Hewitson v The King
[2025] NZHC 3374
•7 November 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CRI-2025-485-000061
[2025] NZHC 3374
BETWEEN ROWAN DAVID HARRIE HEWITSON
Appellant
AND
THE KING
Respondent
Hearing: 29 October 2025 Counsel:
M J Dyhrberg KC and J N Olsen for Appellant N L Jamieson for Respondent
Judgment:
7 November 2025
JUDGMENT OF LA HOOD J
(Appeal against sentence)
[1] Mr Hewitson appeals his sentence of 10 months’ home detention and 200 hours’ community work,1 after entering guilty pleas, following a sentence indication,2 to charges of importing ketamine3 and MDMA,4 supplying5 and offering to supply LSD,6 possessing MDMA for supply7 and failing to comply with a search obligation.8
[2]He appeals the sentence on the ground that it was not the least restrictive
outcome appropriate in the circumstances and that greater reductions should have
1 R v Hewitson [2025] NZDC 18005 [Decision under appeal].
2 R v Hewitson DC Wellington CRI-2023-085-2821, 11 April 2025.
3 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(a) and (2)(c); maximum penalty eight years’ imprisonment.
4 Section 6(1)(a) and (2)(c); maximum penalty 14 years’ imprisonment.
5 Section 6(1)(c) and (2)(a); maximum penalty life imprisonment.
6 Section 6(1)(c) and (2)(a); maximum penalty life imprisonment.
7 Section 6(1)(f) and (2)(a); maximum penalty 14 years’ imprisonment.
8 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 178 maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment.
HEWITSON v R [2025] NZHC 3374 [7 November 2025]
been made for personal mitigating factors. He seeks a sentence of a combination of community detention, community work and intensive supervision.
The offending
[3]I gratefully adopt the sentencing Judge’s summary of the offending:9
[4] At the time of this offending, you were aged between 18 and 19 years old.
[5] You were living between your parent’s addresses in Wilton and Waikanae.
[6] In relation to the ketamine offending between June 2022 and November 2023 you imported 37 packages containing the class C controlled drug ketamine through the postal system. The total amount of ketamine imported was 13.603 kilograms.
[7] Twenty of the 37 packages containing ketamine were intercepted by police or Customs. Each package contained between 252 to 510 grams of ketamine.
[8] Following the seizure of these packages police and Customs conducted a review of similar consignments and identified a further 16 importations of ketamine by you.
[9] These 16 importations were linked to you either by the same or similar consigner details including country of origin United Kingdom, product declaration, weight and value, as well as consignee details including names and addresses that were in close proximity to your home address. The quantities of ketamine contained in these non-intercepted packages were between 100 and 500 grams.
[10] It is estimated that if you sold the ketamine by the gram the total value of the 13.603 kilograms of ketamine imported was between approximately
$2.2 million and $5.8 million. If sold in ounce quantities the total value was between approximately $480,000 and $2.5 million.
[11] In relation to the importing of MDMA on or about 23 March 2023 and 22 June 2023 you imported two packages containing MDMA both of which were intercepted. The first package contained 248.6 grams of MDMA, and the second package contained 249.3 grams of MDMA.
[12] The total quantity of MDMA imported was 497.9 grams. If sold by the gram this would equate to a street value of approximately $149,370.
[13] In relation to the supply of LSD on 8 December 2023 an unknown person contacted you on the encrypted messaging platform Signal asking to purchase LSD. You agreed and you settled on $1,500 for two sheets being 200 tabs of LSD.
9 Decision under appeal, above n 1.
[14] At 6.10 pm that day you met with the unknown person at an address in Strathmore Park and supplied 200 LSD tabs.
[15] In relation to the offering to supply to LSD on 12 December 2023 the unknown person again contacted you requesting to purchase 1,000 LSD tabs.
[16] On 13 December 2023 you agreed to sell this amount to an unknown person for $5,750 and advised him you could deliver at any time that day. The unknown person asked you to deliver the product to him in Lyall Bay the same morning.
