Hopkins v Jackson
[2022] NZHC 2956
•11 November 2022
NOTE: PURSUANT TO S 139 OF THE CARE OF CHILDREN ACT 2004, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B, 11C AND 11D OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION,
PLEASE SEE https://www.justice.govt.nz/family/about/restriction-on- publishingjudgments/
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2022-485-447
[2022] NZHC 2956
BETWEEN HOPKINS
Appellant
AND
JACKSON
Respondent
Hearing: 9 November 2022 Appearances:
E Blincoe for Appellant
N Levy KC, A Esera, and A Jeremich for Respondent S Hughes for Child
Judgment:
11 November 2022
JUDGMENT OF McQUEEN J
[Stay Application]
[1] Ms Jackson1 seeks an urgent partial stay of my decision dated 13 October 2022 directing that the care arrangements in place regarding both parties’ daughter, Kara, revert back to the pre-existing 2:2:3 arrangement (the care order) and that Kara is to attend School A (the school order).2
[2] Ms Jackson is seeking leave to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeal. She seeks to stay the execution of part of the decision pending the outcome of her application for leave to appeal, and, if successful, the appeal itself.
1 The names of the parties in these proceedings have been anonymised pursuant to s 139 of the Care of Children Act 2004.
2 Hopkins v Jackson [2022] NZHC 2649.
HOPKINS v JACKSON [2022] NZHC 2956 [10 November 2022]
[3] The stay is only sought in relation to the school order. Ms Jackson acknowledges that she has no right to appeal the school order, being an order made pursuant to s 46R of the Care of Children Act 2004 (the Act).3 However, the relief Ms Jackson seeks in the Court of Appeal is for both the care and school orders to be referred back to the Family Court for an urgent rehearing of the proceedings, with both parties filing cultural identity evidence.4 In this event, Ms Jackson submits that the Family Court may make a decision that Kara attend a different school, namely School B.
[4] Mr Hopkins opposes the stay application. Mr Hopkins submits that the Court should not grant a stay pending an appeal when the decision sought to be stayed is not the decision under appeal. Further, Mr Hopkins submits that the appeal lacks merit, a stay is not in Kara’s welfare and best interests and that Kara starting school would not render an appeal nugatory and would preserve the appropriate status quo.
Relevant law
[5]Rule 12 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 provides that:
…
(3)Pending the determination of an application for leave to appeal or an appeal, the court appealed from or the Court may, on an interlocutory application,—
(a)order a stay of the proceeding in which the decision was given or a stay of the execution of the decision; or
(b)grant any interim relief.
(4)An order or a grant under subclause (3) may—
(a)relate to execution of the whole or part of the decision or to a particular form of execution …
[6] The principles relevant to a stay application are well established. The Court must determine the application on the balance of convenience between the parties in
3 Care of Children Act, s 145(1)(a).
4 Pursuant to r 48 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 and r 20.19 of the High Court Rules 2016. Ms Jackson seeks a direction from the Court of Appeal to the Family Court that the cultural identity evidence is to be filed within 14 days so that a hearing can be convened in time for a decision to be issued before the start of the 2023 school year.
order to serve the overall interests of justice.5 The following factors are relevant to this assessment:6
(a)whether the appeal may be rendered nugatory by the lack of a stay;
(b)the bona fides of the applicant as to the prosecution of the appeal;
(c)whether the successful party will be injuriously affected by the stay;
(d)the effect on third parties;
(e)the novelty and importance of questions involved;
(f)the public interest in the proceeding;
(g)the overall balance of convenience; and
(h)the apparent strength of the appeal.
[7] This Court has recently summarised the principles relevant to a stay in the care of children context:7
(a)The overriding consideration is the welfare of the children;
(b)Whether or not the appeal will be rendered nugatory if a stay is refused will be a highly relevant consideration;
(c)The arguments in favour of a stay will be stronger if a decision under appeal has the effect of totally changing the status quo;
5 Philip Morris v Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co [1977] 2 NZLR 41 (CA) at 43 per Cooke J. The Court must balance the competing rights of Mr Hopkins to obtain the benefit of this Court’s judgment in his favour with the need to preserve Ms Jackson’s position: see Duncan v Osborne Building Ltd (1992) 6 PRNZ 85 (CA) at 87.
