Jackson v Police

[2015] NZHC 2606

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

CRI-2015-463-49 [2015] NZHC 2606

BETWEEN

VICKY ANN JACKSON

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:	22 October 2015
Counsel:	W H A Te Are for Appellant M S Jenkins for Respondent
Judgment:	22 October 2015

JUDGMENT OF BREWER J

Solicitors:           Te Are Law (Rotorua) for Appellant

Gordon Pilditch (Rotorua) for Respondent

JACKSON v POLICE [2015] NZHC 2606 [22 October 2015]

Introduction

[1]      Ms Jackson appeals against her conviction for a charge of assault with a weapon.  The conviction was entered by Judge TR Ingram in the District Court at Rotorua on 18 August 2015 following a Judge-alone trial.1

Facts

[2]      The allegation against Ms Jackson was that she assaulted another woman using keys as a weapon.  The two had been in a romantic relationship and had just broken up.

[3]      The victim said that during a tussle she was on the ground with Ms Jackson on top of her. The victim said that Ms Jackson had the keys and used them to scratch the victim.  The victim held her arms up defensively and ended up with wounds to her forearms and to the part of her face which she was unable to shield.  Ms Jackson, to the contrary, said that the victim was the aggressor and that her injuries were either self-inflicted or caused by contact with the ground.

District Court

[4]      The Judge was influenced by an independent witness who saw part of the fight.  He had seen the victim shortly before the fight and gave evidence that she was unmarked.  He saw the victim immediately after the fight and noted the cuts on both forearms, which were bleeding, and an injury to her forehead.

[5]     The Judge was also influenced by photographs of the injuries.   These photographs were referred to by the independent witness who confirmed that they were the injuries he had noted immediately after the fight.

[6]      The Judge rejected the evidence of Ms Jackson but directed himself correctly that he must still consider the evidence brought by the prosecution to see whether it proved the essential elements of the case to the required standard.  His Honour held

that the prosecution evidence did that.

1      Police v Jackson [2015] NZDC 17989.

Appeal

[7]      Ms Jackson filed her notice of appeal herself.  She gives the grounds of her appeal as:

(a)       Failure by her lawyer to interview witnesses.

(b)      That the complainant has a history of self-harm.

[8]      Mr Te Are appears today on behalf of Ms Jackson.  He has done his best to investigate the grounds of appeal to see whether they could be progressed before this Court.  The point is that the grounds raised by Ms Jackson are not normal appeal grounds in that they do not criticise anything that the trial Judge did.  In order for me to  take  into  account  the  grounds  raised  by Ms  Jackson,  I would  have  to  have compelling affidavit evidence that would lead me to conclude that there is a real risk of a miscarriage of justice if the conviction stands.

[9]      There are no such affidavits.  Mr Te Are’s advice is that his investigation in relation  to  possible  further  witnesses  elicited  responses  against  Ms  Jackson’s position.

[10]     So far as the history of self-harm is concerned, under a waiver of privilege an affidavit from the lawyer who represented Ms Jackson at the trial has been obtained. In this affidavit, which was sworn on 14 October 2015, the lawyer deposes that he has no recall of being instructed to question the victim about her mental health history.  There is no note on his file to that effect and he is not sure that he would have acted on any such instructions in any event because of admissibility issues. The lawyer deposes that the defence that he was instructed to pursue, and which he did pursue, was that the victim’s injuries were self-inflicted and that Ms Jackson did not strike the victim as alleged.

Decision

[11]     This appeal must fail. There is no error on the part of Judge Ingram. There is nothing before me which raises any possibility that, due to matters not before Judge Ingram, a miscarriage of justice might have occurred.

[12]     The appeal is dismissed.

Brewer J