[17] On the morning of 13 December 2023 police executed a search warrant at your home address. You were arrested at 9.35 am and accordingly the sale of LSD could not be completed.
[18] In relation to the possession for supply of MDMA upon search of your bedroom at the Waikanae address police located three ziplock bags in a bedside table containing a total of 4.3 grams of MDMA.
[19] In relation to the failing to assist in relation to a computer search, after being placed under arrest you were required by police to provide access to information including passwords and PIN numbers to assist police with accessing your electronic devices that were being seized pursuant to the search warrant, namely your cellphones and computers. You refused to provide this information to the police.
[20] A total of $51,990 cash was located and seized from within your bedroom.
[21] A further $21,170 cash was seized from the basement at your Wilton address.
[22] Your phone was seized and examined pursuant to the search warrant. Analysis of your phone shows that you were a member of several encrypted messaging groups identified for the sale and supply of illicit drugs in the Wellington area.
[23] You regularly posted advertisements in the groups advertising 24/7 drop offs of MDMA and ketamine in the Wellington area.
Sentencing decision
[4] In the sentencing indication decision, the Judge identified the ketamine offending as being at the upper end of band two, or on the cusp of bands two and three, of Terewi, warranting a starting point of four years’ imprisonment.10 The Judge adopted a six-month uplift for the MDMA offending and a 12-month uplift for the
10 R v Hewitson, above n 2, at [51]; R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62 (CA); and McCaslin-Whitehead v R [2023] NZCA 529.
LSD offending.11 The Judge was satisfied that the overall starting point of five years and six months’ imprisonment reflected the seriousness of the offending and did not make a further totality adjustment.12 The Judge indicated that Mr Hewitson would be entitled to the maximum 25 per cent reduction if he pleaded guilty.13
[5] At sentencing, the Judge allowed further reductions. The Judge described Mr Hewitson as introverted, isolated and experiencing low mood when he began selling drugs to finance his own habit. Mr Hewitson had engaged in rehabilitative programmes and counselling, intended to engage with Narcotics Anonymous, had undertaken voluntary community service, and was studying towards personal trainer qualifications. He had a supportive and generally positive upbringing, although did remember frequent arguments between his parents ultimately leading to their separation.14
[6] The Judge allowed a 20 per cent reduction for youth and good character, as Mr Hewitson was aged 18 and 19 and had no previous convictions at the time of the offending. The Judge was not prepared to allow a further reduction for good character, noting that Mr Hewitson had received a discharge without conviction in respect of driving-related offending in January 2024.15
[7] The Judge imposed a five per cent reduction for Mr Hewitson’s remorse and offer to make amends, including his voluntary community work. For his prospects of successful rehabilitation, including undertaking alcohol and drug counselling, the Judge gave a further credit of five per cent.16
[8] In respect of Mr Hewitson’s personal background, the Judge observed that he did not experience any abuse and had many advantages, but accepted that the separation of his parents had some impact. The Judge also found that Mr Hewitson
11 At [52]–[53]; referring to R v Wallace [1999] 3 NZLR 159; and McCaslin-Whitehead v R, above n 10.
12 At [54].
13 At [58].
14 Decision under appeal, above n 1, at [30]–[50].
15 At [58]–[60].
16 At [61]–[62].
turned to drugs as a coping mechanism for his being bullied and isolated within the school environment. The Judge therefore allowed a further 10 per cent reduction.17
[9] This meant the five and a half year starting point was reduced by 65 per cent for personal mitigating factors (25 per cent for the guilty plea and 40 per cent for the other features). This resulted in an end sentence of 23 months’ imprisonment.18
[10] Mr Hewitson sought a non-custodial sentence of community detention, community work and supervision.19 The Judge was “persuaded by a very fine margin that a sentence of home detention could meet the purposes of denunciation and deterrence which in my view are required given [Mr Hewitson’s] very serious offending as well as addressing [his] rehabilitation and reintegration.”20
[11] The Judge was not persuaded that 23 months’ imprisonment could be converted to a combination sentence of community detention, community work and supervision, noting that the maximum sentence of community detention is six months, which the Judge considered to be “clearly inadequate.” She held that home detention was the least restrictive sentence available. The Judge was also not persuaded to impose a less-restrictive sentence because it would exclude Mr Hewitson from the operation of the Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004, noting that the significant credit for his youth and rehabilitative potential had enabled imposition of a sentence of home detention rather than imprisonment.21
Approach on appeal
[12] Mr Hewitson must establish that there was an error in the sentence reached and that a different sentence should have been imposed.22 Sentencing “is not a science” and an “appellate court does not start afresh nor simply substitute its own opinion for that of the original sentencer”.23 The court will not generally intervene unless a
