8
6 Decision under appeal, above n 1.
7 At [22].
8 At [30].
[21] The Judge gave the appellant a 25 per cent discount for guilty pleas. However, he only applied a five per cent discount for personal mitigating factors, finding:9
… Your life has been difficult but you are now 45, you have been given rehabilitative opportunities on many, many occasions and they have not been utilised to the best available. I consider that I need to look at this in totality and look at the opportunities given and balance that out today. I consider an uplift to the 25 per cent of five per cent for those personal circumstances is warranted today, no more because you were given much more significant at your last prison sentence. You were given discounts before that and the one before that and it goes on.
[22] Applying 30 per cent in discounts to the 30-month starting point, the Judge imposed an overall sentence of 27 months, or two years and three months’ imprisonment.
Approach on appeal
[23] An appeal against sentence is an appeal against discretion and must only be allowed if the Court is satisfied that, for any reason, there was an error in the sentence imposed and a different sentence should have been imposed.10 Generally, an appellate court “will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.11 In most cases, a sentence appeal will turn on whether the final outcome is manifestly excessive, rather than the route taken by the Judge in reaching that outcome.12 The Court must dismiss the appeal in any other case.13
Leave to appeal
[24] Section 248(2) of the CPA requires a notice of appeal against sentence to filed within 20 working days after the date of sentence appealed against. That 20 working day period expired here on Wednesday 6 August 2025, whereas Ms Jessop filed the appeal on Tuesday 12 August. Her reasons for seeking an extension of time14 are “counsel has been on leave and had personal matters”. The key question is whether it
9 At [31].
10 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26]–[27].
11 At [36].
12 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
13 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(3).
14 The Court can extend the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal at any time under s 248(4) of the CPA.
is in the interests of justice to grant the extension, taking into account all relevant circumstances,15 particularly the reasons for the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal.16
[25] The Police have taken no issue with the appeal being filed and neither do I. Leave to appeal is granted.
Appellant submissions
[26] Ms Jessop takes no issue with the starting point or full credit of 25 per cent for guilty pleas. However, she submits that the discounts for personal factors, including his background and upbringing, ADHD, addiction, prospects of rehabilitation, attempts to rehabilitate whilst in prison and remorse, were inadequate. She says this resulted in an end sentence that was manifestly excessive.
[27] Ms Jessop says that the Judge erred in only providing a five per cent discount for addiction. She cites Zhang, in which the Court of Appeal recognised that addiction which is causative of the offending can be a significant mitigating factor, on its own justifying discounts of up to 30 per cent or more.17 She quotes from the AOD report, which says the appellant:
… presents with a complex pattern of offending closely linked to chronic substance dependence and unresolved neurodevelopmental vulnerabilities. From early childhood, he displayed behavioural difficulties consistent with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, contributing to early school disengagement and disciplinary issues. While his family did not model substance misuse, peer introduction to alcohol and cannabis from age 10 exposed him to substance-using subcultures during formative developmental periods. His trajectory from age 15 involved gang affiliation with the Mongrel Mob, creating additional criminogenic exposure and normalising anti-social behaviour patterns.
The index offending occurred following renewed methamphetamine use and psychological instability after an attempted geographical relocation aimed at desistance. While this move suggested insight and desire for change, it was undermined by absence of structured reintegration planning, unresolved trauma, and continued drug availability in the new environment. His long-
15 Smith v R [2020] NZCA 221 at [3]–[4] citing R v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA) at [96]–[99]; and
R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA) at 587.
16 Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Criminal Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CPA231.02(2)] citing Mikus v R [2011] NZCA 298 at [26]; and R v Slavich [2008] NZCA 116 at [14].
17 Zhang v R [2019] NZCA 507, [2019] 3 NZLR 648 at [10(k)].
standing pattern includes persistent disqualified driving since 1997, frequent property offences reflecting entrenched acquisitive behaviour, multiple violence convictions including family violence, and repeated protection order breaches between 2011 and 2021. This extensive history demonstrates the pervasive nature of his substance-driven offending across multiple domains.
[28] Ms Jessop also notes the appellant’s explanation in the PAC report that he has very limited memory of entering the Blenheim address unlawfully, as a result of his methamphetamine use. Counsel says this shows a link between the appellant’s offending and methamphetamine use and submits that a 10 per cent discount is appropriate for addiction which in part causatively contributed to the offending.
[29] Ms Jessop also says a further discount of at least five per cent was appropriate for the appellant’s remorse and prospects of reintegration and rehabilitation.18 The AOD report noted that the appellant had completed several programmes while in custody, and that “[d]espite his extensive criminal history spanning nearly three decades, protective factors include maintained family relationships, expressed remorse, and acknowledgment of personal responsibility for his actions.” The appellant had provided a letter of remorse which stated, “I’m truly sorry to the people [I’ve] stolen from” and “it really hurt me to see my mum so hurt from my overall action … I really love my mum and plan not to let her down again”.
[30] Counsel submits that if the above discounts were provided and the appeal allowed, the appellant would have served the punitive element of sentencing on a “time served” basis, meaning he should have been released having served at the time of sentence. She submits that a term of imprisonment under two years should have been imposed, and a sentence of home detention and community work was appropriate. This would be in accordance with the principle of imposing the least restrictive outcome and the purpose of assisting in the appellant’s rehabilitation and reintegration.19
18 Citing Royal v R [2020] NZCA 129 at [25]–[26]; Moheebi v R [2020] NZCA 343 at [29]–[31];
and Clark v R [2020] NZCA 641.
