Kingz v The King
[2025] NZCA 390
•5 August 2025 at 11.00 am
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA435/2024 |
| BETWEEN | BOSTON KINGZ |
| AND | THE KING |
| Hearing: | 16 June 2025 |
Court: | Ellis, Peters and Walker JJ |
Counsel: | D J Allan for Applicant |
Judgment: | 5 August 2025 at 11.00 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for an extension of time to appeal is declined.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Peters J)
In July 2005, MacKenzie J sentenced the applicant, Mr Boston Kingz (whose name was then Ross Anderson), to life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 11 years (MPI).[1] This sentence was imposed for the murder of Mr Chevy Koltai. The Judge also sentenced Mr Kingz to a concurrent term of four years’ imprisonment on a charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, the victim of this offending being Mr Kingz’s former girlfriend, Ms Terri‑Ann Murray. Mr Kingz had pleaded guilty to both offences.
[1]R v Anderson HC Palmerston North CRI-2005-454-23, 19 July 2005 [judgment under appeal].
Mr Kingz now seeks an extension of time to appeal against his sentence of life imprisonment. If granted an extension, Mr Kingz proposes to argue on appeal that the sentence of life imprisonment was/is manifestly unjust, and that a finite sentence should be imposed in its place.
The Crown opposes an extension of time. Whilst the Crown does not contend that it is prejudiced by what is an almost 20-year delay, it does submit that numerous factors count against an extension.
Background
Mr Kingz and Ms Murray, both 18 at the relevant time (April 2005), had been in a relationship for about 14 months. Shortly before the offending, Ms Murray had ended her relationship with Mr Kingz and entered into a new relationship with Mr Kingz’s friend, Mr Koltai. Mr Kingz suspected that Mr Koltai was Ms Murray’s new partner but apparently Mr Koltai had assured Mr Kingz several times that he was not.
On the day of the offending, Mr Kingz had arranged with Ms Murray that she would come to his flat so that they could talk matters over. However, when Ms Murray arrived she was accompanied by Mr Koltai. There was some dispute, referred to in MacKenzie J’s sentencing notes, as to whether Ms Murray had told Mr Kingz that she was bringing Mr Koltai. Mr Kingz’s account was that she had not. In any event, having seen Mr Koltai kiss Ms Murray when they got out of the car, Mr Kingz took a knife, went outside, and stabbed Mr Koltai three times. Mr Koltai fell to the ground, following which Mr Kingz chased after Ms Murray, stabbing her twice. After that, Mr Kingz got into Mr Koltai’s vehicle and drove it at Mr Koltai. The car narrowly missed running over Mr Koltai because neighbours managed to pull him to safety. Mr Koltai nonetheless died later that day, in hospital. Ms Murray was hospitalised for a week.
Mr Kingz handed himself in to the police that same afternoon. He pleaded guilty to Mr Koltai’s murder promptly, in May 2005, and he pleaded guilty to the wounding charge a month later.[2] MacKenzie J sentenced Mr Kingz on 19 July 2005.
Sentencing
[2]Mr Kingz initially faced a charge of attempted murder in relation to Ms Murray. Mr Kingz pleaded guilty after that charge was substituted with one of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
In sentencing Mr Kingz, the Judge recounted the facts and matters pertaining to Mr Kingz’s very unfortunate upbringing.[3] The Judge noted the particular tragedy of the offending for Mr Kingz (to say nothing of course of the terrible consequences for Mr Koltai’s family or Ms Murray) was that, after all he had confronted in life, Mr Kingz had begun to turn his life around. He was doing very well on the course he was undertaking and had struck up a good, mentoring, relationship with his tutor.
[3]Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [6]–[7].
As to the sentence itself, the Judge said that he was required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment unless to do so would be manifestly unjust and that, on the facts, a life sentence could not be said to be manifestly unjust.[4] Section 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002 then, and now, provides:
102Presumption in favour of life imprisonment for murder
(1)An offender who is convicted of murder must be sentenced to imprisonment for life unless, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, a sentence of imprisonment for life would be manifestly unjust.
(2)If a court does not impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on an offender convicted of murder, it must give written reasons for not doing so.
[4]At [10]. That said, there is no reference in the sentencing notes of any submission that a sentence of life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust.