6 Keung v GBR Investment Ltd [2010] NZCA 396 at [11]; and Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bilgola Enterprises Ltd (1999) 13 PRNZ 48 (HC) at [9].
7 Lee v Lee [2020] NZHC 2662 at [10], citing CAM v SRM [2012] NZHC 3519 at [11].
(d)The Court will have regard to any evidence of lack of bona fides in the filing of an appeal and the application for stay as a consequence;
(e)Each case will turn on its facts. The length of time before the appeal is likely to be heard, the current circumstances of the parties and the children, and the consequences of delay pending the hearing of the appeal will be relevant.
Discussion
[8] I consider the most important factors to consider in this application to be the welfare and best interests of Kara, the merits of the appeal, whether the appeal will be rendered nugatory, and the preservation of the status quo in light of the likely timeframe for the dispute between the parties to be resolved.
Kara’s welfare and best interests
[9] If the stay is not granted, Kara will start at School A on 21 November 2022, four weeks before the school year ends. Counsel for Ms Jackson, Ms Levy KC, submits that in the event of both a successful leave application and a successful appeal granting the relief sought, it is not in Kara’s best interest to start at School A when there is the potential that the Family Court, upon rehearing the proceedings, reaches a different view as to the school she should attend. Ms Levy submits that there has already been disruption to Kara, namely that she has attended two pre-enrolment sessions at one school and now understands that she is to attend another school. Ms Levy submits that it will be easier for Kara to grasp the concept that the issue as to what school she attends has not yet been resolved, but she will go to school some time in the new year.
[10] Ms Levy submits the delay in starting school is minimal in the circumstances. Kara would be missing four weeks of school. It appears from her affidavit in support of the stay application that Ms Jackson is optimistic that the application for leave to appeal, and any subsequent appeal, will be heard urgently by the Court of Appeal such that the Family Court may rehear the proceedings by early next year. Ms Levy acknowledges, however, that there is the potential that any Family Court proceeding
is not complete by February 2023, when the new school year starts. Ms Levy notes that there is no legal requirement for Kara to attend school until she is six, namely, by October next year, and submits that any delay is unlikely to have a long-lasting impact on Kara’s schooling career. Ms Levy also raised at the hearing of this application that another possibility was for this Court to order a stay until late January, with the parties to return to Court at that point for a reasse ssment of the position.
[11] Counsel for Mr Hopkins, Ms Blincoe, submits that it is unrealistic to consider that the leave application, any substantive appeal and the rehearing sought will all have been heard and decided prior to the commencement of the new school year early in February 2023. The Court of Appeal finishes sitting for the year on 1 December 2022. It is unlikely that both the application for leave and the substantive appeal would be heard before Christmas, let alone a rehearing in the Family Court before early February 2023.
[12] Mr Hopkins’ affidavit records that Kara is enthusiastic about starting school and, in particular, is desperate to learn how to read. He is concerned that keeping Kara out of school when she has been looking forward to it may change her view about starting school and diminish her excitement. Mr Hopkins’ view is that starting school is more important than the school Kara ultimately attends and he believes that Kara would be able to cope with any change in school should that arise. He considers that it would be more harmful for her not to start school when she has been expecting to do so and is looking forward to it. Ms Blincoe submits that no particular difficulty has been identified by Ms Jackson that might result from a change of school for Kara, should that eventuate.
[13] Counsel for Kara, Ms Hughes, raises concerns about the level of disruption that Kara has experienced over the past few months, noting that this is inevitable in circumstances where parents cannot resolve issues and court intervention is necessary. Ms Hughes submits that Kara not attending either school until a final decision has been made has some benefit to her. Ms Hughes submits that from Kara’s perspective, the key issue is the timeliness of a decision as to the school Kara is to attend. She draws a distinction between a three or four week period at the end of the school year and the potentially longer period which means it could be “well into 2023” by the time
this matter is resolved. Ms Hughes does not favour a delay beyond the end of this year in Kara starting school.
[14] I accept that Kara would not be significantly affected by missing four weeks of school at the end of the school year, when classes are winding down before Christmas. In any case, as Ms Hughes notes, minimising any disruption that Kara may experience as a result of the continuation of these proceedings is important.
