Kerr v Police
[2023] NZHC 2235
•18 August 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2023-409-131
[2023] NZHC 2235
BETWEEN REUBEN KERR
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 17 August 2023 Counsel:
R J T George for Appellant L Fiennes for Crown
Judgment:
18 August 2023
JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J
Introduction
[1] On 9 June 2022, Reuben Kerr (the appellant) was sentenced by Judge Couch in the Christchurch District Court to four months’ imprisonment, on two charges to which he pleaded guilty.1
These charges were:
(a)assault;2 and
(b)resisting a corrections officer.3
1 Police v Kerr [2023] NZDC 11677.
2 Crimes Act 1961, s 196; maximum penalty one years’ imprisonment.
3 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 23; maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $2,000.
KERR v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2023] NZHC 2235 [18 August 2023]
[3] Mr Kerr appeals on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, and that there was an error in the sentence imposed. Mr Kerr submits that the Judge failed to properly account for his personal mitigating circumstances.
[4] The police oppose the appeal, submitting that the sentence was in all respects within range and that the appeal should be dismissed.
Background
The offending
[5] Mr Kerr is a sentenced prisoner in the Intervention Support Unit at Christchurch Men’s Prison. On 19 August 2022, following a phone call to his lawyer, Mr Kerr became aggravated and refused to go back to his cell. He was aggressive towards Corrections staff, who attempted to move him to his cell and restrained him. As Mr Kerr was placed in his cell, while restrained, he turned quickly and threw a number of punches as Corrections staff, hitting the complainant, a Corrections officer, in the face. Pepper spray was then used on Mr Kerr to stop his resistance. The complainant received some bruising to the head, and a chipped tooth.
Pre-sentence report
[6] Mr Kerr is 24 years old and of Pākehā descent. Mr Kerr reported that immediately prior to the offending he had an upsetting conversation with his lawyer, that he is regretful, and that he is now working on his violence.
[7] Mr Kerr has a criminal history which began in 2018 and involves mostly violent offending, including six assault convictions and one of injuring with intent to injure. On this basis, the pre-sentence report-writer assessed Mr Kerr as being at a high-risk of reoffending, particularly while he is in custody, and specifically against Corrections officers. Mr Kerr has a history of offending against Corrections staff. The report-writer recommends a sentence of imprisonment.
[8] Mr Kerr was raised on the West Coast of the South Island by his mother and stepfather. He has limited contact with his biological father. He reported experiencing physical abuse from his stepfather, and received limited education due to his
aggressive behaviour at school, as well as learning difficulties. Mr Kerr started experiencing epileptic seizures when he was four and a half years old, from which he has sustained damage to his frontal lobe. He was first imprisoned when he was aged 14, and has spent significant time in custody since. He reports enjoying the structure that prison provides.
[9] Mr Kerr is currently placed in the Intervention Support Unit because he has a number of mental health diagnoses, including Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Opposition Defiant Disorder, anxiety, and depression. He has a pattern of impulsive self-harming and suicidal ideation. He is recorded as having low cognitive functioning. Despite this, he has been assessed by Forensic Mental Health Services as not meeting the threshold of a major mental illness, and therefore he is unable to access specialist mental health services. Te Whatu Ora have also declined to fund a health package for Mr Kerr upon release.
[10] The report-writer notes that Mr Kerr’s ability to comply is low despite extensive work that has been done to place Mr Kerr in supportive environments. There is concerns that he will continue to offend following his release, although it is reported that plans are being developed to support him when this occurs.
First s 38 report
[11] There are two reports prepared pursuant to s 38 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (CPMIP Act) on the court file. They were prepared to assist the court in determining whether Mr Kerr was unfit to stand trial for the current offending.
[12] The first report is dated 21 March 2023, and was prepared by Dr Paul Brown, a Consultant Psychiatrist at Canterbury Regional Forensic Psychiatric Service. Dr Brown interviewed Mr Kerr at Christchurch Men’s Prison, had access to Mr Kerr’s medical records, and also had a telephone conversation with Mr Kerr’s mother.
