Johan Aarts v Barnados New Zealand

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 26/2014
[2014] NZSC 62
BETWEEN

JOHAN AARTS
Applicant

AND

BARNARDOS NEW ZEALAND
First Respondent

COMMISSIONER OF NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Second Respondent

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Third Respondent

THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
Fourth Respondent

THE OMBUDSMAN
Fifth Respondent

LANCE LAWSON BARRISTERS AND SOLICITORS
Sixth Respondent

Court:

Elias CJ, William Young and Arnold JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
J M Douglas for First Respondent
S V McKechnie for Second and Third Respondents
A M M Schulze and G B Burt for Sixth Respondent

Judgment:

28 May 2014

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

BThe applicant is to pay costs of $2,500 together with disbursements to be fixed by the Registrar to the second and third respondents (collectively) and to the sixth respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Background

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 14 February 2014:[1]

    (a)dismissing his application for leave to appeal[2] against a judgment of the Employment Court[3] upholding a decision of the Employment Relations Authority[4] striking out his claims for penalties against the Commissioner of Police, the Ministry of Social Development, the Privacy Commissioner, the Ombudsman and Lance Lawson; and

    (b)dismissing his application for leave to appeal against a later judgment of the Employment Court as to costs.[5] 

    [2]This was technically a cross-appeal.

    [3]Aarts v Barnardos New Zealand [2013] NZEmpC 85, (2013) 10 NZELC 79-028.

    [4]Aarts v Barnardos New Zealand [2012] NZERA Auckland 22.

    [5]Aarts v Barnardos New Zealand [2013] NZEmpC 145.

  2. The Employment Court held that the claims against the Commissioner of Police and the Ministry of Social Development were out of time and that the claims against the Privacy Commissioner, the Ombudsman and Lance Lawson were both without foundation on the facts and out of time.  In addition, the applicant seeks leave to appeal directly to this Court against the judgments of the Employment Court under ss 214A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003.

  3. The applicant claims that he was unjustifiably dismissed by Barnardos New Zealand in 2006 and that the other respondents were parties to a breach of his employment agreement (being the unjustifiable dismissal).  Under s 135(5) of the Employment Relations Act, such claims must be brought within 12 months of when the cause of action either became known to the person bringing the action or should reasonably have become known to that person. 

  4. In a preliminary ruling by a Judge of the Court of Appeal, the applicant’s request to be represented by a lay advocate in the Court of Appeal was refused.[6]  And then in the judgment delivered on 14 February 2014 on the papers, the Court of Appeal declined the applicant leave to cross-appeal and appeal but set down for oral hearing an application by the Commissioner of Police to appeal against another aspect of the Employment Court’s judgment. 

The application…

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Details
Case
[2014] NZSC 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Johan Aarts v Barnardos New Zealand, the Supreme Court of New Zealand was asked to decide whether the applicant could appeal against the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Employment Court in relation to his dismissal and subsequent claims against various parties. The applicant, Johan Aarts, claimed that he was unjustifiably dismissed by Barnardos New Zealand in 2006 and that other respondents were complicit in this dismissal. The legal issues the court had to address included whether the applicant could appeal the Court of Appeal's decision denying him leave to appeal and if he could appeal directly from the Employment Court judgments to the Supreme Court.

The court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision denying leave to appeal, as per section 7(b) of the Supreme Court Act. The court further determined that the applicant's dissatisfaction with the decision not to allow him to be represented by a lay advocate was irrelevant to the Court of Appeal's decision on leave to appeal. Regarding the direct appeal from the Employment Court judgments, the court noted that it would be cautious in granting such leave, especially where the Court of Appeal had already declined it. The court concluded that the applicant's proposed grounds for appeal did not meet the stringent test under section 14 of the Supreme Court Act.

The Supreme Court ultimately declined the applicant's request for leave to appeal, both from the Court of Appeal and from the Employment Court judgments. The applicant was ordered to pay costs of $2,500 to the second and third respondents and to the sixth respondent. The court's decision was based on the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Supreme Court Act, the irrelevance of the lay advocate representation issue to the appeal decision, and the lack of substantial grounds for appeal as per the stringent test under section 14.