17 At [63]–[64].
18 At [67].
19 At [53].
20 At [69]–[71].
21 At [72]–[74].
22 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).
23 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [30] and [35].
sentence is manifestly excessive,24 and outside the range available to the sentencing judge.25 Whether a sentence is manifestly excessive is to be assessed in terms of the final sentence imposed, rather than the process by which it was reached.26
[13] As I have previously said, the “well-engrained”27 error principle recognises that reasonable minds can differ about where an appropriate sentence should sit within an available range.28 This reflects underlying purposes important to the effective administration of justice, including maintaining public confidence in the sentencing process and ensuring finality and predictability for defendants and victims.29
Appellant’s position
[14] As noted above, Mr Olsen, for Mr Hewitson, submits the Judge erred by imposing an end sentence of home detention rather than a combination sentence of community detention, community work and intensive supervision. He submits that such a sentence would have held Mr Hewitson to account, while providing for his rehabilitation and reintegration, and was the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances as required by s 8(1)(g) of the Sentencing Act 2002. In support of this argument, Mr Olsen says the starting point was at the upper end of the available range and that further reductions for personal mitigating factors ought to have been allowed.
Decision
[15] Despite Mr Olsen’s thorough and careful submissions, ultimately this appeal requires me to address a narrow issue, namely whether it was open to the Judge to conclude that a sentence of community detention would not inadequately meet the relevant purposes and principles of sentencing. The question is not whether another judge may have taken a different approach, but rather whether a sentence of home detention was outside the range of available sentencing options.
24 At [35].
25 At [36].
26 At [30]–[36].
27 Tutakangahau v R, above n 23, at [34]–[35].
28 Johnson v R [2023] NZHC 3748 at [6]; and M v R [2024] NZHC 3632 at [9].
29 Johnson v R, above n 28, at [6]; and M v R, above n 28, at [9].
[16] Although the starting point was not directly challenged, it was suggested that it was at the top of the available range. Given the lack of direct challenge, I do not intend to dwell on the point, but I am far from convinced that a sentence of five and a half years’ imprisonment was at the top of the available range given the scale of the offending. I note that in the District Court the Crown submitted that the overall starting point, adjusted for totality, should be eight years’ imprisonment.30
[17] In his oral submissions, Mr Olsen focused on two essential aspects of the sentence. First, he submitted that the Judge fundamentally erred in principle by failing to take into account Mr Hewitson’s youth and prospects of rehabilitation at each stage of the sentencing process. It was submitted that it is evident the Judge failed to do so by stating that the significant credit already given for these factors was a reason not to further reduce the sentence to community detention.31 He submitted that this error also meant that the least restrictive sentence appropriate in the circumstances was not imposed.32
[18] I do not read the Judge’s comments as suggesting that youth and prospects of rehabilitation were irrelevant to the consideration of a sentence of community detention. The Judge was instead saying that these factors were appropriately recognised by the reduction of the sentence from imprisonment to home detention (in addition of course to reduction of the starting point) and any further reduction would result in a clearly inadequate sentence. As already noted, the Judge said she was only persuaded by a very fine margin that a sentence of home detention could meet the purposes of denunciation and deterrence given the seriousness of the offending.33
[19] It is unsurprising in those circumstances that the Judge considered a further reduction of the sentence from 10 months’ home detention combined with 200 hours’ community work to a sentence of only six months’ community detention (in addition to intensive supervision and a possible increase to the hours of community work)
30 The Crown submitted that the starting point for the ketamine offending alone could have been in the region of five and a half years, the starting point for the MDMA on its own could have been in the region of five years imprisonment, and the LSD offending on its own could have attracted a starting point in the region of five and a half years’ imprisonment.