[15] However, there is a concern as to the impact on Kara of a stay that continues into 2023. No information is available to me as to when a substantive appeal before the Court of Appeal could be heard or when the Family Court might be able to hear any referral by the Court of Appeal to it of applications for parenting and guardianship orders. I observe that even if the Family Court was to reconsider matters as Ms Jackson seeks, given the conflict between the parties, the unsuccessful party in the Family Court may seek to exercise their appeal rights.
[16] While Kara is not legally required to start school until she turns six, the affidavit provided by Mr Hopkins indicates that she is enthusiastic about starting school. While I do not consider a four-week delay likely to mitigate Kara’s enthusiasm in the new year, I am conscious that she does want to start school, has expected to start school since she turned five almost a month ago, and any further delay preventing her from starting school at the start of the new school year may have a negative impact on her. Revisiting a stay in late January as proposed by Ms Levy, and leaving Kara in a state of uncertainty as to what, if any, school she will be attending until very close to the start of the school year is, in my view, unsatisfactory.8 I note that ensuring decisions affecting Kara are made and implemented within a time frame that is appropriate to her sense of time is a principle I must take into account when assessing her welfare and best interests.9
8 See Lee v Lee, above n 7, at [20] where this Court observed: “it is in the children’s best interests they understand what decisions are being made for them and why, and have time to digest, and prepare for the implementation of those decisions. A last minute reversal of a decision that they have been prepared for and excited about does not do this.”
9 Care of Children Act, s 4(2)(a)(i).
Strength of the appeal
[17] Minimising the level of disruption experienced by Kara is the focus of the stay application. In this context, I consider it is next necessary for me to consider the strength of Ms Jackson’s proposed appeal—that is, the likelihood of the High Court decision being overturned by the Court of Appeal and the disruption therefore arising.
[18] Ms Jackson seeks to appeal my decision on the basis that there was a breach of natural justice. It is submitted that Mr Hopkins’ submissions to this Court contained evidence, and that this should not have been allowed without Mr Hopkins seeking leave, and if leave was granted, without the opportunity for Ms Jackson to cross- examine or give evidence in reply.
[19] In her affidavit, Ms Jackson notes that her two sons are also Māori and that if she had known that new information from Mr Hopkins would have been allowed and given serious consideration, she would have come to Court herself to give evidence about Kara’s cultural identity. Ms Levy also referred me to the psychologist’s report provided to the Family Court that records that Mr Hopkins is Māori, noting the Family Court Judge was therefore aware of this fact.10
[20] In response to a question from me, Ms Levy indicated that if this matter is referred back to the Family Court Ms Jackson may provide the Family Court with evidence about tikanga relating to whanaungatanga that would favour Kara going to School B. I understand the argument to be that attending School B would promote friendships amongst Kara’s local community while the care arrangement the Family Court ordered still allows Kara sufficient time in Mr Hopkins’ care, noting especially that it provides for equal care during the holidays. Underpinning this argument is that whanaungatanga is a broader concept than s 5(f) of the Act.
[21] In light of all these matters, Ms Levy submits that the prospects of Ms Jackson’s proposed appeal succeeding are high.
10 I note that on this basis, Mr Hopkins’ statement at the appeal hearing before me that he and his children are Māori would not constitute new evidence.
[22] On the other hand, Ms Blincoe submits that the appeal is unmeritorious, referring to the high threshold for leave for a second appeal to the Court of Appeal under s 145 of the Act and the Court of Appeal’s recent observation that:11
Leave for a second appeal in proceedings under the Act is not granted lightly. The appeal must raise a question of law or fact capable of bona fide and serious argument.
[23] Ms Blincoe submits that this Court corrected the Family Court Judge’s error in prioritising the locality of the school above the principles contained in s 5 of the Act. Ms Blincoe submits that a breach of natural justice is not a standalone ground of appeal and that, given Kara’s cultural heritage from both sides of the family was before this Court as a result of submissions (and was acknowledged in this Court’s decision), there was no breach of natural justice in any case. Ms Blincoe submits that while whanaungatanga is important and should have been given weight, this is given expression through s 5(e) of the Act.