[13] Dr Brown is of the opinion that Mr Kerr’s current mental health presentation would be considered to constitute a mental impairment within the meaning of the CPMIP Act. He records that Mr Kerr’s mental health is complicated by his ‘intractable
form of epilepsy’, which has led to an accumulation of mild traumatic brain injuries, exacerbated by a pre-existing personality disorder. Dr Brown says that there is thought to be no viable route to stabilising Mr Kerr’s epilepsy.
[14]Nonetheless, Dr Brown considered that Mr Kerr was fit to stand trial, stating:
During a detailed conversation, he spontaneously was able to understand, retain and consider information relevant to the charges and typical legal processes. He clearly demonstrated an ability to communicate his views and preferences. Without prompting, he communicated a rounded knowledge of his current charges, potential outcomes, and the difference between potential sentences in the situation he pleaded guilty [compared with] being found guilty after a not-guilty plea. He was able to describe the role of his lawyer before and during court processes, the role of the judge, and a potential jury and the importance of having good advice and being able to express his views and instructions to the court during court proceedings. He felt he would manage well with a standard hearing without adaptations but agreed that changes or delays may be needed if his epilepsy was less stable on the day.
(emphases omitted)
[15] Dr Brown records that Mr Kerr had a turbulent childhood, witnessing and experiencing many incidents of physical abuse, with his six half siblings. He attended several different primary schools, being suspended and expelled owing to assaults on teachers, or aggression in the school context. He has used alcohol and cannabis since his teenage years, when his offending began, involving frequent acts of physical aggression, assaults, possession of weapons, damage to property, shoplifting, and theft.
[16] Dr Brown notes that Mr Kerr has had significant contact with Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services from a relatively young age. Given Mr Kerr’s history, Dr Brown assesses Mr Kerr as remaining at a high risk of impulsive acts of violence in the context of intoxication, and interpersonal conflict when he is dysregulated. He says that these risks may be higher when he has recently had a seizure.
[17] Mr Kerr’s mother broadly corroborated Mr Kerr’s background and medical history, and outlined her concerns about the lack of services available to support Mr Kerr in the community. She reported that Mr Kerr is determined to improve and that she hopes to support him to settle when he is released from custody.
Second s 38 report
[18] The second s 38 report is dated 23 March 2023 and was prepared by Ms Elizabeth Milne, a clinical psychologist. Ms Milne interviewed Mr Kerr at Christchurch Men’s Prison, had access to his medical records, spoke to his lawyer, and also Corrections staff.
[19] Ms Milne records that prior to Mr Kerr’s period of imprisonment, he resided in the Intellectual Disability and Forensic Unit at Porirua Hospital for approximately four years under an extended Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 order. He has also spent time in youth justice facilities. Ms Milne records that Mr Kerr has repeatedly been assessed and medicated in respect of his epilepsy, and that he has a history of not complying with his medication regime.
[20] Ms Milne records that Mr Kerr has a basic understanding of the roles of persons in court, and their functions. He understood plea options, and the effect of evidence in the prosecution case. Mr Kerr has a good working relationship with his lawyer, and noted that he trusted his lawyer. Ms Milne notes that Mr Kerr has recently been complying with his medication regime and this has stabilised his health. She, like Dr Brown, considers that Mr Kerr is likely to have a mental impairment within that definition in the CPMIP Act, and also that he is fit to stand trial.
District Court decision
[21] The Judge discussed the factual background of the offending, and noted the personal mitigating factors advanced by counsel on behalf of Mr Kerr. The Judge considered that Mr Kerr has a significant mental impairment and personality issues. The Judge recorded that he took those mitigating factors into account, but that it was also important to deter persons in custody from assaulting prison officers.
[22] The Judge noted that an assault on a Corrections officer is an aggravating factor included in the Sentencing Act.4 The Judge then adopted a starting point of five
4 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)(fa).
months’ imprisonment for the totality of Mr Kerr’s offending, then uplifting by 10 per cent on the basis of Mr Kerr’s six previous assault convictions.
[23] As to mitigating factors, the Judge accepted that Mr Kerr was entitled to a full 25 per cent guilty plea discount, leading to end point of just over four months’ imprisonment, which the Judge rounded down to four months. The Judge did not accept the argument made by counsel for Mr Kerr that the sentence should be made concurrent on his existing sentence, saying that would deprive the sentence of any deterrent effect.
