Hook v Callaghan Innovation

[2024] NZHC 3432

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2024-485-000243

[2024] NZHC 3432

UNDER

Senior Courts Act 2016

IN THE MATTER OF

An application for leave to appeal under s 60(2)

BETWEEN

CHRISTOPHER RUSSELL HOOK

Applicant

AND

CALLAGHAN INNOVATION

Respondent

Hearing:

7 November 2024

Counsel:

Applicant in person

C R Langstone for Respondent

Judgment:

18 November 2024

JUDGMENT OF LA HOOD J

(Application for leave to appeal)

[1]                 The applicant, Mr Hook, seeks leave to appeal my decision dated 9 August 2024 dismissing his appeal against the District Court’s decision striking out his negligence claim against Callaghan Innovation (Callaghan).1

[2]                 Mr Hook’s grounds for leave to appeal are largely a reiteration of the substantive arguments he made in the District Court and High Court.

1      Hook v Callaghan Innovation [2024] NZHC 2240 [Substantive judgment]; and Surface Micro- Guard Ltd v Callaghan Innovation [2024] NZDC 7314 [District Court judgment].

HOOK v CALLAGHAN INNOVATION [2024] NZHC 3432 [18 November 2024]

[3]                 Callaghan submits that Mr Hook’s application should be declined, as he has failed to raise any meritorious ground for leave to be granted.

[4]                 I do not intend to repeat the background to these proceedings already set out in my substantive judgment.

Applicable legal principles

[5]                 Although s 60 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 does not prescribe grounds for obtaining leave to appeal, it is well established that an applicant for leave must show that the proposed appeal would raise some question of law or fact capable of bona fide and serious argument in a case involving some interests, public or private, of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of the further appeal. Not every alleged error of law is sufficiently important, either generally or to the parties, to justify further pursuit of litigation already twice considered and ruled upon by a Court.2

Grounds for application

[6]                 Although Mr Hook’s submissions are not particularly clear, it appears he is seeking leave to appeal on the following grounds:

(a)The proceedings against Callaghan are separate from the proceedings concerning Cross Slot IP Ltd (CSIP).

(b)Mr Hook was “denied” his right of recusal of Judge Kelly on the grounds of bias.

(c)The affidavit of Timothy Matheoda, which was submitted in support of Mr Hook and Surface Micro-Guard Ltd’s summary judgment application in the District Court, had 40 exhibits and, therefore, should hold more weight than the affidavit of Stefan Korn made in support of Callaghan’s strike-out application.

2      Matthew Casey and others Sim’s Court Practice (online ed, LexisNexis) at [60.6], citing Cuff v Broadlands Finance Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 343 (CA) at 346–347; Snee v Snee (1999) 13 PRNZ 609 (CA) at [15]; and Waller v Hider [1998] 1 NZLR 412 (CA) at 413.

(d)Counsel for Callaghan made various “erroneous and misleading” statements that “unduly influenced” Judge Kelly.

(e)Callaghan generally operated in bad faith with Mr Hook.

Decision

[7]                 I accept Callaghan’s submission that Mr Hook has not satisfied the criteria for granting leave for a second appeal. Mr Hook’s submissions essentially restate the allegations he has made throughout the proceedings, which I considered misapprehend the law of negligence and were bound to fail. He has raised nothing on this application that persuades me to reach a contrary view.

[8]                 I therefore conclude Mr Hook has not raised a question of law or fact capable of bona fide and serious argument involving some interest of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of a further appeal.

[9]The application for leave to appeal is declined.

Costs

[10]             I have ordered indemnity costs for the substantive High Court appeal on the basis that: the claim was hopeless and was being used to circumvent orders restraining Mr Hook from advancing related proceedings; Mr Hook filed material essentially aimed at relitigating the proceedings he was restrained from progressing; and he made unfounded claims of judicial bias.3 Callaghan now seeks indemnity costs on the application for leave to appeal. I consider Callaghan should be entitled to reasonable indemnity costs on the application for leave to appeal on the basis that it was hopeless and a further attempt to progress a claim being used to circumvent orders restraining Mr Hook from advancing related proceedings.

[11]             I consider Callaghan’s claim for actual costs in  the  sum  of  $9,655.50  (GST exclusive) requires some reduction for the same reasons set out in my costs decision for the appeal (noting that scale costs would be $5,616.50).

3      Hook v Callaghan Innovation [2024] NZHC 3430 (Costs judgment).

[12]I therefore order Mr Hook to pay indemnity costs in the sum of $8,000.00.

La Hood J

Solicitors:
Fee Langstone, Auckland for Respondent