Harrison v Harrison
[2020] NZHC 3066
•19 November 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2019-404-2078
CIV-2019-404-2566 [2020] NZHC 3066
IN THE MATTER Of the Valerie Geard Trust BETWEEN
PAULINE JANICE HARRISON
Plaintiff
AND
ADRIENNE HARRISON and GRAEME
ROSS HARRISON as trustees of the Valerie Geard Trust
Defendants
Hearing: 30 July 2020 Appearances:
A J Harrison as litigation guardian for the plaintiff in both proceedings
P M Webb for the first defendants in CIV-2019-404-2566 and defendants in CIV-2019-404-2078
M Carlson for the second defendant in 2566 The third defendant in 2566 in person
R A Rose for the fourth defendant in 2566
S C P Gollin and H M Jacques for the fifth defendants in 2566Judgment:
19 November 2020
JUDGMENT OF POWELL J
This judgment was delivered by me on 19 November 2020 at 4 pm pursuant to R 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
HARRISON v HARRISON [2020] NZHC 3066 [19 November 2020].
CIV-2019-404-2566
BETWEEN PAULINE JANICE HARRISON
Plaintiff
ANDADRIENNE HARRISON and GRAEME ROSS HARRISON as
trustees of the Valerie Geard Trust
AND NICHOLAS HAMILTON BIRDSEY
Second Defendant
RAYMOND OWEN PARMENTER
Third Defendant
CHILDFUND NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Fourth Defendant
ASB BANK LIMITED
Fifth Defendant
[1] This judgment deals with a number of interlocutory applications in relation to two proceedings brought by the plaintiff, Pauline Harrison:
(a) CIV-2019-404-2078 (“the 2078 proceedings”); and
(b) CIV-2019-404-002566 (“the 2566 proceedings”).
[2] In the 2078 proceedings Ms Harrison seeks a range of relief against Adrienne Harrison and Graeme Ross Harrison as trustees of the Valerie Geard Trust (“the trustees”). The trustees are also the first defendants in the 2566 proceedings. The other defendants in the 2566 proceedings are:
(a)Nicholas Birdsey (the second defendant) a conveyancing solicitor who has acted for the trustees;
(b)Raymond Parmenter (the third defendant), a barrister who previously acted for the trustees in respect of a number of proceedings brought by Ms Harrison;
(c)ChildFund NZ Ltd (“ChildFund”)(the fourth defendant), a discretionary beneficiary of the Valerie Geard Trust; and
(d)the ASB Bank (“ASB”) (the fifth defendant).
[3] In the 2078 proceedings Ms Harrison contends that the Valerie Geard Trust was wound up by operation of law on or about 14 December 2009 and at that point the Trust assets automatically vested in the final beneficiaries, including Ms Harrison, in equal shares as tenants in common. Ms Harrison claims that the trustees have fraudulently breached the terms of the Valerie Geard Trust trust deed and therefore seeks a “full and complete trust accounting with supporting evidence”, “compensatory restitution by [the trustees] in their personal capacity to restore the plaintiffs equal share of beneficial entitlement lost by their breaches of trusts” and “compensatory monetary damages to the sum of $100,000 for severe punitive detriment”.
[4] In contrast, in the 2566 proceedings Ms Harrison alleges that each of the defendants has acted “in wilful reckless defiance” of a November 2015 judgment issued by Faire J on an application by the trustees seeking approval to vest the assets of the Valerie Geard Trust in a new trust, the Valerie Geard Waiheke Trust (“the 1442 proceedings”).1 As a result, Ms Harrison seeks a fine of $25,000 for contempt of Court against the trustees, Mr Birdsey, Mr Parmenter and ChildFund, as well as a “term of imprisonment for contempt of court proportionate to contempt of Court”. With regard to the ASB, it is not only alleged that the Bank has acted in “wilful and reckless defiance” of the judgment, but that it has also “breached the bank’s statutory obligations imposed by ss 22 and 23 of [the] Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 … imposing on the bank enhanced customer due diligence relating to trusts” for which Ms Harrison seeks compensatory damages.
[5] Finally, in the 2566 proceedings, Ms Harrison asserts that the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the sum of $100,000 for “their dehumanising disrespect and abuse of the truth and the plaintiff’s legal, constitutional and beneficial rights and unlawful treatment of the plaintiff’s rights and interests as free for all in violation of the rule of law”.