19 Sentencing Act 2002, ss 7(1)(h) and 8(g).
Consideration
[31] Ms Jessop submits that the Judge should have offered a discrete discount of five per cent for prospects of reintegration and rehabilitation and characterises the five per cent discount as for addiction. However, the Judge gave that discount for “personal circumstances” — the discount encapsulated all personal factors. As Mr Lao for the Police notes, the Court of Appeal has held that simply tallying up a series of discounts and deducting them from the starting point can result in a sentence that is inadequate.20 It was open to the Judge to give a discount for personal factors generally without separating this out into discrete factors. The question is whether that five per cent discount was inadequate to take account of all relevant personal mitigating factors.
[32] I acknowledge that there was evidence before the Judge outlining a nexus between the appellant’s addiction and his offending, as well as his other personal mitigating factors. However, as Mr Lao notes, the Judge’s rationale for only providing a five per cent discount was that the appellant had received significant discounts for his personal factors on previous sentences.21 Mr Lao notes that the cultural report relied on at the present sentencing was from the appellant’s 2024 sentencing, and submits that I can infer from the appellant’s numerous prison sentences that discounts would have been applied in the past.
[33]In Berkland v R, the Supreme Court commented:22
Logically, there will come a point where background, even if it has contributed to the offending, can have no impact…
In addition to the potential effect of seriousness, a question also arises as to the impact of background in sentencing for rehabilitative offending. While this is not a matter before us we acknowledge that it may raise similar issues. Again, the focus must be on the facts of the offence and the offender. On the one hand criminogenic background factors tend to be reflected in repeat offending. Sentencing judges generally understand this and the need for patience. But we accept that at some point other sentencing principles however will take over.
20 McCaslin-Whitehead v R [2023] NZCA 259 at [61]–[66].
21 Decision under appeal, above n 1, at [31].
22 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509 at [94] and n 105.
[34] In Carroll v Police, Mr Carroll was a recidivist offender. On appeal, Palmer J held:23
[26] Here, there is a clear causal link between Mr Carroll's childhood experience of violence, physical and sexual abuse, parental incarceration, and his offending. Accordingly, he received a 15 per cent discount for his personal circumstances for four family violence offences against the same complainant in May 2022. This reflected his reduced agency — his lessened ability to rationally choose optimal and pro-social behaviour. It also reflected what the Judge then saw as demonstrated remorse, which offers the prospect of rehabilitation.
[27] But this offending was not purely instinctive. Mr Carroll had to make an effort to turn up at the complainant's house. Taking the family safety alarm demonstrated an intention to offend again in the future. And Mr Carroll committed this offending just three months after receiving that discount which had resulted in a sentence of imprisonment of 13 months, and just under two months after his release from prison for the previous offending. This is the third sentence Mr Carroll has received for offending against the same complainant since 2021. Understandably, she says she does not want him living in Hawke's Bay when he is released.
[28] All that casts some doubt on whether Mr Carroll's agency continues to be reduced. It also suggests the sentencing purposes of denunciation, community protection, and protection of the victim in particular, should be relatively heightened now. And Mr Carroll's current opportunities for rehabilitation appear remote.
[29] If some level of discount was justified for Mr Carroll's reduced agency because of his background, it should have been at a rate that was lesser than his previous discount, to reflect the heightened need to denounce his conduct, and to protect the community, and to recognise the lower likelihood of rehabilitation.
[35] Mr Lao acknowledges that Palmer J’s comments related specifically to background factors, but submits that the same principles can apply to addiction and any other mitigating factors. As Mr Lao notes, the appellant in this case has consistently re-offended within short spaces of time throughout his adult life, amassing 150 previous convictions. I accept Mr Lao’s submission that any discounts should be reduced accordingly, and that the sentencing purposes of community protection, deterrence and denunciation increase in relative importance.
[36] A five percent discount for personal mitigating factors is perhaps on the lower end of what would be available, but I do not consider the Judge erred in giving a
23 Carroll v Police [2023] NZHC 3293.
five per cent discount; it was within range and open to him. While it might fairly be said that Mr Knight continues to have reduced agency and the court must have regard to that, as Palmer J said in Carroll, at a certain point the sentencing aims of protection of the community and rehabilitation must take precedence.
[37] Additionally, stepping back and looking at the overall sentence, I do not consider the two years and three months’ imprisonment imposed by Judge Snell manifestly excessive. As Judge Snell commented, his starting point could be considered generous.24 Ms Jessop says that it would have been appropriate for the appellant to have been sentenced to home detention, but he has shown no ability to comply with such conditions, nor does an address appear available.
[38] Nor would yet another short-term sentence of imprisonment have been appropriate, given those short sentences do not appear to have deterred the appellant in the past. And although the appellant’s completion of rehabilitative programmes in custody are encouraging, there is no indication that that rehabilitation has continued outside of it. Indeed, the rehabilitative purpose of sentencing may be better served through a longer period of imprisonment.
Result
[39]The appeal is dismissed.
Gwyn J
24 Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [28].
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