Ives v Accident Compensation Corporation - [2012] NZHC 3442

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2012-404-004977 [2012] NZHC 3442

BETWEEN CHRISTINE IVES Appellant

ANDACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent

Hearing: 5 December 2012

Appearances: H Peart for Appellant
D Tuiqereqere and E Bergin for Respondent

Judgment: 17 December 2012

JUDGMENT OF VENNING J

This judgment was delivered by me on 17 December 2012 at 2.30 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the
High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

Solicitors: Schmidt & Peart Law, Auckland
Medico Law Limited, Auckland

IVES V ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION HC AK CIV-2012-404-004977 [17 December 2012]

Introduction

[1] Ms Ives appeals to this Court from a decision of the District Court on the following question of law:

Whether under the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act
1992 (the 1992 Act) a mental injury within the terms of s 4(1) of that Act can stand as a personal injury in its own right and thus take for entitlement
purposes a different date of injury from that of the causative physical injury?1

Background

[2] I take the background largely, but not exclusively, from the summary of

Judge Beattie and his factual findings in the decision under appeal:2

On 31 July 1990 the appellant, then aged 35 years, suffered an injury to her

neck and back in a motor accident when her car was struck by another car.

The appellant consulted her GP in relation to pain she experienced in her neck and her back. The GP identified the injury and associated pain as a consequence of the accident. The appellant undertook treatment by way of
physiotherapy.

In November 1991 the appellant lodged a formal claim in relation to the injuries she had suffered in the accident. The injuries were identified as neck and spinal whiplash. The appellant received cover under the Accident
Compensation Act 1982 (the 1982 Act) for the injuries.

As the appellant was not working at the time of the accident she was not entitled to weekly compensation. However, from 18 April 1993 onwards the
appellant was employed as a loans officer with Countrywide Bank.

1 Leave was granted by District Court in Ives v Accident Compensation Corporation [2012] NZACC 261 (Judge Roderick Joyce QC).
2 Ives v Accident Compensation Corporation [2011] NZACC 48.

Save for medical reports from Mr A N M McAuslan, orthopaedic surgeon, in April 1992 and Mr Colin Hooker, orthopaedic surgeon, in December 1993, the appellant’s ACC file was effectively dormant until April 1997, when a
claim for treatment expenses was made in relation to her covered injuries.

On 2 September 1997 the appellant’s GP, Dr Corbett, issued an ARC 18 medical certificate, identifying that the appellant was unfit for work consequent upon her back strain injuries and that she would be unfit for a
three month period.

Dr Corbett also referred the appellant to Dr Berke, a consultant psychiatrist for assessment of depression and panic attacks. On 3 September 1997 Dr Berke confirmed a diagnosis of:

Axis I 1. Dysthymic disorder

2. Adjustment Disorder with depressed mood

Axis II…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2012] NZHC 3442
Decision Date: 17 December 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ives v Accident Compensation Corporation, the High Court of New Zealand was tasked with determining whether a mental injury, which arose as a consequence of a physical injury, could be considered a separate personal injury under the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. The appellant, Ms. Ives, had suffered a neck and back injury in a motor accident in 1990. She subsequently developed a mental injury in 1997, which she argued entitled her to weekly compensation under the 1992 Act. The District Court had previously dismissed her appeal, holding that the mental injury did not constitute a separate personal injury for the purposes of the Act.

The central legal issue was whether the mental injury could be treated as a distinct personal injury, separate from the physical injury sustained in 1990, thus allowing Ms. Ives to claim weekly compensation from the date of the mental injury diagnosis in 1997. The Court examined the definitions of "personal injury" and "mental injury" within the 1992 Act and considered whether the mental injury could be seen as an outcome of the physical injury, thus entitling her to compensation from the date of the mental injury.

The Court found that the mental injury could indeed be considered a separate personal injury under the Act, provided it met the statutory criteria. The definition of personal injury in s 4 of the 1992 Act includes "any mental injury suffered by that person which is an outcome of those physical injuries". The Court concluded that if the mental injury was a significant behavioural, psychological, or cognitive dysfunction resulting from the physical injuries and occurred while Ms. Ives was employed, she would be entitled to weekly compensation from the date of the mental injury. This interpretation aligns with the purpose of the weekly compensation provisions, which aim to support those incapacitated by personal injuries.

The Court's decision allows for flexibility in determining the date of injury for mental injuries arising from physical injuries, provided all statutory conditions are met. This ruling provides clarity for claimants who develop mental injuries as a consequence of earlier physical injuries, potentially entitling them to compensation from the date the mental injury is diagnosed, rather than the date of the initial physical injury.

Orders