John Morgan MacKenzie v The Attorney-General

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 21/2016
[2016] NZSC 110

BETWEEN	JOHN MORGAN MACKENZIE Applicant
AND	THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL Respondent

Court:	Elias CJ, William Young and Arnold JJ
Counsel:	Applicant in person I M G Clarke for Respondent
Judgment:	23 August 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for recall is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

The applicant seeks a recall of our judgment of 1 June 2016 declining him leave to appeal against a judgment of Andrews J in the High Court.[1]
[1]MacKenzie v Attorney-General [2016] NZSC 60.
Amongst his complaints is the suggestion that his argument as to limitation was not fully captured in [7] of the leave judgment. In an earlier leave judgment, we explained his argument in a slightly different and perhaps better way:[2]
The applicant has the fixed idea that time did not begin to run for limitation purposes until 24 November 2006, which is the date on which he received a letter from the Crown Health Financing Agency denying liability. If this is the case, then his proceedings were issued in time. He considers that he could not have filed proceedings in the High Court until liability was denied.

In that judgment, we then went on to say:[3]

This, however, is not in accordance with the way the Limitation Act 1950 operated.
[2]MacKenzie v Legal Services Commissioner [2014] NZSC 49 at [2].
[3]At [2].

Nothing that has been said in support of the application would warrant a recall of the 1 June 2016 judgment.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

John Morgan MacKenzie, the applicant, sought a recall of the Supreme Court's judgment from 1 June 2016, which had declined him leave to appeal against a High Court judgment. The respondent, the Attorney-General, opposed the recall. The case involved the applicant's contention that his argument concerning the limitation period was not fully captured in the earlier leave judgment, particularly regarding the start date for the limitation period. The applicant argued that his proceedings were timely if the limitation period began on 24 November 2006, the date he received a letter from the Crown Health Financing Agency denying liability. However, the Supreme Court had previously noted that this understanding did not align with the Limitation Act 1950.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's grounds for recall were sufficient to warrant a reconsideration of the earlier leave judgment. The court needed to determine if any of the applicant's arguments or submissions could change the conclusion that the limitation period had started before the date claimed by the applicant. The court had to assess whether the applicant's arguments provided new or compelling evidence that was not previously considered, or if there was a significant misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the law in the earlier judgment.

The Supreme Court found that none of the arguments presented by the applicant warranted a recall of the earlier judgment. The court reiterated that the Limitation Act 1950 did not support the applicant's interpretation of when the limitation period began. The applicant's belief that he could not file proceedings until liability was denied was not consistent with the statutory provisions. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for recall, confirming that the earlier judgment remained valid and no further appeal would be entertained on the basis presented.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established