[24] Ms Blincoe further submits that if there was an error in the treatment of Mr Hopkins’ submissions, the error was immaterial to the decision made by this Court and there is no realistic prospect that cross examination or more detailed cultural identity evidence from Ms Jackson would have affected the outcome of the appeal. Ms Blincoe submits that any new Family Court decision is very likely to stick to an equal care arrangement given the proper application of the s 5 principles.
[25] I do not share Ms Levy’s view as to the prospects of Ms Jackson’s appeal. Mr Hopkins did make broader comments regarding tikanga and his cultural identity before this Court. However, the point I considered material to my decision was the fact that Kara is Māori.12 While I found that Kara’s cultural identity and tikanga did have a bearing on the appropriate care arrangements, I specifically recorded that I did not need to reach a final view on the separate application of tikanga to Kara’s care arrangements for the purposes of my judgment.13 Rather, I preferred to rely on the application of the principles in s 5(d), (e) and (f). In making my decision I also
11 B (CA27/2022) v W [2022] NZCA 99 at [6].
12 Hopkins v Jackson, above n 2, at [68].
13 At [69]–[70].
recognised the aspects of Kara’s cultural identity connected to Ms Jackson and observed that:14
…I do not consider reverting back to the 2:2:3 arrangement negatively impairs Kara’s ability to connect to her family and cultural identity on her mother’s side of the family.
[26] Ultimately my finding was that on the proper application of the principles contained in s 5(d), (e) and (f) of the Act it was in the welfare and best interests of Kara for the parties to revert to the previous 2:2:3 care arrangement.15 I concluded that any benefits in Kara attending School B did not outweigh the resumption of the 2:2:3 arrangement and under this arrangement, given the constraints on Mr Hopkins, it was therefore also in the welfare and best interests of Kara to attend School A. I did not consider that the benefits of attending School B outweighed this position.16
[27] Even putting the matters of cultural identity to the side and relying solely on s 5(d) and (e) (namely, the continuity of Kara’s care and the preserving and strengthening of family relationships) I would have reached the same outcome. I therefore find it difficult to contemplate that additional evidence in relation to cultural identity could advance Ms Jackson’s case before the Family Court in the way she submits. And if the argument is to be that tikanga (whanaungatanga, in this case) supports Kara’s attendance at School B because it would promote friendships at school and in the local community, I continue to find it unpersuasive that this would trump the application of the principles in the Act, particularly the principle relating to strengthening and preserving family relationships.
[28] There is an additional jurisdictional issue. Ms Blincoe submits that, as Ms Jackson has recognised, the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal or application for leave to appeal in relation to the school decision as it is a guardianship order made under s 46R of the Act.17 Ms Blincoe submits that the Court of Appeal therefore does not have the ability to order that both the care order and
14 At n 59. I also recorded at [45] the submission of counsel for Ms Jackson that Kara is a young person of rich cultural heritage, given Mr Hopkins’ Māori heritage and Ms Jackson’s Tahitian/Chinese and Italian descent.
15 At [70] and [80].
16 At [72]–[74] and [80].17 Care of Children Act, s 145(1)(a).
school order be referred back to the Family Court; in other words the relief would be restricted to the care order only. Ms Blincoe submits that an application under s 139A of the Act (seeking leave of the Family Court to commence substantially similar proceedings) is necessary to revisit the school decision. Ms Blincoe submits that the clear policy underpinning these provisions is the desirability of finality, for the parties and in particular for the child.
[29] Ms Blincoe also submits that the stay application subverts the purpose of a stay, which is to avoid the effect of the decision under appeal. As the school decision is not the decision under appeal, Ms Blincoe submits that a decision to stay the school decision is not available to this Court.
[30] Ms Levy recognises that s 145(1)(a) of the Act prevents Ms Jackson from appealing the school decision but argues that r 48 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 permits the Court of Appeal to give any judgment and make any order which ought to have been given or made by this Court (so including the direction to the Family Court), and make any other orders that the case may require, and may do so even although only part of a decision is appealed. Ms Levy says that the Court of Appeal has the broad power to take the necessary steps to achieve an outcome that it finds ought to have been achieved in this Court, notwithstanding the matters the parties choose or can put before it. Ms Levy also flagged that Ms Jackson may also raise a “breach of right so there must be a remedy” Bill of Rights argument in the Court of Appeal.
[31] Ms Levy also submits that because new evidence was considered in the appeal before this Court, her appeal to the Court of Appeal is in effect a first appeal. She argues that this will affect the Court of Appeal’s view as to what its rules permit it to do. Ms Blincoe does not accept that an appeal right can be created when there is a clear statutory provision in relation to jurisdiction. She observes that the High Court has the power to hear new evidence on appeal and when this occurs, no further appeal right results.
[32] I am troubled by this jurisdictional issue. As set out above, I do not accept the merits of an appeal to be particularly strong in any case. However, while r 48 of the
Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules allows the Court to make orders pertaining to parts of a decision that are not appealed from, I question whether the Court has jurisdiction to make such orders where there is a statutory restriction on appealing those matters. Counsel for the parties did not refer me to any authority that suggests the ambit of the Court of Appeal’s role is wider than that and extends to orders that are outside of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to address.18 Nor am I convinced that Ms Levy’s argument that Ms Jackson’s appeal to the Court of Appeal is in effect a first appeal is correct. In the face of the clear statutory direction in s 145(1)(a) of the Act, I do not find Ms Levy’s arguments to circumvent this to be persuasive.
Will the appeal be rendered nugatory?
[33] Ms Levy submits that if Kara starts at School A before the summer holidays, there is a real risk that upon rehearing the proceedings the Family Court will be reluctant to disrupt the new status quo, being Kara’s attendance at School A, and that this may dictate the care arrangement now under appeal. This is said to render the appeal nugatory. Ms Levy also submits that Mr Hopkins achieved the new status quo by unfair means (relying on her argument that there was a breach of natural justice before this Court). Rather, she says that the correct status quo is for Kara not to be at school, pending the resolution of the appeal.
[34] Once again, this requires an awkward interpretation of the ambit of the appeal. The appeal is related to Kara’s care arrangements only. Ms Jackson has not sought a stay of the care arrangements. As Ms Blincoe submits, I find it difficult to see how an order that is not under appeal can render the appeal nugatory.
18 At the hearing, Ms Hughes referred me to ROJ v TEJ [2013] NZCA 323. This was a case where the Court of Appeal concluded that s 145(1)(a) of the Act provided an absolute bar to an appeal where the primary issue before the High Court concerned the relocation of a child. The Court recognised the potential injustice of denying the application for leave to appeal and suggested that Parliament reconsider the limitation on rights of appeal. I observe that recently, in R v J [2021] NZCA 49, the Court of Appeal noted at [12] that Parliament did amend the Care of Children Act in 2013 when it enacted s 46R and amended s 145(1) to refer specifically to s 46R but did not amend the Act as suggested by the Court in ROJ v TEJ. The Court concluded at [17] that the plain and ordinary language of s 145(1)(a) must be honoured and there was no jurisdiction for the Court to give leave to appeal from the High Court’s decision under s 46R. I note that counsel for the parties did not address me on either case.
[35] Even if I am wrong, and the Court of Appeal both considers it open to it to refer the school order back to the Family Court, and does so, I do not accept that the appeal would be rendered nugatory. Kara will not be so settled into routine at School A such that the Family Court would not change this, should it find that justified. Continuity is only one of the principles set out in s 5 of the Act. Children may change schools for a variety of reasons. I accept Mr Hopkins’ view that the school holidays could provide a natural break which would help Kara adjust to any further transition. While it seems extremely unlikely that the entire proceedings as envisaged by Ms Jackson will conclude prior to February 2023, the same logic can be applied to the term holiday between Term 1 and Term 2 which may be a more realistic timeframe.
[36] I do not accept Ms Levy’s argument that the school Kara attends will dictate the care arrangement under appeal. As I discuss above, once I had decided the appropriate care arrangement was a return to the previous 2:2:3 arrangement in light of a proper application of the s 5 principles, the choice of school necessarily followed. It is not apparent to me that the reverse applies. Even if Kara stayed at School A, it seems to me that it would remain open for the Family Court to conclude that a different care arrangement was more appropriate.
Status quo
[37] The status quo concerns have already contributed to the discussion above of whether the appeal will be rendered nugatory, without a stay. As noted earlier, Ms Levy submits that the status quo is best preserved by Kara not starting school at School A, rather, it would be in Kara’s best interests to start school once the Family Court has reconsidered the school order. Ms Levy is also concerned that the school Kara attends will dictate the care arrangement, although I do not accept that to be the case.
[38] In contrast, Ms Blincoe submits that the relevant status quo should be understood as Kara expecting to start school very soon, particularly given she has recently had her fifth birthday.
[39] Ms Hughes submitted that the status quo should be understood as Kara attending day care, however, she has advised the Court that she does not support any delay in Kara starting school beyond this year.
[40] An important status quo for Kara is that she is in the equal care of her parents. This was the position for over two years prior to the Family Court decision, and following my decision, is the position again. While Ms Jackson is seeking to appeal the care decision, she does not seek a stay of it in the interim.
[41] While Kara is currently at day care, I place some weight on her expectation that, having turned five, she will attend school, and that she is looking forward to it.
[42] Given the length of time that it may take for this dispute to resolve, I do not consider that deferring Kara’s attendance at school is an appropriate way to maintain the status quo.
Conclusions
[43] All of the matters I discuss above contribute to my overall conclusions, which I set out below.
[44] I conclude that the prospect of a delay in Kara starting school would be inconsistent with her welfare and best interests. As I have discussed, resolving the dispute between the parties may take considerable time. Counsel for Kara is concerned about any delay in Kara attending school, beyond the last weeks of this year. Kara’s welfare and best interests must be paramount and any decision affecting Kara must be made and implemented within a timeframe that is appropriate to her sense of time.19 While Kara may be able to understand that she is not to start school this year, it may be harder for her to understand that she is not to start school early next year, or know what school she is to attend then.
[45] A stay until late January will achieve little then, as it is certain (assuming leave is granted) that any substantive appeal in the Court of Appeal will not have been heard at that time and therefore neither will any Family Court hearing have occurred, or possible appeals been dealt with.
19 Care of Children Act, s 4.
[46] It is problematic that I am being asked to stay an aspect of this Court’s decision that is not under appeal. The question about the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction in these unusual circumstances poses an additional hurdle to a successful appeal and redirection to the Family Court. However, even putting any jurisdictional issues to the side and accepting Ms Levy’s interpretation of the appeal rights and relief available, I consider that the merits of the appeal are weak.20
[47] I consider that refusing the application for a stay would not render the appeal nugatory. Leaving aside the jurisdictional questions, I consider that it will remain open to the Family Court to consider that a change of school is in the best interests of Kara at the time of any hearing of Ms Jackson’s intended applications, despite her attendance at School A in the meantime. As I have noted, children may be required to change schools, and while there may be a period of adjustment, I believe that Kara would cope if an order was made for her to change schools at that time. I place some weight on Kara’s expectation that she will start school in the near future. It is my view that it is in Kara’s welfare and best interests to start school without delay in the circumstances, and this must be my paramount consideration.
Result
[48] The stay application is dismissed. In all the circumstances, it is in Kara’s welfare and best interests to start school at School A on 21 November 2022.
Postscript: Parenting orders
[49] Counsel for Kara, Ms Hughes, helpfully provided a draft Parenting Order with her submissions. Ms Hughes observes that it may be desirable for the parties to have a single document recording the current position (subject to the intended appeal by Ms Jackson). Counsel will confer amongst themselves about the document. Assuming
20 Ms Jackson also submits that should I find the stay decision finely balanced, I should take into account that Mr Hopkins has obtained advantages in both this Court and the Family Court (at an earlier time, in relation to a without notice parenting order) through not following prescribed Court procedures. As I do not consider this matter to be finely balanced, I do not consider I need to take these matters further. I note that the suggestion that Mr Hopkins failed to provide all relevant information to the Family Court in obtaining the without notice parenting order is disputed by Mr Hopkins.
it is accepted as correct, the parties are agreed that, should it be necessary, a copy may be provided to a school that Kara attends.
McQueen J
Solicitors:
Ord Legal, Wellington for Appellant
Family Law Specialists Ltd, Porirua for Respondent
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