[24]The Judge concluded by stating:5
On the charge of common assault then you will be sentenced to imprisonment for four months, cumulative on the current sentence which was imposed on 13 January 2021. You will be sentenced to two months concurrent of the charge of resisting.
Positions of the parties
Appellant
[25] Mr George, on behalf of Mr Kerr, submits that the Judge erred in not providing discounts for Mr Kerr’s personal circumstances, and that therefore the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. Mr George submits that discounts should have been provided for Mr Kerr’s mental impairment, personal deprivation, and youth.
[26] As to mental impairment, Mr George notes that Mr Kerr’s mental impairment was accepted as significant by the Judge, and was based on the evidence provided in the two s 38 reports. Mr George submits that Mr Kerr’s offending shows consistency with the findings of Dr Brown and Ms Milne, which were that the offending was a manifestation of Mr Kerr’s mental impairment and/or personality disorder. Mr George submits that the Judge erred in declining a discount for mental impairment, apparently on the need to recognise general deterrence. He says that general deterrence should be moderated as a purpose of sentencing when the evidence shows that an offending
5 Above n 1, at [9].
was “not conduct performed rationally by one who exercises a willed choice to offend”.6
[27] As to personal deprivation, Mr George submits that the s 38 reports also record that Mr Kerr was ‘subject to an abhorrent childhood’. He says that there is an obvious causal connection between the violence Mr Kerr experienced in his childhood and his willingness to use violence as a way to rationalise his emotions. He submits that this factor should have been a potent sentencing factor warranting a substantial discount.
[28] As to youth, Mr George that Mr Kerr should receive a discount based on his youth as he was 24 years old at the time of his offending. He accepts that a discount for youth would overlap somewhat with a discount for mental impairment, given the impulsivity that could be said to arise from both his mental impairment and relative youth. Nevertheless, he submits that a discrete discount should be applied to recognise Mr Kerr’s age and lack of maturity.
[29] Finally, Mr George submits that although the Judge was limited in his options as Mr Kerr was already serving a sentence of imprisonment, the present offending would seldom attract a sentence of imprisonment. He submits that when acknowledging that Mr Kerr would in other circumstances, have received a sentence less than imprisonment, the effect of the manifestly excessive sentence imposed is exacerbated. He notes Woolford J’s view that:7
…it is more common for small variations to be made to the length of short sentences than to the length of long sentences. Tinkering also tends to be defined by reference to the proportionate reduction rather than the period involved.
[30] In sum, Mr George submits that evidence of Mr Kerr’s personal mitigating circumstances was plainly before the District Court and the Judge failed to apply the appropriate discounts in fixing the end sentence. He says that the result was a manifestly excessive sentence.
6 E (CA689/10) v R [2011] NZCA 13 at [68].
7 Deslaurier v Police [2022] NZHC 1078 at [21].
The police
[31] Ms Fiennes, counsel for the police, submits that the sentence was in range and that Mr Kerr’s appeal should be dismissed. She accepts that the Judge did not follow the sentencing methodology adopted in Moses v R, as he did not take into account Mr Kerr’s personal mitigating features after setting a starting point for the gravity of the offending. However, she submits the starting point adopted by the Judge supports the inference that, in fixing that starting point, the Judge must have taken into account the mitigating factors advanced by Mr Kerr, and that the end sentence is not manifestly excessive.
[32] Ms Fiennes submits that the aggravating factors of the offending include: offending against a Corrections officer, attacks to the head, and the harm suffered by the complainant. She says that a starting point of seven to eight months’ imprisonment would have been available to the Judge, citing R v Matehaere, Kershaw v Police and R v Edwards.8 She submits that had the Judge adopted a starting point of eight months’ imprisonment, uplifted 10 per cent for previous convictions, and then applied a 30 per cent personal factors discount alongside a 25 per cent guilty plea discount, the end sentence would have been approximately the same as what was actually imposed. She says the sentence therefore cannot be manifestly excessive.