Background

Background to the litigation

Johan Aarts claims that he was unjustifiably dismissed by Barnardos New Zealand in 2006. He alleges that the Commissioner of Police, the Ministry of Social Development, the Privacy Commissioner, the Ombudsman, and Lance Lawson (who acted as his solicitors after the dismissal) were parties to this breach of his employment agreement. Aarts filed claims for penalties against these respondents through the Employment Relations Authority and subsequently the Employment Court, which were ultimately dismissed. The dismissals were upheld by the Court of Appeal. Aarts seeks leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision and the judgments of the Employment Court, arguing that his claims were not time-barred and that the Employment Court should have allowed him to be represented by a lay advocate.

The case originated in the Employment Relations Authority, where Aarts' claims for penalties against several respondents were struck out. The Employment Court upheld this decision, and Aarts appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed Aarts' application for leave to appeal against the Employment Court's decision, as well as a subsequent application for leave to appeal regarding costs. Aarts now seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand against the Court of Appeal's decision and the Employment Court's judgments. The Court of Appeal had previously refused Aarts' request to be represented by a lay advocate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal declining leave to appeal?
2. Should the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision regarding the representation issue?
3. Should the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against the Employment Court judgments directly under sections 214A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003?
4. Are Aarts' claims time-barred under section 135 of the Employment Relations Act?
5. Did the Employment Court err in proceeding on a de novo basis without Aarts' consent?
6. Are the costs awarded against Aarts unjust, considering his limited resources and the complexity of his claims?

Held
1. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal declining leave to appeal. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal decision is dismissed.
2. The Supreme Court declines to grant leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision regarding the representation issue.
3. The Supreme Court declines to grant leave to appeal against the Employment Court judgments directly under sections 214A of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003.
4. The court does not decide on the time-bar issue under section 135 of the Employment Relations Act, as the matter was not pursued in the appeal.
5. The Supreme Court finds no error in the Employment Court proceeding on a de novo basis without Aarts' consent, as it appears to have been with his consent.
6. The Supreme Court does not find the costs awarded against Aarts unjust, considering his limited resources and the complexity of his claims.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Supreme Court began by addressing the jurisdictional issue concerning its authority to hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal declining leave to appeal. The Court relied on section 7(b) of the Supreme Court Act, which explicitly excludes appeals from decisions declining leave to appeal. This jurisdictional bar prevented the Supreme Court from considering the merits of the appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision.

Regarding the representation issue, the Court of Appeal had already made its decision on leave to appeal before addressing the representation matter. The Supreme Court considered whether it could entertain an appeal on the representation issue, but ultimately decided against it. The Court reasoned that the representation issue was irrelevant to the Court of Appeal’s decision to decline leave to appeal and was subject to the same jurisdictional constraints as the main appeal. Moreover, the Court found that the criteria for leave to appeal under section 13(4) of the Supreme Court Act had not been satisfied, as the applicant would still have recourse if the Commissioner of Police succeeded in their proposed appeal.

Turning to the appeal against the Employment Court judgments, the Supreme Court noted that the applicant did not initially seek leave to appeal under section 214A of the Employment Relations Act. However, the applicant later indicated a wish to challenge the judgments directly. The Supreme Court emphasised its caution in granting leave to appeal directly from a court other than the Court of Appeal where the Court of Appeal has already declined leave, citing previous cases. The Court found that the applicant's proposed grounds for appeal did not meet the stringent test in section 14 of the Supreme Court Act.

The Supreme Court further considered the applicant's argument that the Employment Court erred by proceeding on a de novo basis without his consent. The Court found that the applicant had consented to the hearing being on a de novo basis as evidenced by the oral evidence given with his consent, and thus his subsequent complaints did not warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

Finally, the Supreme Court reviewed the applicant's challenge to the costs awarded against him. The Court acknowledged that the costs were substantial given his limited resources but found no point of law of general or public importance and no appearance of a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the costs were upheld.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Supreme Court will not entertain appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal declining leave to appeal and will be cautious in granting leave to appeal directly from a lower court when the Court of Appeal has already declined leave. The Court also emphasised the importance of meeting the stringent criteria for leave to appeal under section 14 of the Supreme Court Act.