Section 103 (likewise then and now) required MacKenzie J to impose an MPI of at least 10 years. In setting the MPI, the Judge took into account that the offending was premeditated, at least to the extent that Mr Kingz had armed himself with a knife before going outside; that although Mr Kingz had “lost control” when he saw Mr Koltai kiss Ms Murray, it could not in any way justify his actions; and the further aggravating features of Mr Kingz’s attempt to run Mr Koltai over and the wounding of Ms Murray.[5]
[5]At [11]–[12].
The Judge adopted a starting point of 15 years for the MPI.[6] After allowances (albeit limited) for Mr Kingz’ youth, deeply felt remorse, early surrender to the police, and early guilty pleas, the Judge imposed an MPI of 11 years.
No contemporaneous appeal
[6]At [13].
In an affidavit sworn in support of his application, Mr Kingz says that he did not appeal against sentence because, as he recalls it, he had been advised that a sentence of life imprisonment was inevitable. On the contrary, Mr Kingz says he was grateful to his lawyer, Mr Steedman, for securing an MPI of 11 years, as Mr Kingz’s recollection is that prison staff had told him his MPI would be 18 years. Mr Steedman has sworn an affidavit in support of the application, to the effect that he now has no real recollection of the case.
Present application
Mr Kingz said he reconsidered his position on an appeal after a fellow inmate informed him of this Court’s decision in Dickey v R.[7] Mr Kingz then approached several lawyers but none were able to assist him. Ultimately, Mr Kingz filed his own application for leave, following which Mr Allan, counsel for Mr Kingz, was assigned.
Submissions
[7]Dickey v R [2023] NZCA 2, [2023] 2 NZLR 405.
Mr Allan referred us to a decision of a full bench of this Court in R v Knight.[8] Although Knight concerned an application for an extension of time to appeal against conviction, the case is relevant to determination of applications for an extension of time for any appeal. Indeed, this Court applied Knight recently in Kriel v R, in which it determined five offenders’ applications for extensions of time to appeal against sentences of life imprisonment.[9]
[8]R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA).
[9]Kriel v R [2024] NZCA 45.
As was said in Knight, the policy rationale for a time limit on the bringing of an appeal is the public interest in finality and certainty.[10] Equally, however, there will be instances in which the interests of justice require an extension of time. The considerations likely to be relevant in making that assessment include: the strength of the proposed appeal and the practical utility of the remedy sought; the length of and reasons for the delay; the extent of the impact on others similarly affected and on the administration of justice (floodgate considerations); and the absence of prejudice to the Crown.[11]
[10]R v Knight, above n 8, at 587–589.
[11]At 588–589.
Addressing each of these factors, Mr Allan submits that the merits of the proposed appeal are strong. At the time of the offending, Mr Kingz was a troubled adolescent, with a history of formative trauma, addiction, mental illness, and insecure attachment. A contemporaneous report — prepared by the Department of Corrections for sentencing — recorded that Mr Kingz said he had a troubled and unsatisfactory childhood, characterised by separation, and physical and sexual abuse perpetrated at different times by his biological father, mother, stepfather, and grandmother. Mr Kingz also reported experiencing symptoms of mental illness, including second and third person auditory hallucinations, from the age of 11.
Mr Kingz also pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and was deeply remorseful. MacKenzie J noted that the only reason Mr Kingz had waited a month to plead guilty was at Mr Steedman’s urging, so that Mr Steedman could at least review the disclosure. Mr Allan also submits that the remedy sought is a practical one, as it could relieve Mr Kingz of a life sentence.
As to delay, prior to Dickey, Mr Kingz had no reason to think an appeal would have any prospect of success. However, and the Crown accept this, he acted promptly once he became aware of Dickey.
In addition, Mr Allan submits that granting the extension is most unlikely to have a “floodgates” impact. Few young people are convicted of murder in New Zealand. In Dickey, this Court said that of 967 people convicted of murder in New Zealand between 2002 and 2019, only 40 were adolescents.[12]
[12]Dickey v R, above n 7, at [172].
Lastly, Mr Allan submits that there is no prejudice to the Crown. No expert evidence will be required because the Crown has previously accepted the validity of research identifying the deficiencies of neurocognitive development in adolescents and young adults.[13]
[13]Churchward v R [2011] NZCA 531, (2011) 25 CRNZ 446; and Dickey v R, above n 7.
