Isabella Niki-Harper Ahlawat v The King

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

 SC 136/2022
 [2023] NZSC 28
BETWEEN

ISABELLA NIKI-HARPER AHLAWAT
Applicant

AND

THE KING
Respondent

Court:

Glazebrook, O’Regan and Kós JJ

Counsel:

S N B Wimsett for Applicant
N J Wynne for Respondent

Judgment:

5 April 2023

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. The applicant incited Stephen Ewart to set fire to a residential flat from which her mother had been evicted.  Mr Ewart was intellectually impaired.  The plan miscarried and Mr Ewart’s clothing caught fire.  He died at the scene.  The applicant was convicted of manslaughter and arson causing danger to life.  She was sentenced to eight years and three months’ imprisonment.[1]  An appeal against conviction was filed.

  2. At trial, the applicant’s name had been suppressed for fair trial reasons because she was still to be tried on an unrelated charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice.  That arose from a complaint made by her against Mr A.  Mr Ewart had made a statement to the police in support of the complaint against Mr A.  Mr A was charged with indecent assault, but the charge was later dismissed when it was established he could not have been present at the time and place alleged.  The perversion charge against the applicant was withdrawn after she was sentenced on the manslaughter and arson charges.

  3. Once the perversion charge was withdrawn the question arose whether name suppression should continue.  Continuation was sought on two grounds: (1) that the applicant was suffering post-traumatic stress (so that disclosure would cause extreme hardship) and (2) the protection of fair trial rights at retrial should her appeal succeed.  In the High Court, Venning J declined to continue suppression.[2]  He held that the former claim was not made out, the latter was speculative and remote, and the interests of open justice should prevail.  The applicant was however granted interim suppression while appealing to the Court of Appeal. 

  4. On appeal, the first ground was abandoned, the second was renewed and a third was now advanced: (3) that the applicant was also entitled to suppression under s 203 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 because she was a complainant in the now-dismissed indecency charge against Mr A.[3]  That section provided automatically for the suppression of a complainant’s name in the case of such a charge — although a court could make an order otherwise under s 203(3)(b).  At trial the Crown had led evidence of Mr Ewart’s statement on the basis that its demonstrable falsity was propensity evidence of a tendency by the applicant to exploit Mr Ewart to commit offences for her. 

    [3]Ahlawat v R [2022] NZCA 615 (Miller, Collins and Palmer JJ).

  5. The Court of Appeal dismissed the second ground for the same reasons as Venning J had.[4]  As to the new, third ground, it…

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Details
Case
[2023] NZSC 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand was presented with an application for leave to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Isabella Niki-Harper Ahlawat v The King. The applicant was convicted of manslaughter and arson causing danger to life and was sentenced to eight years and three months' imprisonment. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeal had erred in declining to suppress the applicant’s name and details relating to a dismissed sexual assault complaint under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The applicant argued that the suppression of her identity as a sexual assault complainant should extend to her name in relation to the manslaughter and arson convictions.

The Supreme Court assessed whether the proposed appeal involved issues of significant public importance, as required under section 74(2)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 2016. The Court noted that the circumstances of the case were highly unusual, and any decision would reflect the particularities of the facts rather than broader public issues. The Court also considered that the public domain had already been informed of the general details of the sexual assault complaint, explicitly linking it to the manslaughter and arson charges. Therefore, suppressing the evidence while publishing the applicant’s name would be futile. The Court concluded that the Court of Appeal had exercised its discretion under section 203(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the prospects of the applicant successfully arguing that the Court of Appeal made an error of law or principle were insufficient to justify the grant of leave. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances of the serious offending required publication of the offender’s name and that there was no risk of a miscarriage of justice if leave to appeal was declined.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the issues raised did not meet the criteria of significant public importance. The Court held that the Court of Appeal had appropriately exercised its discretion under section 203(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the circumstances of the case did not warrant a broad suppression order. The applicant’s name would not be suppressed in relation to the manslaughter and arson convictions.

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