Hatch v The Queen - [2016] NZCA 339

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA523/2015
[2016] NZCA 339

BETWEEN	COREY HATCH Appellant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Hearing:	31 May 2016
Court:	Ellen France P, Clifford and Katz JJ
Counsel:	D M Goodlet for Appellant J C Pike QC for Respondent
Judgment:	19 July 2016 at 3 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AAn extension of time to file the notice of appeal is granted.

B The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

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REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Clifford J)

Introduction

On 12 February 2015, after a jury trial in the District Court, the appellant Corey Hatch was found guilty by a majority verdict on charges of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and possession of a knife in a public place. Mr Hatch was sentenced on 4 May 2015 to eight years’ imprisonment, and ordered to serve a minimum period of imprisonment of four years.[1]
[1]R v Hatch [2015] NZDC 7789.
On 15 September 2015 Mr Hatch appealed his conviction.[2] He did so on the basis that his conviction represents a miscarriage of justice because one of the 11 jurors who supported the majority verdict was biased and predetermined.
[2]Mr Hatch also appealed his sentence. The sentence appeal will be heard separately if it is being pursued.
To pursue that ground of appeal, Mr Hatch would need to give evidence of the jury’s deliberations. The purpose of the hearing before us on 31 May 2016 was to determine, in terms of the agreed procedures in this area, whether Mr Hatch’s appeal met the threshold test that applies before such evidence may be given.
Mr Hatch needs an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. Mr Hatch explained the delay, the Crown did not object and we grant an extension accordingly.

Facts

On 26 May 2015 a member of the jury at Mr Hatch’s trial, Ms X, wrote a “to whom it may concern” letter. That letter was left by Ms X’s husband in Mr Hatch’s mother’s mailbox. In that letter Ms X expressed concerns about the fairness of the jury’s deliberations. She also said that, after the jury had given its verdict and had been discharged, another member of the jury (Mr Y) had told her that Mr Hatch had confessed to the offending in prison and, because of that, was not allowed to be in possession of knives. Mr Y knew that, Ms X wrote, because his wife — who was a warden at the local prison — had told him so. Ms X wrote “[w]hether what she [Mr Y’s wife] said was true or not is not up to me to decide but I feel this may have influenced the jury member’s decision.”
That letter was brought to Ms Goodlet’s attention. Very properly, Ms Goodlet approached the Crown. It was agreed that a private detective would obtain a signed statement from Ms X. This Court was advised accordingly in mid-December of 2015. Pursuant to directions from this Court, that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hatch v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Hatch v The Queen [2016] NZCA 339
Case: [2016] NZCA 339
Decision Date: 19 July 2016 at 3 pm

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hatch v The Queen involved the appellant, Hatch, who was convicted of various charges related to the importation and possession of prohibited drugs. Hatch sought to appeal his conviction on the basis of alleged misconduct by a juror during the trial. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining the admissibility of evidence related to the juror's conduct and whether it warranted a new trial. The primary legal issue was whether the evidence of the juror's misconduct should be admitted under the provisions of section 76 of the Evidence Act 2006, which prohibits the disclosure of jury deliberations. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the alleged misconduct by the juror, namely discussing the case with his wife, constituted a compelling reason to allow the evidence to be given as per section 76(3) of the Act.

The Court held that the alleged misconduct by the juror did not meet the threshold for admitting evidence of jury deliberations. It found that while the juror's conduct was inappropriate, it did not create a suspicion on reasonable grounds that it may have influenced the verdict. The Court reasoned that although the juror's actions were improper, there was no compelling evidence that the misconduct led to a miscarriage of justice. The Court also emphasised the importance of protecting the confidentiality of jury deliberations and the public interest in ensuring that justice is done. The Court concluded that the alleged misconduct, while serious, did not warrant the admission of evidence that would breach the confidentiality of the jury's deliberations.

Given the Court's findings, the appeal was dismissed. The Court maintained that the misconduct, while problematic, did not reach the exceptional circumstances required for admitting evidence of jury deliberations. The conviction and sentence of Hatch were upheld, and no new trial was ordered. The Court's decision underscored the high threshold for admitting such evidence and the need to balance the interests of justice with the protection of the jury process.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

That principle is now reflected in s 76 of the Evidence Act 2006:76Evidence of jury deliberations(1)A person must not give evidence about the deliberations of a jury.(2)Subsection (1) does not prevent the giving of evidence about matters that do not form part of the deliberations of a jury, including (without limitation)—(a)the competency or capacity of a juror; or (b)any conduct of, or knowledge gained by, a juror that is believed to disqualify that juror from holding that position.(3)Subsection (1) does not prevent a person from giving evidence about the deliberations of a jury if the Judge is satisfied that the particular circumstances are so exceptional that there is a sufficiently compelling reason to allow that evidence to be given.(4)In determining, under subsection (3), whether to allow evidence to be given in any proceedings, the Judge must weigh—(a)the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of jury deliberations generally;(b)the public interest in ensuring that justice is done in those proceedings. In light of that principle, the courts have long had, and now with reference to s 76 continue to have, a practice of not receiving such evidence without prior leave. The purpose of the requirement for leave is to allow the Court to assess whether there is a sufficient likelihood that the very rare circumstances in which such evidence may be received, as now provided in s 76(3), exist. This Court in R v Taka described that practice in the following terms:[4]When there is reasonable ground for contending that, despite the general rule, a disclosure of jury deliberations is admissible, the proper course is an agreed memorandum by prosecuting and defending counsel or, failing that, an application to this Court for directions. Members of the jury should not be approached by counsel without the leave of the Court or the agreement of the Crown. Examples of the agreed memorandum procedure are the cases of R v Norton-Bennett [1990] 1 NZLR 559 (CA) and R v Bates [1985] 1 NZLR 326 (CA) and R v Gillespie CA277/88, 7 February 1989.[4]R v Taka (1991) 7 CRNZ 544 (CA) at 546. In that sense, a threshold test exists as regards the admissibility of such evidence. The second factor is that not every instance of juror misconduct will give rise to miscarriage of justice. In R v Bates a threshold test was articulated: namely there must be a suspicion on reasonable grounds, that is on an objective view, that the misconduct may have influenced the verdict.[5] The Court went on to find in Bates that, where that threshold test would have been met if some incident affecting a juror stood without explanation, the Court, where fully apprised of the circumstances, might nevertheless conclude that no miscarriage of justice had occurred.[6] [5]R v Bates [1985] 1 NZLR 326 (CA) at 328.[6]At 329. Here Ms X’s concerns based on perceptions of unfairness in the jury’s deliberations were raised at the same time as concerns with a juror’s misconduct. Evidence of the first type of concerns necessarily engages the prohibition now expressed in s 76. As s 76(2) reflects, however, evidence of concerns of the second type do not necessarily do so. It is now clear that Mr Hatch would not seek to adduce evidence from Ms X as to the jury’s deliberations. Rather, that evidence would be limited to the question of Mr Y’s misconduct as a juror, as reflected in the allegation that he had discussed the case with his wife and may have been biased or predetermined.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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