IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2021-485-749
[2022] NZHC 2096
UNDER the Unit Titles Act 2010 IN THE MATTER
of breach of statutory duty, negligence and nuisance
BETWEEN
CY KENNEDY and KAJSA KARIN ELEONORA BJORS
Plaintiffs
AND
BODY CORPORATE 82981
First Defendant
NEIL DOUGLAS CHARLES COOPER
Second DefendantANTHONY VOLPICELLI
Third Defendant
Hearing: 30 June 2022
(and costs on the papers)
Counsel:
I J Stephenson for Plaintiffs N S Wood for Defendants
Judgment:
23 August 2022
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
(Costs)
KENNEDY v BODY CORPORATE 82981 [2022] NZHC 2096 [23 August 2022]
[1] In my judgment of 5 August 2022, I declined the plaintiffs’ application that Chapman Tripp not represent the defendants.1
[2] I made what amounted to a default order in respect of costs, that is, costs were to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants on a 2B basis plus disbursements as fixed by the Registrar unless costs memoranda were filed within five working days following the Judgment.
[3] Mr Stephenson, counsel for the plaintiffs, filed a memorandum on 12 August 2022 submitting there should be an order fixing costs on a 2B basis together with disbursements totalling $6,309.65 as calculated by the defendants but that I should order those costs not become payable until further order of the Court.
[4] Mr Stephenson recognised the starting position under r 14.8 of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules) is that costs on interlocutory steps are to be fixed, at the time the interlocutory is dealt with and are to be payable when fixed unless there are special reasons to order otherwise.
[5] Mr Stephenson submitted the following factors meant there were special reasons why costs should not be made payable by his clients now.
[6] The first factor is there is no evidence or finding that the application was brought for tactical or bad faith reasons. I do not consider this a ground for deferring the payment of costs. I accept the submission of Mr Woods, counsel for the defendants, that while these are factors that may lend to an increased award of costs under r 14.6, the absence of those factors is not of itself a basis for deferring costs.
[7] Second, Mr Stephenson noted applications to restrain counsel from acting need to be made early but doing so may result in an application being premature, which proved to be the case here. Here, the application being in part premature arose from the shape of the plaintiffs’ claim changing during the hearing. I do not consider this a ground for costs to be delayed, it being a factor for which the plaintiffs were responsible.
[8] Third, Mr Stephenson noted opposing counsel accepted a further application may be warranted. Whether there will ever be a further application is unknown. If and when that application is made costs on it will be dealt…
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- Case
- [2022] NZHC 2096
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether there were grounds to prevent Chapman Tripp from representing the defendants and whether there were special circumstances to delay the payment of costs to the defendants by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that Chapman Tripp's representation of multiple defendants could lead to conflicts of interest and bad faith tactics, while they sought a delay in paying costs to allow for potential future applications and amendments to the pleadings.
Associate Judge Lester found that there was no evidence the application was brought for tactical or bad faith reasons, nor was there a conflict of interest warranting the restraint of counsel. The court also noted that the potential for future applications and amendments to pleadings did not justify delaying the payment of costs. The judge concluded that the plaintiffs were responsible for the premature nature of their application and the uncertainty regarding Chapman Tripp's role. Consequently, the court fixed the costs at the agreed sum of $6,309.65 and rejected the plaintiffs' request to defer the payment of these costs.
The final orders of the court required the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the fixed costs of $6,309.65, with no deferral in payment. The plaintiffs' application to restrain Chapman Tripp from representing the defendants was also declined.
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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