[6] Against that background, the following applications stand to be considered in this judgment:
(a)The Trustees have applied for:
(i)the dismissal of the 2078 proceedings; and
(ii)security for costs against Ms Harrison on the 2566 proceedings; and/or
(iii)an order preventing Ms Harrison commencing or continuing civil proceedings pursuant to s 166 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 (“the trustees’ s 166 application”).
1 Harrison v Harrison [2015] NZHC 2935.
(b)Mr Birdsey, Mr Parmenter and ChildFund have each applied for security for costs against Ms Harrison in respect of the 2566 proceedings and have indicated their support for the trustees’ s 166 application.
(c)The ASB has applied to strike out Ms Harrison’s claims against the Bank in the 2566 proceedings or alternatively seeks summary judgment. If these are unsuccessful then the Bank too seeks security for costs and also supports the trustees’ s 166 application.
[7] Unsurprisingly Ms Harrison opposes the applications. In broad terms Ms Harrison argues that the applications are merely an attempt to obstruct, pervert, prevent or otherwise defeat the course of justice.
Discussion
[8] The various applications are made in the context of some thirteen years of litigation. The background to this history is as set out succinctly in the judgment of Toogood J in yet another earlier set of proceedings2 brought by Ms Harrison against the trustees:3
On 18 October 2005, a terminally ill Valerie Margaret Geard settled a family trust (“the Valerie Geard Trust” or “the Trust”) appointing the first defendant (her brother Graeme Harrison) and the second defendant (her sister-in-law Adrienne Harrison) as trustees. The final beneficiaries of the Trust were Mrs Geard’s siblings who then comprised Graeme Harrison, Brian Harrison, Malcolm Harrison and the second plaintiff Pauline Harrison. The discretionary beneficiaries included Mrs Geard, her husband David, the final beneficiaries, and Child Fund New Zealand Limited.
At the time of the settlement of the Trust, Mrs Geard signed a memorandum which included an indication that she wished her brother Malcolm to be the primary beneficiary of the Trust. The memorandum included also a wish that her husband should be able to continue to reside in the home he shared with Mrs Geard for a sufficient period of time to ensure an orderly transition to an alternative property following Mrs Geard’s death. The memorandum also expressed wishes as to how the Trust funds should be applied on the death of Mrs Geard’s brother, Malcolm Harrison.
Mrs Geard also executed a Will on 18 October 2005, appointing Graeme and Adrienne Harrison to be the executors and trustees of the Will, making specific
2 CIV-2012-404-993 (“the 993 proceedings”).
3 The Valerie Geard Family Trust v Harrison [2013] NZHC 385 at [1]-[4].
bequests in favour of her husband and her sister Pauline, and bequeathing the residue of her estate to the trustees of the Valerie Geard Trust.
Mrs Geard died on 3 March 2006. Malcolm Harrison, the intended primary beneficiary of the Trust, died on 2 November 2007.
[9] Since Mrs Geard’s death Ms Harrison, through a range of proceedings, has consistently expressed a range of concerns with the administration of the Valerie Geard Trust by the trustees. In response, the Courts, through the numerous judgments that have now been issued, have been equally consistent. As Faire J noted in his judgment on the 1442 proceedings, while the trustees could not vest the assets of the Valerie Geard Trust in the Valerie Geard Waiheke Trust, his Honour confirmed that this did not mean that the Valerie Geard Trust was wound up and its assets distributed to the final beneficiaries. Instead, as Faire J noted:4
The only practical consequence of my finding that the resettlement is invalid is that the property at 19 Causeway Road, Waiheke will go back to being held by the Valerie Geard Trust, of which the plaintiffs are still trustees.
[10] Given this conclusion it is difficult to see on what basis Ms Harrison can continue to assert, including in the present proceedings, that the judgment of Faire J had the effect of winding up the Valerie Geard Trust. The point was made even more explicitly by Brewer J in his judgment on proceedings brought by the trustees for directions pursuant to s 66 of the Trustees Act 19565 in which he noted:6
A chief concern of Ms Pauline Harrison is the creation of a related trust, the Valerie Geard Waiheke Trust (“the Waiheke Trust”). She thinks this was a fraudulent act designed to steal money from the Trust. She also contends that the transfer of funds to the Waiheke Trust in effect wound up the Trust and so its assets should have been distributed. She further points to the Trust’s ASB investment account being still in the name of the Waiheke Trust as proof that Mr and Mrs Harrison are fraudulently operating an “illegal trust” to the detriment of herself and the other beneficiaries of the Trust.
