Johns v Johns

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA108/03

BETWEENS H C JOHNS


Appellant

ANDL R JOHNS AND C C HOLLOWAY


First Respondents

ANDL R JOHNS


Second Respondent

Hearing:19 November 2003

Coram:Gault P
Tipping J
Glazebrook J

Appearances:  B P C Carter for Appellant


G J Judd QC for Respondents

Judgment:31 March 2004 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY TIPPING J

Introduction

[1]       The primary questions in this appeal from Potter J concern the interpretation of a deed of trust and whether the two causes of action in issue should be struck out on limitation grounds.  The appellant, Mr Stephen Johns, to whom we will refer as the plaintiff, wishes to pursue the first cause of action against the first respondents, who are his father, Mr L R Johns, and a Mr C C Holloway, as trustees of a family trust settled by his father in 1967, and the second against his father personally.  Potter J struck out certain aspects of the first cause of action, which alleged breaches of trust by the trustees and held that the second cause of action brought against Mr L R Johns personally for breach of fiduciary duty should be largely struck out unless, pursuant to s28 of the Limitation Act 1950, there was postponement of the limitation period, so as to bring the claim within time. 

[2]       As the case is one involving strike out, the facts upon which the Court must act are those alleged in the plaintiff’s pleadings, which must for present purposes be taken as capable of proof.  Causes of action or aspects thereof should only be struck out before trial on the basis that they are statute or otherwise barred, if the defendant can establish that proposition conclusively.  If there is any real doubt about the matter, the case should be allowed to go to trial where all issues of fact and law can be fully explored.  This is no more than the ordinary strike out principle applied in the context of a strike out application which is based on limitation grounds.

[3]       The best way of recounting the relevant background is to refer to the plaintiff’s allegations of fact as set out in his most recent pleading which is a fourth amended statement of claim dated 1 August 2002.  It was on that pleading that the matter was addressed in the High Court and no further pleading has been filed or tendered.

[4]       The proceeding was commenced on 11 January 2000.  The six year period prescribed by s21 of the Act in respect of claims for breach of trust therefore runs from 11 January 1994.  If and to the extent that the plaintiff’s claims or any of them are subject to a six year limitation, either directly or by analogy, the plaintiff cannot rely on any event or circumstance which occurred prior to 11 January 1994. 

[5]       In his fourth amended statement of claim the plaintiff puts his case on the following basis.  By deed dated 18 December…

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Details
Case
[2004] NZCA 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Johns v Johns was heard by Tipping, Gault, and Glazebrook JJ in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand. The appeal concerns the interpretation of a deed of trust and whether two causes of action should be struck out on limitation grounds. The plaintiff, Stephen Johns, sought to pursue the first cause of action against his father, LR Johns, and Mr CC Holloway, as trustees of a family trust settled by his father in 1967, and the second cause of action against his father personally for breach of fiduciary duty. Potter J had struck out certain aspects of the first cause of action and held that the second cause of action should be largely struck out unless, pursuant to s28 of the Limitation Act 1950, there was postponement of the limitation period. The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by Potter J were set aside. The respondents were to pay the appellant for his costs in the Court of Appeal $6,000 plus disbursements.

The Court examined the plaintiff's interests in the trust property and determined that his discretionary interest did not fall within the proviso to s21(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court found that the plaintiff's residual interest was a future interest in the trust property, and he was entitled to invoke the proviso to sue for breach of trust. The Court also held that the plaintiff's income interest under clause 8 of the trust deed was a future interest that had not yet fallen into possession, and he had a right to sue by dint of the proviso.

Regarding the second cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty), the Court examined whether the plaintiff's equitable claim was barred by analogy with s21(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court determined that the second cause of action could not be barred by analogy as the first cause of action was not statute barred. The Court concluded that the different capacities in which Mr LR Johns was being sued introduced a material distinction from the point of view of the relationships between the parties, making it inappropriate to apply any bar by analogy.

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