Jindal v Auckland Standards Committee 1

[2024] NZHC 3392

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV 2024-404-2362

[2024] NZHC 3392

BETWEEN

GAUTAM JINDAL

Appellant

AND

AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1

Respondent

Hearing:

6 November 2024

Appearances:

The appellant in person

B Tantrum and K Robinson for the respondent

Judgment:

6 November 2024

Reasons:

14 November 2024

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF CAMPBELL J

These reasons for judgment were delivered by me on 14 November 2024 at 12.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

JINDAL v AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1 [2024] NZHC 3392 [6 November 2024]

[1]                 Mr Jindal is a lawyer. A disciplinary proceeding is on foot against him in the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal. Mr Jindal applied  to strike out the proceeding. On 13 August 2024, the Tribunal declined to strike out.1

[2]                 Mr Jindal appealed against the Tribunal’s strike-out decision. He then filed an interlocutory application for a stay of the disciplinary proceeding in the Tribunal pending resolution of his appeal.

[3]                 I heard Mr Jindal’s stay application on 6 November 2024. At that time, the substantive hearing in the Tribunal was scheduled to be heard about a week later.    It was therefore important to determine Mr Jindal’s stay application expeditiously.  At the end of the hearing, I declined the application, with my reasons to follow.

[4]                 After declining the application, I discussed with Mr Jindal and Mr Tantrum (counsel for the respondent) my concern that it might be unhelpful if I provided detailed reasons for my decision, given the impending substantive hearing before the Tribunal. Both agreed that I should provide only short reasons. These are those reasons.

Background

[5]                 The disciplinary charge against Mr Jindal arises out of his conduct towards another lawyer, Neville Woods. Mr Woods is a partner in a firm, Rice Craig. Rice Craig sued Mr Jindal in the District Court for payment of an invoice for legal services. Mr Jindal disputed liability.

[6]                 In  the District Court  hearing, Mr Woods gave evidence that he had had       a telephone conversation with Mr Jindal in which he told Mr Jindal that if he sought legal services from Rice Craig he would be charged in accordance with the firm’s usual terms of engagement. Mr Jindal was adamant there was no such conversation. He called Mr Woods a liar both in evidence and submissions.

1      Jindal v Auckland Standards Committee 1 [2024] NZLCDT 24.

[7]                 In a judgment dated 11 November 2022, the District Court Judge found that Mr Woods did not lie and found for Rice Craig. Mr Jindal appealed.

[8]                 On 17 April 2023, Mr Jindal delivered  a document to Rice Craig’s offices.   It said “Neville Warwick Woods lied under oath”. Two days later, Mr Jindal delivered the same document to Mr Woods’ home and to the homes of two of his neighbours. Mr Jindal also set up a website calling Mr Woods a liar and stating that this information was “published in the interests of public safety”. Mr Woods’s lawyer asked Mr Jindal to take down the webpage and apologise to Mr Woods. On 20 April 2023, Mr Jindal refused to do so and said that Mr Woods had perjured himself.

[9]                 On about 24 April 2023, Rice Craig and Mr Jindal settled the debt between them on confidential terms.

[10]              On 9 May 2023, Mr Woods filed a complaint with the New Zealand Law Society. The Auckland Standards Committee 1 determined that the complaint should be heard by the Tribunal. The Committee’s primary case is that Mr Jindal’s conduct was professional (that is, connected to the provision of regulated services) and constituted conduct that would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable. The alternative case is that his conduct was personal (that is, unconnected to the provision of regulated services) and was conduct that would justify a finding that Mr Jindal is not a fit and proper person or is otherwise unsuited to engage in practice as a lawyer.

Mr Jindal’s application to the Tribunal to strike out the charges

[11]              In pursuing his strike-out application in the Tribunal, Mr Jindal’s then counsel Mr Hodge said there was no dispute as to the underlying facts. Mr Hodge submitted that the charges should be struck out on the basis of a lawyer’s right to freedom      of speech.

[12]              The Tribunal approached the strike-out application by considering whether there was an arguable case of personal (rather than professional) misconduct (the threshold for personal misconduct being higher than that which applies to professional

misconduct). The Tribunal found that there was at least an arguable case of personal misconduct:

[39] … [F]reedom of speech must be exercised by a lawyer with dignity and restraint. On the undisputed evidence, it is arguable that restraint does not appear to have been exercised by [Mr Jindal].

Mr Jindal’s appeal and stay application

[13]              In his appeal against the Tribunal’s decision, Mr Jindal says (among other things) that he was not providing any regulated services, that the correct forum for litigating the publication is in the civil courts under the Defamation Act 1992, that the Tribunal’s decision is unreasonably restrictive towards a citizen’s right to free speech and that his strike-out application should have been considered in the wider context of his free speech rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

[14]              Mr Jindal sought a stay. Among other things, he said that if there was no stay his appeal would be rendered nugatory, that there was no risk to the public and that the Standards Committee would not be injuriously affected by a stay.

Reasons for declining stay application

[15] One of the purposes of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 is that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers be disposed of expeditiously.2 This Court is for that reason reluctant to stay such proceedings pending appeals to this Court, unless there is good reason to do so.3

[16]              Mr Jindal’s appeal against the strike-out decision is likely to be rendered nugatory by the lack of a stay. But this is unlikely to have significant adverse consequences for him. He will be able to advance all his appeal arguments at the substantive hearing in the Tribunal. If he is dissatisfied with the Tribunal’s substantive decision, he can appeal.  This is likely to lead to a speedier ultimate resolution than  if the disciplinary proceeding were stayed while Mr Jindal pursued an appeal against the strike-out decision.

2 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 120(3); Deliu v New Zealand Law Society [2012] NZCA 359 at [10].

3      Lagolago v Wellington Standards Committee 2 [2015] NZCA 2187 at [10].

[17]              The only potential injury to Mr Jindal is an exposure to costs in the Tribunal on the strike-out application. But costs in the Tribunal are not automatic. It is possible there might be no award at all against Mr Jindal if he ultimately succeeds in defending the charges.

[18]              A relevant consideration on a stay application is the apparent strength of the appeal. It suffices to observe that the Tribunal was dealing with a strike-out application. Mr Jindal had to meet a high threshold in order to succeed.

Campbell J