There is nothing in any of these allegations.
4 Harrison v Harrison, above n 1, at [83].
5 CIV-2018-404-002681 (“the 2681 proceedings”).
6 Harrison v Harrison [2019] NZHC 3474 at [46].
[11] After reviewing the background to the purported creation of the Valerie Geard Waiheke Trust and the judgment of Faire J,7 Brewer J observed:8
The [Valerie Geard] Trust did not cease to exist. All that happened was that Mr and Mrs Harrison as trustees of the Trust purported to resettle the principal asset of the Trust (the Waiheke property) on the [Valerie Geard] Waiheke Trust. Justice Faire held that the resettlement was ineffective. The Waiheke property remained an asset of the Trust. Mr and Mrs Harrison have treated it as such.
[12] Justice Brewer also addressed the other propositions which underpin the present proceedings in separate proceedings before his Honour (“the 320 proceedings”).9 In those proceedings Ms Harrison purported to challenge the orders made by Toogood J in the 993 proceedings. Specifically, in the 320 proceedings Ms Harrison alleged that the trustees had “breached their obligations as trustees by keeping and using the trust property for their own benefit to the exclusion of [Ms Harrison] and her brother, Brian Harrison”.10 These were substantially the same concerns that had underpinned the 993 proceedings in which Toogood J had ordered Ms Harrison to pay security for costs in the sum of $25,000.11 As the total security ordered by Toogood J was never paid by Ms Harrison, the result was the 993 proceedings were stayed and subsequently struck out four years later for want of prosecution.12 Given this position, Brewer J concluded Ms Harrison’s 320 proceedings were a belated attempt to rely upon r 7.51 of the High Court Rules 2016 in order to argue that the order for security for costs had been obtained fraudulently. Dismissing the 320 proceedings, Brewer J noted:13
To succeed, Ms Pauline Harrison had to prove that Mr and Mrs Harrison acted fraudulently.14 That is to say, that they intentionally misused the Court processes to obtain the costs and security for costs orders made by Toogood J. The courts will generally do what they can to compensate for the fact that a plaintiff is a lay litigant when reading and interpreting their claims. However, where any plaintiff alleges fraud, particularly as grounds for revisiting court orders, they must show a prima facie case for credible grounds to make out
7 Harrison v Harrison, above n 1, at [48]-[52].
8 Harrison v Harrison, above n 6, at [53].
9 CIV-2018-404-000320.
10 Harrison v Harrison, above n 6, at [4].
11 The Valerie Geard Family Trust v Harrison, above n 3, at [36].
12 Harrison v Harrison [2017] NZHC 598.
13 Harrison v Harrison, above n 6, at [31] – [34].
14 See Elvidge v ASB Bank Ltd [2015] NZHC 44 at [134]; Yang v Ko HC Auckland CIV-2005-404- 4583, 31 July 2007 at [24]; and Spence v Lynch [2015] NZHC 609 at [2].
fraud, with a higher obligation to particularise their claims than generally applies.15
Ms Pauline Harrison made many allegations. I will not summarise them. I have, for this purpose, had regard to her affidavits of 21 June 2018 and 7 June 2019 as her evidence. I have also had regard to the evidence of Mrs Adrienne Harrison.
Ms Pauline Harrison’s case is that because Mr and Mrs Harrison acted fraudulently as trustees their fraud carried over in the matters before Toogood J and so they deceived the Judge and duped him into making his orders.
I find the premise is wrong. I will discuss Mrs Adrienne Harrison’s evidence when I determine the 2681 proceeding. But I accept it. I find there was no fraud by Mr and Mrs Harrison in the exercise of their duties as trustees of the Trust. They acted properly and carefully and in conditions of great difficulty owing to Ms Pauline Harrison’s hostility.
(citations included)
[13] These earlier decisions make it clear that the present 2078 proceedings brought by Ms Harrison against the trustees are based squarely on assertions by Ms Harrison on which this Court has already ruled definitively, namely:
(a)the Valerie Geard trust was wound up by operation of law on or about 14 December 2009;
(b)the assets of the Valerie Geard Trust were therefore automatically vested in the final beneficiaries including Ms Harrison; and
(c)the trustees have otherwise breached their obligations with regard to the running of the Valerie Geard Trust.
[14] Given this position, it is clear that the 2078 proceedings cannot possibly succeed, are an abuse of process, and must be struck out.16
15 See Iles v Z [2019] NZHC 1396 at [30]; citing Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Redcliffe Forestry Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 94; [2013] 1 NZLR 804 at [32]–[33].
16 An abuse of process includes attempts to relitigate matters already determined e.g. Hunter v Chief
Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 (HC) at 541; Collier v Butterworths of New Zealand Ltd [1997] 11 PRNZ 581 (HC) at (586).
[15] While similar propositions are littered through the 2566 statement of claim in support of Ms Harrison’s contention the trustees, Mr Birdsey, Mr Parmenter and ChildFund have all breached the judgment of Faire J, these defendants do not seek orders striking out this claim, with each conceding that it is at least arguable, albeit manifestly weak. Instead, as noted, these defendants, along with the ASB, seek security for costs on the 2566 proceeding and there can be no doubt that such orders are entirely warranted. Ms Harrison’s bankruptcy, and that of her daughter (and litigation guardian for the purposes of this application) are matters of record, as are the difficulties of litigating against Ms Harrison, in both time and money. This means that a significant amount of security is warranted to appropriately protect the position of each of the defendants in this case.17 Having considered the position, I am satisfied that security for costs in the 2566 proceedings is as necessary now as when Toogood J concluded it was in respect of the 993 proceedings, noting that in the meantime Ms Harrison has chosen to substantially expand the circle of defendants despite her claims being noticeably weaker, given the judgments issued to date.
[16] I therefore conclude that in respect of the security for costs applications brought by the trustees, Mr Birdsey, Mr Parmenter and ChildFund, Ms Harrison must pay $20,000 security each, a total of $80,000. The timing of that payment is addressed later in this judgment.
[17] I do not make an order for security in favour of the ASB. That is because I am satisfied that Ms Harrison’s claims against the Bank are completely untenable and must be struck out. As Mr Gollin has noted on behalf of the ASB, the primary allegation against the Bank, that it has breached the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009, (“AML Act”), is fundamentally misconceived. Ms Harrison simply does not have standing to bring a claim that the Bank breached the AML Act for the simple reason that only the Crown is able to bring such proceedings.18
17 It is noted for example that following the striking out of the 993 proceedings the trustees were awarded scale costs in the sum of $21,324.68 for interlocutory steps other than the applications dealt with by Toogood J through to the striking out of the proceeding. See Harrison v Harrison [2017] NZHC 1498.
18 See Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 ss 79 and 90.
[18] I am likewise satisfied that the remaining allegations against the ASB cannot succeed. First, Mr Harrison’s assertion that the Bank has in some way “facilitated” the trustees’ breach of trust or contempt of Court by allowing them to continue to operate a bank account in the name of the Waiheke Trust cannot succeed given the findings of Faire J and Brewer J detailed above.19 Secondly, the final claim against the Bank that it, along with the other defendants, has had “reckless disregard for the truth and the plaintiff’s rights” is, as Mr Gollin has submitted, not a recognised legal claim against ASB, nor does it in fact identify any particular wrongdoing on the part of the ASB.
[19]As a result, the causes of action against the ASB are struck out.
[20] The final application to be addressed is the trustees’ s 166 application, which, as noted, is supported by the other defendants in the 2566 proceedings. Under s 166 of the Senior Courts Act, this Court may make an order restricting a person from commencing or continuing a civil proceeding.
[21] In this case the trustees seek an extended order against Ms Harrison. This is an order restraining a party from commencing or continuing civil proceedings on a particular or related matter in a senior court, another court, or a Tribunal.20
[22] An extended order is distinguished from a limited order, which only applies to a particular proceeding,21 and from a general order, which applies to any civil proceeding, but which can only be applied for by the Attorney-General.22
[23] Section 167 of the Senior Courts Act sets out when a Judge may make an extended order under s 166. Of particular relevance the section provides:
(2)A Judge may make an extended order under section 166 if, in at least 2 proceedings about any matter in any court or tribunal, the Judge considers that the proceedings are or were totally without merit.