The Crown opposes the extension for four reasons. First, Crown counsel, Ms Brook, submits that a life sentence was warranted on the facts of the offending and would be inevitable on appeal. This is because Mr Kingz acted alone; his offending was extremely serious given the violence to Ms Murray; the offending was premeditated; and sufficient account was taken of Mr Kingz’s background, circumstances, and possible schizophrenia when the Judge sentenced him in 2005.
Secondly, the imposition of a finite sentence would be neither practical nor in the public interest. The Crown asserts that the Parole Board’s assessment is that Mr Kingz poses an undue risk to the public. Although we do not have any of the Parole Board decisions before us, plainly Mr Kingz has now been eligible for parole for nine years and the Parole Board has still not considered it appropriate to release him.[14]
[14]Mr Allan informed us at the hearing that Mr Kingz is getting closer to release on parole, with preparatory steps for such a release now underway.
Thirdly, the Crown submits the delay is extreme and insufficiently explained. If the application were granted, it would greatly undermine the principle of finality. In addition, although the Crown takes no issue with the delay between this Court’s judgment in Dickey and the filing of the application, Mr Kingz could have filed an appeal prior to Dickey.
Lastly, the Crown refers to the precedential implications of granting an extension of time. The Crown submits it would represent a “significant lowering of the bar” both as to the merits and to the principle of finality.
Discussion
Although the Crown is right to say that it was open to Mr Kingz to seek a finite sentence from the outset, we do not think Mr Kingz can be criticised on that score. The effect of the prevailing authority at the time (for instance, R v Rapira) would not have given any cause for optimism as to a finite sentence.[15] In any event, each applicant in Kriel had offended pre-Dickey, so we do not think this could be treated as a disqualifying factor for Mr Kingz.
[15]R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 (CA).
Moreover, having considered the circumstances of the applicants in Kriel and the appellants in Dickey, we do not consider it inevitable, as Crown counsel submitted, that (an 18-year-old) Mr Kingz would now receive a sentence of life imprisonment.
We say this because the facts of Mr Kingz’ offending against Mr Koltai have some similarities to Ms Epiha’s, Ms Epiha being the third appellant in Dickey. Aged 18, Ms Epiha stabbed Ms Nathan in the neck at a party, this causing Ms Nathan’s death. The two had argued over the volume of the music that was being played. Ms Nathan returned to the party. Not content to let it rest, Ms Epiha took a knife from the kitchen and stabbed Ms Nathan, and did so despite other partygoers telling her to put the knife down. On appeal, this Court referred to several factors that made a life sentence for Ms Epiha manifestly unjust and substituted a finite sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment, with an MPI of seven years. Given the similarities, we consider Mr Kingz had a reasonable case for a finite sentence, but we could not put it any higher than that.
All of that said, we decline to grant Mr Kingz an extension of time to appeal for the following reasons.
The first is the sheer length of the delay. We accept that no real blame for that can be laid at Mr Kingz’ door, but the delay of almost 20 years in this case exceeds by a considerable margin that of any applicant in Kriel and any appellant in Dickey. The longest delay in Kriel was 13 years, which this Court described as “extremely long”.[16] Mr Lo, the only successful applicant in Kriel, was nine years out of time, and that length of time was almost fatal to his application. And although each appellant in Dickey required an extension, the comparable length of time was approximately five years. Thus 20 years is far beyond anything this Court has previously accepted, and we agree with the Crown that to allow an extension of time of that length would undermine the principle of finality to too great an extent.
[16]Kriel v R, above n 9, at [106].
We also take into account what we were told at the hearing — that the Parole Board and Mr Kingz are working towards his release. As Ms Brook submitted, we do think some inference may be drawn from the fact the Parole Board has not yet seen fit to release Mr Kingz. However, even if that is left to one side, Mr Kingz has now been in custody for some 20 years and after so long we do not wish to take any step that might affect the Parole Board’s no doubt well-established process for managing the release of a long-term prisoner.
For these reasons, we decline to grant the extension of time that is sought.
Result
The application for an extension of time to appeal against sentence is declined.
Solicitors:
Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent