| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 16/2025 [2025] NZSC 98 |
| BETWEEN | GAUTAM JINDAL |
| AND | CHERAG DARUWALLA |
| Court: | Ellen France and Williams JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 4 August 2025 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is granted.
B The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
C The applicant must pay the respondent costs of $2,500.
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REASONS
Introduction
The applicant brought proceedings in the High Court alleging emails sent by the respondent defamed him. He sought declaratory relief and damages. The respondent sought strike‑out of part of the applicant’s claim against him. The High Court struck out two of the causes of action on the basis they were not reasonably arguable as they were barred by the Limitation Act 2010.[1] Two of the other causes of action were found to have made on occasions of absolute privilege giving the respondent a complete defence. The applicant’s appeal from that decision to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful.[2] The applicant seeks leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision.[3]
Background
[1]Jindal v Daruwalla [2023] NZHC 3315 (Associate Judge Taylor).
[2]Jindal v Daruwalla [2024] NZCA 685 (Mallon, Gwyn and Moore JJ) [CA judgment].
[3]The application is out of time, but the delay is minimal.
After completing his law degree in July 2020, the applicant applied in August 2020 to the New Zealand Law Society | Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa for admission as a barrister and solicitor of the High Court. As part of its enquiries, the Law Society received emails from the respondent about the applicant’s character. The Law Society declined to issue a certificate of character which delayed his application for admission.[4]
[4]The applicant was eventually provided a certificate of good character and was admitted about a year later than he intended.
To put the present application in context, it is helpful to say a little more about the emails. As the Court of Appeal explained:[5]
[6] Applicants for a certificate of character are required to disclose if they had been a director of a company that had been put in liquidation. Mr Jindal disclosed that he was a director of Orange Capital Ltd (Orange) which was in liquidation. This led to the Law Society contacting the liquidator of Orange (Mr Kamal) who in turn contacted Mr Daruwalla, of Adon Holdings Ltd (Adon), with whom there had been business dealings in 2017. This led to an exchange of emails that became the subject of Mr Jindal’s intended defamation claim.
[5]CA judgment, above n 2 (footnote omitted).
The first set of emails, dated 1 May 2020 and 6 November 2020, were sent by the respondent to Mr Kamal (the Kamal emails). Mr Kamal gave the respondent the Law Society’s contact details, and the respondent sent the next set of emails to the Law Society dated…
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- Case
- [2025] NZSC 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Supreme Court were whether the application for leave to appeal was timely and whether the proposed grounds for appeal had sufficient prospects of success. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the Court of Appeal erred in striking out the causes of action based on the Kamal and Law Society emails. Jindal argued that the Court of Appeal erred in treating the Law Society's statutory responsibility for deciding on applications for a certificate of character as integrally connected to judicial proceedings, and in failing to analyse whether absolute privilege was necessary or whether qualified privilege would suffice.
The Supreme Court found that the application for leave to appeal was out of time, but the delay was minimal. The Court noted that Jindal's arguments about the interplay between the various limbs of r 7.77 of the High Court Rules 2016 did not have sufficient prospects of success. The Court also found that the Court of Appeal's orthodox approach to the construction of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act and its consideration of the underlying policy considerations was correct. The Court held that the Law Society's role in providing evidence to the Court was integral to an application to the High Court and that the communications made to the Law Society as part of its enquiries were protected by the common law absolute privilege that applies to witnesses, judges, counsel, parties and every document produced in the course of judicial proceedings.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal but dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The Court also ordered that the applicant pay the respondent costs of $2,500.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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