…
19 At [9] – [12] above.
20 Senior Courts Act 2016, s 166(4).
21 Section 166(3).
22 Section 169(2).
(5) The proceedings concerned must be proceedings commenced or continued by the party to be restrained, whether against the same person or different persons.
[24] The authorities are clear this Court should be slow to make a restraint order as it amounts to a breach of a person’s right of access to justice.23 At the same time however the Court is required to be conscious of “the worry and expense that the opponents of meritless litigation face, and the barely sufficient resources of the judicial system to afford justice without unreasonable delay to those who have genuine grievances”.24 As a result, a Court should exercise its discretion to make an order in appropriate cases.25
[25] In determining whether proceedings brought by Ms Harrison were without merit, it is noted that what is in fact a “proceeding” is not defined in the Senior Courts Act. However:
(a)Under the High Court Rules a proceeding is defined as “any application to the Court for the exercise of the civil jurisdiction of the Court other than an interlocutory application”.26
(b)As provided in s 167(6), for the purposes of making a s 166 order, an appeal in a civil proceeding must be treated as part of the proceeding and not as a distinct proceeding.
(c)In determining whether proceedings are or were totally without merit, the Court may take into account the nature of any interlocutory applications, appeals, or criminal prosecutions involving the party to be restrained, but is not limited to those considerations.27
[26] The term “totally without merit” is also not defined in the Senior Courts Act. In Genge v Visiting Justice Christchurch Men’s Prison, Nation J referred to the factors
23 Genge v Visiting Justice Christchurch Men’s Prison [2018] NZHC 1457 at [30]; and
Attorney-General v Siemer [2014] NZHC 859 at [50]–[52].
24 Auckland Council v Mawhinney [2019] NZHC 299 at [55].
25 Attorney-General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859 (CA) at 865.
26 High Court Rules 2016, r 1.3 at “proceeding”.
27 Section 167(4).
identified by the Ministry of Justice in its report on the Judicature Modernisation Bill as being relevant to determining whether a proceeding is totally without merit:28
(a)the proceeding has no prospect for success, whatsoever;
(b)the proceeding exposes the defendants to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to the gain a plaintiff is likely to receive;
(c)the proceeding is brought at the drop of a hat despite the lack of merit;
(d)the litigant has paid no regard to the merits, proportionality or costs of the proceeding;
(e)the statement of claim or defence discloses no reasonable grounds of bringing or defending the claim;
(f)the statement of claim is an abuse of the Court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceeding; and
(g)the litigant has failed to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.
[27] Some of these factors are obviously more relevant than others with respect to the proceedings brought by Ms Harrison.
[28] Under s 88B of the Judicature Act 1908, the predecessor to s 166, the proceedings complained of were required to be vexatious. While no longer an explicit requirement, the test for vexatiousness is still relevant as to whether an order is necessary. A Full Bench of this Court in Attorney-General v Heenan identified features that will indicate a claim is vexatious:29
28 Genge v Visiting Justice Christchurch Men’s Prison, above n 22, at [29]; see further Judicature Modernisation Bill: Report of the Ministry of Justice to the Justice and Electoral Committee (Ministry of Justice, Departmental Report CRT-09-04-07, April 2014) at [292]–[293].
29 Attorney-General v Heenan [2009] NZAR 763 (HC) at [138]; upheld on appeal in Heenan v Attorney-General [2011] NZCA 9, [2011] NZAR 200.
(a)a pattern of complex, prolix, and sometimes incomprehensible pleadings;
(b)the proceedings showing the respondent to be an almost compulsive litigant against a widening circle of defendants;
(c)extravagant claims or scandalous allegations which the litigant has no prospect of substantiating or justifying;
(d)the frequency with which part or all of the respondent’s statements of claim have been struck out; and
(e)the extent to which the respondent allows their proceedings to lie dormant.