[33] Ms Fiennes accepted that discounts were available for Mr Kerr’s mental impairment and background, but submitted that the Judge had allowed for those factors at the first step of the sentencing process. She says that a discount of 20 per cent would be appropriate, but that because the appellant was aged 24 at the time of the offending, any discount for youth should be discrete and limited. In oral submissions she referred to a five per cent discount.
[34] Ms Fiennes submits that it was open to the Judge to hold that general deterrence remained a relevant sentencing principle for the offending. She says that for offending of the present nature there is a general need for denunciation and deterrence to the wider community in particular, sentenced prisoners.
R v Matehaere DC Christchurch CRI-2011-009-013507, 21 February 2013; Kershaw v Police
[2019] NZHC 379; and R v Edwards DC Christchurch CRI-2012-009-1144, 22 August 2013.
Approach to appeal
[35] An appeal against sentence is an appeal against a discretion. Under s 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, the appeal court must allow the appeal if satisfied that for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed on conviction, and a different sentence should be imposed. The Court must dismiss the appeal in any other case. Where the appeal court allows the first appeal, the appeal court must, pursuant to s 251:
(a)set aside the sentence and impose another sentence (whether more or less severe) that it considers appropriate; or
(b)vary the sentence, vary any part of the sentence, or vary any condition of the sentence; or
(c)remit the sentence to the court that imposed it and direct that court to take any action of a kind described in paragraph (a) or (b) as specified.
[36] Section 250(2) was not intended to change the previous approach taken by the courts under the now repealed Summary Proceedings Act which applied where the sentence was “clearly excessive or inadequate or inappropriate”.9 Further, despite s 250 making no express reference to “manifestly excessive”, this principle is “well-engrained” in the court’s approach to sentence appeals. An appeal court cannot "tinker" with the end sentence if the end sentence is within range.10 The focus is on the end sentence and not the process adopted to reach that end sentence. As recently stated by the Court of Appeal:11
[16] It is the end sentence which must be shown to be manifestly excessive. It is the end sentence which will be the Court’s focus. Where one component of a sentence is criticised, the Court’s inquiry, if the criticism is found justified, will be whether the end sentence is nevertheless within the range available to the sentencing Judge.12
9 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26] and [27].
10 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
11 Te Ao v R [2023] NZCZ 327.
12 Tutakangahau v R, above n 9, at [39], citing Green v Police [2014] NZHC 444 at [21].
[17] We use the term “range” advisedly. Determining a sentence is not a mathematical exercise. It is a judicial evaluation. Different judges could quite properly weigh factors relevant to a sentence differently.
[18] A sentence might lie in a range from lenient to stern and be unimpeachable.
[19] For a sentence to be manifestly excessive it must be beyond the upper end of the range available to the sentencing Judge. In other words, it will be significantly more severe than it ought to have been having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the defendant.
Analysis
[37] The sole focus of Mr Kerr’s appeal was on the Judge’s failure to discount for mitigating factors. I address these matters in order.
[38] As a preliminary matter, I accept (as was conceded by the Crown) that it is not apparent that the Judge adopted the sentencing methodology set out in Moses v R.13 That methodology imposes a two-step process. First, the gravity of the offending is assessed for the purposes of setting a starting point, with regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors of the offending. Second, the starting point is adjusted by factors relating to the offender, both aggravating and mitigating.
[39] The District Court Judge did set a starting point relative to the offending, noting the need for the general deterrence of violence against Corrections officers, and the fact that the infliction of violence against a prison officer acting in the course of their duty is an aggravating factor recorded in the Sentencing Act 2002.14
[40] However, I am satisfied that the Judge erred in his consideration of the defendant’s mitigating factors. It appears that the Judge took into account Mr Kerr’s personal mitigating factors in addressing the gravity of the offending under the first step, concluding that an aggravating factor relative to the offending, obviated the need for a discount, because of the importance of general deterrence. That is not in accordance with the two-step process.
13 Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296, [2020] 3 NZLR 583.
14 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)(fa).