31 At [74].
32 Sentencing Act 2000, s 8(1(g).
33 Decision under appeal, above n 1, at [71].
would not meet the purposes and principles of sentencing. Mr Olsen has understandably focused his submissions on the principle that the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances must be imposed, as well as the sentencing purpose of assisting Mr Hewitson’s rehabilitation and reintegration.34 But the Judge was also required to take into account the other purposes and principles of sentencing including the gravity of the offending,35 accountability, denunciation and deterrence.36
[20] I find little assistance in the cases relied on by Mr Olsen. I accept that in cases where home detention or community detention would be within the available range of sentencing responses, the imposition of the maximum period of community detention combined with an increased amount of community work may be more appropriate to allow an offender to continue in employment or access better support in the community.37 Two of the three cases relied on by Mr Olsen were sentences imposed in the High Court where the choice between home detention and community detention was being considered at first instance rather than on appeal.38 The Court is conducting a very different assessment on appeal, focused on whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. As noted above, there are underlying policy reasons for this approach important to the effective administration of justice. It is also notable that the cases relied on did not involve offending as serious as Mr Hewitson’s (they attracted substantially lower starting points).39
[21] The remaining issue is whether the overall reduction of 40 per cent for personal mitigating factors (excluding the guilty plea) was manifestly inadequate.
[22] The Court of Appeal has cautioned that where reductions for personal mitigation overlap, care needs to be taken that the purposes of sentencing are not distorted by adopting a series of separate reductions and simply tallying them up.40
34 Sentencing Act 2002, ss 7(1)(h) and 8(1)(g).
35 Section 8(1)(a).
36 Sections 7(1)(a), (e) and (f).
37 R v Radick HC Hamilton CRI-2007-075-295, 6 May 2008; R v Coombes [2013] NZHC 70; and
Teraki v R [2022] NZHC 2658.
38 Those cases were Radick and Coombes.
39 The starting points in Radick, Coombes and Teraki were two years, three years, and two years respectively.
40 McCaslin-Whitehead v R, above n 10, at [61]–[63]; and following Nguyen v R [2020] NZHC 910.
[23] The Court of Appeal has also said that, although there is no ceiling for reductions for background, addiction and rehabilitative efforts, orthodox reduction levels typically range between 15 and 20 per cent for this mix of factors.41 In the same case, the Court noted that the seriousness of the offending also constrains the available reduction, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Berkland v R.42
[24] I accept that Mr Hewitson can point to significant personal mitigating factors, including his youth (although there are more youthful offenders that come before the courts), the extensive efforts he has already made to rehabilitate, and his future prospects of successful rehabilitation. However, I consider the overall reduction of 40 per cent was, if anything, generous, especially as his stable and loving upbringing seems to have only been disturbed by the separation of his parents, an event that many people endure without committing serious drug dealing offending.
[25] I have not overlooked Mr Olsen’s submissions that although Mr Hewitson is not currently in work, his ability to do voluntary work and to potentially obtain paid employment will be increased if community detention is imposed. However, this was the position at first instance, and it is insufficient to persuade me that the sentence is manifestly excessive.
[26] It follows that I consider it was clearly open to the Judge to conclude that, despite Mr Hewitson’s youth and prospects of rehabilitation, home detention was the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances.
41 Hunter v R [2025] NZCA 499 at [21]; citing Poi v R [2020] NZCA 312 at [32]–[39]; and Holtz v R [2024] NZCA 585 at [38]–[44].
42 At [21]; Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509 at [111].
[27] I am therefore satisfied by a comfortable margin that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive, nor that there has been any error of principle that means a different sentence should be imposed.
[28]I dismiss the appeal.
La Hood J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Wellington for Respondent
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