[29] A proceeding may be vexatious even if it contains the germ of a legitimate grievance, or may disclose a cause of action or a ground for institution. The conduct and outcome of such a proceeding when viewed in the overall light of the institution, conduct, and outcome of other proceedings may well demonstrate its own particular vexatiousness and unreasonableness.30 I consider these statements are equally applicable to whether a proceeding is “totally without merit” under s 166.
[30] Applying these various criteria to the present case it is clear there are at least four proceedings brought by Ms Harrison to date which are completely without merit. In particular:
(a)The 6634 proceedings. Proceedings commenced by Ms Harrison against the Auckland District Health Board31 with regard to the care provided to Malcolm Harrison, the intended primary beneficiary of the Valerie Geard Trust. The 6634 proceedings were struck out by Associate Judge Abbott for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of
30 Attorney-General v Hill (1993) 7 PRNZ 20 (HC) at 23.
31 CIV-2011-404-006634.
action against any defendant, that it was vexatious and an abuse of process.32
(b)The 993 proceedings. Proceedings against the trustees which were initially stayed for failure to pay the security for costs ordered by Toogood J, and were subsequently struck out for want of prosecution.33
(c)The 320 proceedings. Proceedings against the trustees which were determined by Brewer J to be a retrospective attempt to revisit the award of security for costs on the 993 proceedings notwithstanding those proceedings had been struck out.34
(d)The 2078 proceedings. Proceedings against the trustees which attempted to revisit earlier findings of this Court and, in particular, the 1442 and 320 proceedings and which were struck out earlier in this judgment for the reasons set out.35
[31] Having reached the conclusion that the prerequisite for the exercise of my discretion under s 166(2) has been met, I am in no doubt that it is appropriate to make an order pursuant to s 166 preventing Ms Harrison from commencing or taking legal proceedings for a full five years. In reaching this conclusion I take into account not only the four proceedings set out above, but the findings of Harrison J in the 2003 proceedings,36 Ms Harrison’s conduct on the 2681 proceedings brought by the trustees, the position taken by Ms Harrison across numerous interlocutory applications and appeals to both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, as well as the clear lack of any substantive merit in the 2566 proceedings. As the defendants have all submitted, Ms Harrison has, on an ongoing basis, refused to acknowledge the authority of any court and the judgments that have been issued to date, and instead, assisted by her daughter, Ms A J Harrison, continues to assert interpretations of those judgments
32 Harrison v Auckland District Health Board [2012] NZHC 2693 at [133].
33 Harrison v Harrison, above n 12, and Minute of Wylie J dated 23 May 2017.
34 Harrison v Harrison, above n 6.
35 At [14] above.
36 Acknowledging that Harrison J mistakenly believed Ms Harrison was not a beneficiary of the Valerie Geard Trust. See Harrison v Harrison as executors and trustees in the estate of Valerie Margaret Geard HC Auckland, CIV 2006-404-2003, 6 August 2008.
which are simply not available to her. The inevitable result is unless an order pursuant to s 166(2) is made the defendants and in particular the trustees will continue to be remorselessly hounded by Ms Harrison for no useful purpose whatsoever. An order pursuant to s 166(2) of the Senior Courts Act is therefore made in the terms proposed by the trustees, and incorporating the suggestions made on behalf of Mr Birdsey.
Decision
[32]For the reasons set out above:
(a)The 2078 proceedings are struck out.
(b)The claims against the ASB Bank Limited in the 2566 proceedings are struck out.
(c)An extended order pursuant to s 166(2) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 is made preventing Pauline Janice Harrison from commencing or continuing civil proceedings on any matter the subject of the proceeding in CIV-2019-404-2566 or otherwise relating to or involving the Valerie Geard Trust, the Valerie Geard Waiheke Trust, or the applicants in either the capacity as trustees of those trusts or their personal capacity in a senior court, another court, or a tribunal.
(d)Ms Harrison is ordered to pay security for costs in the 2566 proceeding in respect of each of the first, second, third and fourth defendants in the sum of $20,000 for each defendant, a total of $80,000.00, with the security to be paid within 28 days of the expiry of the order made pursuant to s 166(2) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 detailed above.
[33] The defendants are entitled to costs on their respective applications. Memoranda on behalf of the defendants are to be filed within 15 working days of this judgment following which Ms Harrison will have 15 working days to respond. I will then determine costs on the papers.
Powell J
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