| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 16/2016 [2017] NZSC 10 |
| BETWEEN | JANINE DAVINA SAX |
| AND | LUKE ANDREW SIMPSON LUKE ANDREW SIMPSON AND JANINE DAVINA SAX AS TRUSTEES OF THE LUKE AND JANINE SIMPSON FAMILY TRUST |
| Court: | Glazebrook, Arnold and OʼRegan JJ |
Counsel: | G C McArthur for Applicant |
Judgment: | 17 February 2017 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
BCosts of $2,500 are to be paid by the applicant to the first respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Ms Sax applies for leave to appeal against a decision of Miller J of 27 January 2016, dismissing her application to review the decision of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal refusing to dispense with security for costs.[1]
Background
[1]Sax v Simpson [2016] NZCA 3 [Sax (CA)]. The application for leave was filed on 23 February 2016. At the request of the parties the Court suspended its consideration of the application to allow settlement discussions between the parties. However, no settlement was reached.
Ms Sax’s substantive appeal to the Court of Appeal is against a judgment of Brewer J of 26 June 2015,[2] concerning the use of a house purchased by the Luke and Janine Simpson Family Trust. The house was used (rent free) by Ms Sax and Mr Simpson as their matrimonial home before their separation. After separation Ms Sax continued to occupy the house for a period of 42 weeks. Mr Simpson then occupied the house for 97.7 weeks, before purchasing it from the trust.
[2]Simpson v Sax [2015] NZHC 1466, [2015] NZAR 1210.
Relevantly for this application, Brewer J held that both Ms Sax and Mr Simpson succeeded in their occupation rent claims against each other, meaning that Ms Sax owed Mr Simpson $9,450 in occupation rent and Mr Simpson owed Ms Sax $21,982.50.[3] Brewer J refused Ms Sax compensation for rental payments ($8,366.00) she had made while Mr Simpson occupied the house on the basis that to do so would constitute double counting.[4]
[3]At [68]. The two sums for occupation rent were offset against each other, with the result that Mr Simpson was directed to pay Ms Sax $12,532.50.
[4]At [36].
Brewer J also rejected Ms Sax’s claim against Mr Simpson for loss of rental. She claimed Mr Simpson had intentionally induced tenants she had arranged to live in the house with her to breach their contract. Brewer J found Ms Sax failed to discharge her onus of proof on this ground. He relied on a Tenancy Tribunal decision which proceeded on the basis that Ms Sax was acting as landlord in her personal capacity and that she had, through her lawyer, terminated the tenancy.[5]
Miller J’s decision
[5]At [43]–[45].
Miller J rejected Ms Sax’s contention that security for costs was not payable because she had filed an application for legal aid.[6] Miller J agreed with the Registrar that Ms Sax did not file an application for legal…
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- Case
- [2017] NZSC 10
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were twofold. Firstly, whether Miller J erred in his assessment of the merits of Ms. Sax’s appeal regarding the security for costs, specifically whether she should have been ordered to pay occupation rent and if she should have been compensated for rent paid while excluded from the house. Secondly, whether Brewer J was incorrect in rejecting Ms. Sax’s claim that Mr. Simpson induced the tenants to break their tenancy and in relying on a Tenancy Tribunal decision, instead of applying Section 50(1) of the Evidence Act 2006 by analogy. The court scrutinized Ms. Sax’s arguments regarding the interpretation of the trustees’ agreement and the merits of her appeal but found no basis to suggest that Miller J’s decision was incorrect or that a miscarriage of justice would result if leave was not granted.
The court concluded that Ms. Sax’s arguments did not demonstrate any error in Miller J’s assessment of the merits of her appeal. Given the potential for the substantive appeal to proceed to a hearing in the Court of Appeal, the court deemed it inappropriate to comment further on the matter. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs of $2,500 were to be paid by the applicant to the first respondent.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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