Hudson v R

Case [2011] NZSC 51


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 100/2010
[2011] NZSC 51

STEPHEN THOMAS HUDSON

v

THE QUEEN

Hearing:         7 April 2011

Court:             Elias CJ, Blanchard, McGrath, William Young and Anderson JJ

Counsel:         G J King and C J Milnes for Appellant
M D Downs for Crown

Judgment:      19 May 2011

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal is dismissed.

REASONS

(Given by William Young J)

Table of Contents

Para No

Introduction  [1]
An overview of the case  [3]
The alleged prison admissions  [17]

Section 122 of the Evidence Act 2006  [17]
The evidence in question  [18]
Some preliminary comments  [26]
The Judge’s directions  [28]
What happened in the Court of Appeal  [30]
The appellant’s argument in this Court  [32]
Our evaluation: overview  [33]
Exclusion?  [35]
Stronger directions?  [39]

The propensity evidence  [45]

Section 43 of the Evidence Act  [45]
The approach taken by Ronald Young J  [46]
The admissibility of the evidence  [53]
The Judge’s directions  [60]

Disposition  [65]

Introduction

  1. Nicholas Pike was last seen alive in March 2002.  He was then 21.  His body has never been found.  The police did not inquire actively into his disappearance for some months, and their inquiries, once commenced, did not initially produce sufficient evidence to justify the laying of a charge.  But significant new evidence came to light in March 2007 and this prompted further investigative activity which culminated in March 2008 when the police charged the appellant with Mr Pike’s murder.  The appellant was tried in the High Court before Ronald Young J and a jury in October and November 2009, found guilty and later sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 16 years.[1]  His appeal to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed[2] and he now appeals to this Court against the dismissal of his conviction appeal.

    [1]      R v Hudson HC Palmerston North CRI-2008-078-372, 4 February 2010.

  2. This appeal turns on the admissibility of, and the Judge’s directions as to:

    (a)admissions allegedly made by the appellant to other prison inmates (“the prison admissions”); and 

    (b)propensity evidence associated with prior violent behaviour by the appellant.

An overview of the case

  1. In late 2001, the appellant was involved in two extremely violent assaults. This was the violent behaviour which was relied on by the Crown as providing evidence of propensity, which we will discuss later in the judgment.  As well, the two assaults provide a convenient starting point for discussion of the events which led to the disappearance of Mr Pike.

  2. The first of these incidents involved a Mr Cook and occurred in the early hours of 25 November 2001.  The appellant had a grudge against Mr Cook because of the latter’s involvement with the appellant’s girlfriend, Ms S.  The appellant arranged for Mr Cook to be lured to a country location.  When he arrived, the appellant and another man assaulted him and in the…

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Details
AGLC
Hudson v R [2011] NZSC 51
Case
[2011] NZSC 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hudson v R concerned the admissibility and reliability of witness evidence in a criminal trial. The appellant, Hudson, was on trial for murder, and several witnesses testified to statements he made while in prison. The trial judge gave a warning to the jury about the potential unreliability of the evidence, under section 122 of the Evidence Act. The central issue before the court was whether the trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in issuing the warning, and if the warning was appropriate given the circumstances of the case.

The court examined whether the judge had correctly applied section 122 of the Evidence Act, which allows the judge to warn the jury about unreliable evidence, particularly when a witness may have a motive to give false evidence. The court noted that the judge was not bound to give a warning even if requested by a party, if it might unnecessarily emphasise the evidence or for other good reasons. The court had to determine if the judge appropriately considered the evidence and exercised his discretion correctly.

The court found that the judge had correctly issued the warning under section 122. The evidence of two witnesses was questionable and lacked plausibility, while the other five witnesses came forward as a result of police canvassing, which could have influenced their accounts. The judge had reasons to believe the evidence could be unreliable and appropriately warned the jury about the need for caution. The court held that the judge exercised his discretion properly and the warning was justified.

The court affirmed the decision of the trial judge and dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. The warning given to the jury about the unreliable nature of the evidence was appropriate and correctly issued under section 122 of the Evidence Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The section of the Evidence Act which is primarily relevant to this aspect of the case is s 122 which provides:122 Judicial directions about evidence which may be unreliable(1)If, in a criminal proceeding tried with a jury, the Judge is of the opinion that any evidence given in that proceeding that is admissible may nevertheless be unreliable, the Judge may warn the jury of the need for caution in deciding— (a) whether to accept the evidence:(b) the weight to be given to the evidence.(2) In a criminal proceeding tried with a jury the Judge must consider whether to give a warning under subsection (1) whenever the following evidence is given: ...(c) evidence given by a witness who may have a motive to give false evidence that is prejudicial to a defendant:(d) evidence of a statement by the defendant to another person made while both the defendant and the other person were detained in prison, a police station, or another place of detention:...(3) In a criminal proceeding tried with a jury, a party may request the Judge to give a warning under subsection (1) but the Judge need not comply with that request— (a) if the Judge is of the opinion that to do so might unnecessarily emphasise evidence; or(b) if the Judge is of the opinion that there is any other good reason not to comply with the request.(4) It is not necessary for a Judge to use a particular form of words in giving the warning....(6) This section does not affect any other power of the Judge to warn or inform the jury. The Crown called seven witnesses who had been in prison with the appellant to give evidence of admissions allegedly made by the appellant. Two of these witnesses (A and B) approached the police independently after the March 2007 publicity. The other five came forward as a result of the canvassing exercise we have mentioned. The evidence of one of these witnesses lacked plausibility in that management arrangements in place in Paremoremo Prison at the time he and the appellant were both there were, at least apparently, inconsistent with his account of how he and the appellant met and were able to speak together. In the end, the Crown prosecutor did not place reliance on his evidence and the Judge effectively directed the jury to put it on one side. For this reason we will not review his evidence. A gave evidence of a discussion he claimed to have had with the appellant when they were both in the same block in Paremoremo Prison. His evidence was relevantly in these terms: Q. What did he say? A. He asked me if I’d ever killed anyone. Q. What did you say? A. And I just, I said no because I haven’t. And it seemed kind of a bizarre question to ask but there you go. He told me that he had and like I said to you before, in jail you hear conversations, you have conversations that 95 per cent of what’s said you take with a grain of salt and you either cho[o]se to believe it or you don’t. Q. So at this time, what did you think about what he was telling you? A. Crap. Q. Did the conversation carry on? A. It carried on. He explained to me that there was a fellow who had, who owed him drug money or had owed him drug money which he then told me was [$]2000. …A. And that he had killed the guy because he wasn’t going to pay it or he had refused to pay it or had just not paid it at all. He told me roughly what had happened in his words, where he’d gone, what he’d done, and again I’m still not really believing a lot of it but am listening, and he explained how he had picked the guy up with a story that he needed some drugs picked up in Tauranga and that he picked him up in Palmy, Palmerston North, and driven through to Tauranga, to the outskirts. He then got the guy out of the guy [sic] and they were going to smoke a joint and he’d clubbed him, pretty much bashed him in the face and knocked him down and then caved his head in.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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