[41] The defendant’s personal characteristics are seldom relevant to an assessment of gravity under the first step. Their impact comes at the second step, when assessing the manner in which those characteristics mitigate their culpability. Other than to record that Mr Kerr’s guilty pleas warranted a 25 per cent discount, the Judge did not appear to undertake that all important second step. I am accordingly satisfied that the Judge erred in his consideration (or lack thereof) of Mr Kerr’s mitigating circumstances.
[42] I turn now to whether that error means that Mr Kerr’s sentence was manifestly excessive.
Mental impairment
[43]As submitted by Mr George, the Court of Appeal has noted:15
A mental disorder falling short of exculpating insanity may be capable of mitigating a sentence either because: if causative of the offending, it moderates the culpability; it renders less appropriate or more subjectively punitive a sentence of imprisonment; or because of a combination of those reasons. The moderation of culpability follows from the principle that any general criminal liability is founded on conduct performed rationally by one who exercises a willed choice to offend.
[44] Put simply, the criminal justice system is premised on an assumption that persons offend rationally. In certain circumstances, where it is shown clearly that a person’s offending was less than rational, by reference to mental impairment, their culpability is considered reduced. I consider that there is an evidential basis that Mr Kerr’s culpability is mitigated by his mental impairment, as seen in the reports prepared by Dr Brown and Ms Milne. Mr Kerr’s is a clear case of an offender whose ability to rationally manage his impulsivity is limited.
[45] While he does not have a definitive diagnosis, the evidence indicates that he has a mental impairment that is undoubtedly linked to his offending. That does not entirely mitigate his culpability, but it does go some way to explaining his offending. This is because the evidence of Dr Brown and Ms Milne illustrates that Mr Kerr is at his most impulsive and/or aggressive. in the periods before and after he experiences
15 E (CA689/10) v R, above n 6, at [68].
an epileptic seizure. The epilepsy that he experiences has led to an accumulation of mild traumatic brain injuries, considered to further exacerbate his personality issues. I am of the view that in the circumstances, a discrete discount of 10 per cent would be justified on the basis of Mr Kerr’s mental impairment.
Personal deprivation
[46] In Berkland the Supreme Court clarified how s 27 reports (and background factors generally) are to be approached in the sentencing exercise.16 While in the present case the District Court did not have a s 27 report, the two s 38 reports include information relating to Mr Kerr’s background and upbringing, corroborated in Dr Brown’s report by a conversation Dr Brown had with Mr Kerr’s mother. That information was relevant to whether Mr Kerr’s background could mitigate his culpability. The District Court Judge did not refer to that information.
[47] The Supreme Court concluded in Berkland that the required degree of connection between background factors and their mitigatory effect on sentencing is a “causative contribution” approach.17 The Court held that circumstances of deprivation can have a powerful explanatory force in revealing how an offender has come to offend and in guiding the court’s assessment in sentencing.18 This is of particular importance in the context where offending can be linked to intergenerational depravation.19 The discount range for these factors is wide and largely fact dependent.
[48] The material before the District Court establishes that violence was normalised in Mr Kerr’s upbringing. He experienced and witnessed family violence in his own home. He regularly moved between care settings, spending time with Oranga Tamariki, and being expelled from a number of schools. He had significant contact with Mental Health Services from a young age, and the management of his behaviour was complicated by his epilepsy.
16 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509.
17 At [109].
18 At [120].
19 At [125].
[49] As submitted by Mr George, it is apparent that from a young age, Mr Kerr has used violence as a method for rationalising his emotions. While his use of violence is to be condemned, when viewed in the context of Mr Kerr’s upbringing, it is in my view, causally connected to that upbringing. I am satisfied that there is a causal link between personal deprivation in Mr Kerr’s background and his willingness to use violence, that would justify a discrete discount of 10 per cent.
