IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-004537 [2014] NZHC 280
UNDER The Accident Compensation Act 1982
IN THE MATTER of an application for leave to appeal to the
High Court pursuant to s 111 of the Act
BETWEEN MICHAEL JOHN JONES Applicant
ANDACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent
Hearing: 5 February 2014
Appearances: Applicant in person
C Hlavac for the Respondent
Judgment: 25 February 2014
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF ELLIS J
This judgment was delivered by me on Tuesday 25 February 2014 at 5.00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:………………………….
Counsel/Solicitors:
C Hlavac, Young Hunter Lawyers, Auckland
Copy to: The Applicant
JONES v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION [2014] NZHC 280 [25 February 2014]
[1] On 3 September 1987 the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority (the ACAA) dismissed an appeal by Mr Jones in relation to his claim for medical misadventure under Accident Compensation Act 1982 (the 1982 Act). The medical misadventure for which Mr Jones had sought cover related to an adverse reaction he had apparently had, in 1979, to the drug Sinequan. It is evident from the ACAA’s decision that his claim had two facets, namely that:
(a) His physical1 and psychological reaction to the drug was rare and severe;
(b)His adverse reaction had been caused by an underlying condition, Lown-Ganong-Levine syndrome (LGLS), which his doctor (the doctor who prescribed the Sinequan) had been negligent not to have diagnosed.
[2] In the 1987 decision, Judge Middleton upheld the position taken by the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) declining Mr Jones’ medical misadventure claim.
[3] Mr Jones’ appeal rights in relation to this decision were governed by s 111 of the 1982 Act, which provided:
111 Appeal to High Court
(1) Where any party is dissatisfied with any order or decision of the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority, that party may, with the leave of the Authority, appeal to the High Court against that order or decision:
Provided that, if the Appeal Authority refuses to grant leave to appeal, the High Court may grant special leave to appeal.
(2) The Appeal Authority or the High Court, as the case may be, may grant leave accordingly on a question of law or if in its opinion the question involved in the appeal is one which by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason ought to be submitted to the High Court for decision.
(3) ...
1 The immediate physical reaction took the form of paroxysmal atrial tachycardia, or a racing heart beat.
(4) Every such appeal shall be made by giving notice of appeal within 28 days after the date on which the appellant was notified of the order or decision appealed against or within such further time as the Appeal Authority or the Court may allow on application made either before or after the expiration of those 28 days.
(5) In its determination of any appeal, the Court may confirm, modify, or reverse the order or decision appealed against, and, subject to…
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- Case
- [2014] NZHC 280
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether to grant Jones an extension of time for applying for special leave to appeal the ACAA’s decision and whether to grant Jones special leave to appeal. The court considered the factors that were to be weighed when determining whether to grant an extension of time for lodging an application for review. The relevant factors were the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the strength and merits of the case on review, and any prejudice arising to the Corporation in the event that an extension were granted. The court found that a delay of 26 years was extraordinary and that there was no material before the Court upon which it could conclude that the very significant delay in seeking leave to appeal was explicable or justified. The length of the delay would also inevitably prejudice the Corporation if leave were to be granted.
The court also considered whether there were any tenable questions of law or questions of public importance raised by Jones’ proposed appeal. The court found that there were no tenable questions of law or questions of public importance raised by Jones’ proposed appeal. The court found that Jones’ proposed appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and that there was no extraordinary factor which was not properly taken into account by the ACAA. The court declined to grant Jones an extension of time for applying for special leave to appeal the ACAA’s decision. Were it necessary for the court to determine the matter, it would also decline the application for special leave itself.
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