Kane v Attorney-General

[2014] NZHC 1444

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2013-485-4843 [2014] NZHC 1444

UNDER

the Judicature Amendment Act 1972

AND UNDER

Part 30 of the High Court Rules

BETWEEN

MICHAEL ANTHONY KANE, PATRICIA MARY BARRETT, IRENE DOROTHY LODER, JENNINE TERESA KANE, KAY THOMSON, JANET ELIZABETH OTTO, RODERICK ANDREW RUTHERFORD AND LOUIS EVAN ERSKINE FAIRHALL

Applicants

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL Respondent

On the papers
Counsel:	R J B Fowler for Applicants A Allan for Respondent
Judgment:	25 June 2014

JUDGMENT OF GODDARD J AS TO COSTS

This judgment was delivered by me on 25 June 2014 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Gillespie Young Watson, Lower Hutt for Applicants

Crown Law, Wellington for Respondent

KANE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2014] NZHC 1444 [25 June 2014]

an award of costs followed in favour of the Crown on a 2B basis.

[2]      The Crown subsequently filed a costs schedule seeking costs of $28,457.00 plus $473.85 in disbursements, to a total award of $28,930.85.

[3]      Prior to orders being sealed in this sum, the unsuccessful applicants sought a review of the costs order, asking that the Court exercise its discretion to decline to award costs, or to only award reduced costs under r 14.7(e).  Rule 14.7(e) provides:

The proceeding concerned a matter of public interest, and the party opposing costs acted reasonably in the conduct of the proceeding.

[4]      I directed that the applicants’ request be served on the Crown and requested

that the Crown indicate its attitude on the question of a waiver of costs.

[5]      In the event, timetabling orders were made and submissions filed by the applicants and the Crown setting out their respective positions on the costs issue.

[6]      The Crown’s stance is that no public interest exception to an award of costs arose in this case as the applicants were essentially pursuing their own interests and there was no matter of public interest arising sufficient to displace the established principle that costs follow the event.  Furthermore, the actual costs incurred by the Crown are far greater than the amount of costs claimed, which the Crown says are modest and reasonable in the overall circumstances of the proceeding.   Indeed, no issue has been taken with either the costs category identified or the reasonableness of the amount claimed.

Conclusion

[7]      The fundamental principle is that costs should follow the event and there are no  circumstances  arising  in  this  case  that  warrant  departure  from  the  general principle.

Goddard J