Youth
[50] The Court of Appeal has recently re-examined research regarding the neurological differences between young people and adults, and what effect those differences should have in sentencing young people.20 The Court of Appeal previously reviewed that research in Churchward v R.21 In Dickey v R, the Court acknowledged that there is no outer limit to the discount for youth, with discounts of 10–30 per cent being common.22 It also considered that it was no longer correct to say that “youth can carry little weight when balanced against the public interest in denunciation and accountability”.23 In that case, in respect of much more serious offending, discounts were awarded to appellants whose offending “reflected the poorly developed neurological capacity of adolescents”.24
[51] Mr Kerr was aged 24 at the time of the offending. He is therefore at the outer limit of the age where a discount for youth is a possibility. Against that, however, is that his offending reflects the poorly developed neurological capacity of adolescents. While his behaviour is to be condemned, I accept Mr George’s submission that a small and discrete discount for Mr Kerr’s youth is available, notwithstanding its overlap with his mental impairment. Mr Kerr remains at the rehabilitative threshold, should he continue to maintain his compliance with his medication. It is also important that he be provided with opportunities to successfully reintegrate into the community.
[52] In previous cases discounts have been awarded to defendants older than Mr Kerr. In R v Nepia, youth was a relevant factor in a discount was awarded for
20 Dickey v R [2023] NZCA 2. See also Frost v R [2023] NZCA 294 at [99]–[109].
21 Churchward v R [2011] NZCA 531, (2011) 25 CRNZ 446.
22 Dickey, above n 20 at [174]; citing Pouwhare v R [2010] NZCA 268, (2010) 24 CRNZ 868 at [98].
23 At [177]; compare R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 (CA) at [120].
24 At [203(a)].
personal circumstances to a defendant aged 25, on a charge of manslaughter.25 I note also Woodstock v R, youth was a relevant factor in a discount was awarded for personal circumstances to a defendant aged 23, on charges of aggravated robbery, burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, and failing to carry out obligations in relation to a computer search.26
[53] Recognising the overlap between Mr Kerr’s mental impairment and his youth, I am satisfied that a further discount of five per cent was available to him in the circumstances.
Conclusion – manifestly excessive
[54] Ms Fiennes submitted that the sentence could not be considered manifestly excessive, because the Judge had accounted for Mr Kerr’s mitigating factors in setting the starting point. If that is in fact what occurred, it was an error by the District Court Judge. In any event, the submission ignores the point that neither the starting point nor the uplift for previous relevant convictions is challenged by Mr Kerr on appeal.
[55] I have concluded that the Judge erred in failing to consider and implement discounts for mitigating factors that were plainly before the District Court. However, as noted by Ms Fiennes, the appeal may only be successful if the end sentence was out of range. Ultimately, I am of the view that in the circumstances, and by a fine margin, the end sentence was out of range, for the reason that the Judge did not properly account for Mr Kerr’s mitigating characteristics.
[56] As submitted by Mr George, upon appeal, the weight of a sentence in terms of its range against discounts must be assessed in a proportional manner. Having concluded that discounts of at least 25 per cent were available to Mr Kerr on the material before the District Court, I consider that the sentence was manifestly excessive. In the context of a sentence that was relatively short, 25 per cent is proportionally significant. It is for this reason I consider that Mr Kerr’s appeal should be allowed and a different sentence be imposed.
25 R v Nepia [2019] NZHC 1932 at [36].
26 Woodstock v R [2020] NZCA 472 at [31]–[34].
[57] Taking the Judge’s starting point of five months’ imprisonment, and imposing a ten per cent uplift for previous convictions, leaves an adjusted starting point of five and a half month’ imprisonment. From there, I discount 25 per cent for Mr Kerr’s guilty plea, and a further 25 per cent for the factors discussed above relating to his mental impairment, deprivation experienced in his background, and youth. That results in a sentence of roughly two and three quarters months’ imprisonment, which I round to two and half months’ imprisonment.
[58] The new sentence of two and a half months’ imprisonment is to be served cumulatively upon Mr Kerr’s current sentence, as held by the District Court Judge. The concurrent sentence of two months’ imprisonment on the charge of resisting is to remain.
Result
[59] The appeal is allowed. The sentence of four months’ imprisonment for the assault charge is quashed and replaced with a sentence of two and a half months’ imprisonment, cumulative on the sentence which Mr Kerr is currently serving. The concurrent sentence of two months’ imprisonment on the charge of resisting is to remain.
Churchman J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office, Christchurch for Crown R J T George, Christchurch for Appellant
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