HHP Society Incorporated v Aiqiong

[2025] NZHC 921

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2023-404-001898

[2025] NZHC 921

BETWEEN

HHP SOCIETY INCORPORATED

Plaintiff

AND

WANG AIQIONG

First Defendant

HU WENBIN

Second Defendant

Hearing:	On the papers
Appearances:	D J Pine / H Sutcliffe for the Plaintiff D K Wilson for the Defendants
Judgment:	15 April 2025

COSTS JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE COGSWELL

This judgment was delivered by me on 15 April 2025 at 3.30 p.m. pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date.......................................

Solicitors:

Clendon Webb, Auckland Henry Feng Lawyer, Auckland

D J Pine/H Sutcliffe, Auckland D K Wilson, Auckland

HHP SOCIETY INC v WANG [2025] NZHC 921 [15 April 2025]

[1]    On 11 February 2025 I granted summary judgment to the plaintiff against the first and second defendants and held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs. The judgment made final interim injunction orders previously granted by the Court.

[2]    The parties were invited to liaise regarding costs and, if unable to agree, to file memoranda which the Court would determine on the papers. They cannot agree.

[3]    The plaintiff seeks a 50 per cent uplift on 2B scale costs against the defendants under r 14.6. The defendants resist an uplift at all, or, if one is granted, seek to restrict it just to steps taken in opposition to the summary judgment hearing on the grounds that the interim injunction was granted without opposition.

[4]    As relevant to this application, the starting point is that generally in relation to the determination of costs:

(a)the party who fails with respect to a proceeding or an interlocutory application should pay costs to the party who succeeds;

(b)an award of costs should reflect the complexity and significance of the proceeding;

(c)costs should be assessed by applying the appropriate daily recovery rate to the time considered reasonable for each step reasonably required, in relation to the proceeding or interlocutory application;

(d)an award of costs should not exceed the costs incurred by the party claiming the costs, and

(e)so far as possible, the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.

[5]    At the end of the day, the determination of costs is an exercise of the Court’s discretion. That said, the discretion is not unfettered and has to be exercised judicially.

[6]    I approach the assessment of costs in this matter with two key principles in mind:

(a)the unsuccessful party to the litigation should pay costs to the successful party; and

(b)if possible, the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.

[7]    In the present case, the successful plaintiff seeks a 50 per cent uplift on      2B scale costs against the defendants. They point to earlier correspondence issued to the defendants following the Court’s granting of an interim injunction, where the plaintiff invited the defendants to agree on the interim orders being made final without the full need for a hearing. That invitation was not taken up by the defendants, and the plaintiff says that it supports argument that increased costs should be granted.

[8]    The plaintiff also notes that the defendants took an “unnecessary step” in defending the summary judgment application in the way that they did. The plaintiff criticises the defendants for defending the summary judgment application solely in reliance on the clean hands doctrine. The Court held that there was no credible evidence of the plaintiff’s involvement in the alleged criminal acts.

[9]    The defendants say that the fact that the Court ruled against that defence does not mean that it lacked merit and certainly does not warrant the imposition of increased costs.

[10]   The Court has noted in an earlier costs decision that it is becoming increasingly common for there to be applications to depart from the standard award of costs determined under Part 14 of the Rules. The Court has noted that this is a practice that should be discouraged unless there is a clear basis for such departure in accordance with the rules. Such cases are expected to involve costs calculated on a 2B basis. This would be in keeping with the principled approach that costs should be predictable.

[11]   The defendants were not represented at the hearing when the initial interim injunction order was made. They opposed the entry of summary judgment on grounds which they considered had merit, although the Court ultimately found that they had no arguable defence to the application. That does not mean that their decision to oppose the summary judgment application should visit upon them increased costs orders.

[12]   The defendants make the following points in opposition to the plaintiff’s claim for increased costs:

(a)the settlement offer was not a settlement offer in substance; rather, it was a requirement that the defendants accede to the entirety of the plaintiff’s claim, including full costs;

(b)the defendant’s advanced opposition did not lack merit, it was just not accepted by the Court;

(c)the amount of costs claimed is a substantial and generous sum for a proceeding that only had one contested issue and occupied an extremely short amount of Court time.

[13]   Standing back and looking at the proceedings as a whole, I consider that the plaintiffs have not made out grounds for the imposition of increased costs. The defendants opposed the entry of summary judgment with a focused argument, but one that was not accepted by the Court. The hearing was conducted efficiently by both parties. There were no unnecessary steps required as a result of the defendants’ conduct of their defence.

[14]   The plaintiff is entitled to costs on a 2B scale as set out in the annexure to its memorandum. I decline the application for increased costs by the plaintiff.

[15]   I have considered whether the plaintiff should recover for the costs of preparing submissions for the interim injunction hearing, but note that the plaintiff filed a fulsome memorandum in support of its application which assisted the Court.

[16]    The defendants take issue with the plaintiff’s claim for preparation of the bundle for the interim injunction hearing (item 25). They say that a bundle is a collection of pleadings, evidence and similar documents, and not, as here, a bundle of authorities. I agree. I have allowed the plaintiff 1.5 days for the preparation of submissions for the interim injunction hearing, I disallow the claim for the separate collation of the supporting authorities.

[17]   Accordingly, I award costs in accordance with the plaintiff’s calculation of 2B costs in its memorandum, with the exception that item 25 is disallowed.

[18]The disbursements claimed are awarded.

Associate Judge Cogswell