Joseph Auga Matamata v The Queen - [2022] NZSC 16

NOTE: HIGH COURT ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE NAMES OF THE COMPLAINANTS REMAINS IN FORCE.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

SC 110/2021
[2022] NZSC 16

BETWEEN	JOSEPH AUGA MATAMATA Applicant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Court:	William Young, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ
Counsel:	N P Chisnall and L A Elborough for Applicant S K Barr and H S Cunningham for Respondent
Judgment:	3 March 2022

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

The applicant was found guilty after a High Court jury trial on 10 charges of human trafficking and 13 charges of dealing in slaves, affecting 13 different complainants between 1994 and 2019.[1] He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment.[2]
[1]He was acquitted on one further charge of human trafficking.
[2]R v Matamata [2020] NZHC 1829 (Cull J) [HC judgment].
The applicant appealed against conviction to the Court of Appeal. The Solicitor‑General appealed against the sentence imposed on the applicant. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction and allowed the Solicitor‑General’s appeal against sentence only to the extent of imposing a minimum period of imprisonment of five years.[3]
[3]R v Matamata [2021] NZCA 372 (Miller, Clifford and Collins JJ) [CA judgment] at [86].
The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to this Court against conviction. He says that the Court of Appeal erred in two respects:
(a)its conclusion that the jury was properly directed as to the elements of human trafficking in terms of s 98D(1) of the Crimes Act 1961; and
(b)its construction of the legal definition of “slave” for the purposes of s 98 of the Crimes Act.
The facts are summarised in the Court of Appeal judgment.[4] For present purposes, it suffices to say that the applicant ran a business supplying labour to orchards. The complainants were individuals brought to New Zealand from the applicant’s community in Samoa and put to work in the orchard business. The applicant arranged flights and visas for the complainants. The Crown alleged at trial that the applicant brought the complainants to New Zealand on the false promise that the money they would earn would be theirs after they had repaid the cost of bringing them to New Zealand and an allowance for lodging with him. But, although they undertook the work required of them, the applicant retained their income, restricted their freedom of movement, restricted their communications and used actual or threatened violence for breaching his rules or standards.

Human trafficking

[4]At [4]–[8].

Section 98D of the Crimes Act was amended in 2015.[5] Seven of the 10 human trafficking charges on which the applicant was convicted relate to the pre‑2015 period and are therefore governed by the old s 98D. Under the old s 98D, a person is guilty of human trafficking if he or she “arranges the entry of a person into New Zealand … by 1 or more acts of coercion against the person, 1 or more acts of deception…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2022] NZSC 16
Decision Date: 3 March 2022

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Joseph Auga Matamata, the applicant, was convicted of multiple charges of human trafficking and dealing in slaves by a jury in the High Court. The applicant was subsequently sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The Solicitor-General appealed against the sentence imposed on the applicant, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal only to the extent of imposing a minimum period of imprisonment of five years. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against his conviction, alleging two errors made by the Court of Appeal. The first concerns the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the jury was properly directed as to the elements of human trafficking under section 98D(1) of the Crimes Act 1961, and the second concerns the Court of Appeal's construction of the legal definition of "slave" for the purposes of section 98 of the Crimes Act.
The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The Court found no error in the Court of Appeal's reasoning and did not find that the issues raised were of general or public importance. The Court also found that there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal's direction to the jury regarding the definition of a slave and the elements of human trafficking were correct. The Court found that the legislative history of the Crimes Act and the text of the Act supported the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the Act. The Court also found that the Court of Appeal's approach to the mens rea requirement of the slavery offence was correct. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders